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This dissertation explores how organizations attempt to construct their ontology and 
legitimacy through external messages, known as institutional positioning.  Constructing 
an image of legitimacy is particularly important, yet complicated, for groups thought to 
be illegitimate, such as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)—an organization 
that is emerging as a de facto nation state.  Analysis of Dabiq, ISIL’s recruitment and 
propaganda magazine series, revealed ISIL’s institutional positioning conformed to a 
communication pattern I define as a transactional organizational identity 
narrative.  This pattern is comprised of a set of legitimacy appeals that, together, 
socially construct the unfolding of a collective’s defining characteristics across time, 
and anticipate and refute other collectives’ delegitimation attempts.  Across the pages of 
the magazines, the transactional organizational identity narrative consisted of three 
broad categories of institutional appeals: material, religious, and confrontational.  
Implications for communication constitutes organizing (CCO) theory and the social 
construction of organizations are included. 





Chapter 1: Introduction 
On February 18th, 2015, President Obama declared, “al Qaeda and ISIL and 
groups like it are desperate for legitimacy. [...] That’s why ISIL [Islamic State of Iraq 
and the Levant] presumes to declare itself the ‘Islamic State’” (Office of the Press 
Secretary, 18 February 2015, n.p.; emphasis added).  Legitimacy and, more importantly, 
perceptions of legitimacy, are entirely powerful in not only the formation and 
maintenance of organizations, but also in their dissolution and destruction.  The more 
legitimate an organization is perceived to be, the more powerful its status becomes 
within its institutional field (Parsons, 1951).  Bitektine (2011) explains issues 
surrounding the symbolic construction of organizational legitimacy, reputation, and 
status are key to understanding organizational theory and the constitution of 
organizations. 
To be considered a substantial threat on an international stage, terrorist 
organizations such as al Qaeda and ISIL must construct perceptions of legitimacy if 
they are to be taken seriously by enemies, allies, members, and potential recruits.  
Therefore, attempts at legitimation are likely at the forefront of ISIL’s organizational 
agenda.  So, how does an organization create perceptions of legitimacy?  Organizations 
model themselves after similar organizations that are perceived to be more legitimate or 
successful (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).  According to a report published by the 
Institute for the Study of War in August of 2014, ISIL has attempted to do just that.  
Caris and Reynolds (2014) posit, “through the integration of military and political 
campaigns […] [ISIL] has built a holistic system of governance that includes religious, 




(p. 4).  As will be discussed throughout this dissertation, ISIL’s access to resources and 
infrastructure mimic what many in the West consider to be modernized nation-states.  
According to ISIL and its enemies, ISIL is now more than just a terrorist organization; it 
is an organization emerging as a de facto nation-state.  To justify that claim, the 
Institute’s report highlights how ISIL built administrative offices responsible for 
managing religious outreach and religious reinforcement, created courts and systems for 
punishment, and established educational programming and networks of public relations 
(Caris & Reynolds, 2014).  ISIL constructed offices that manage humanitarian aid, 
opened bakeries and grocers, and has accessed and gained control of key sites of 
infrastructure, including water and electricity.  Additionally, ISIL has attempted to 
manage large-scale industrial facilities, such as dams, thermal power plants, sewers, and 
electrical power lines (Caris & Reynolds, 2014).   
Although achieving organizational legitimacy is largely a symbolic undertaking, 
access to and establishment of material resources, such as those mentioned above, are 
vital to the ongoing process of an organization’s institutional positioning.  Achieving 
legitimacy is no easy task, especially for terrorist organizations, such as ISIL.  This 
process is particularly challenging when legitimation attempts are thwarted, both 
explicitly and consistently, by superpowers that exist outside of the organization—as 
illustrated by the opening quote offered by President Obama.  Therefore, this 
dissertation investigates the means by which ISIL attempts to position itself as 
legitimate in a context of nations that seek consistently to “degrade and ultimately 
destroy” it (Office of the Press Secretary, 10 September 2014, n.p.).  Through a 




this dissertation examines the transactional, discursive construction of ISIL’s 
organizational constitution as well as the socio-material configurations that play a role 
in establishing its credibility, and thus, its legitimacy.  
Preview and Rationale 
In this dissertation, I define ISILi as an organization, which is emerging as a de 
facto nation-state.  The third chapter of this dissertation explains this conceptualization 
of ISIL in more detail.  ISIL is now a multi-faceted, massive organizational entity 
“desperate for legitimacy” (Office of the Press Secretary, 18 February 2015, n.p.).  As 
the previous discussion illuminates, ISIL’s access to material resources position it as 
emerging as more than a loosely-connected terrorist network or organization.  
Employing Lammers and Barbour’s (2006) definition of “institution,” ISIL may be 
regarded as a “[communicatively constituted] constellation of established practices, 
guided by formalized, rational beliefs that transcend particular organizations and 
situations” (p. 364).  Again, the organization’s self-conceptualization as a supra-
organizational nation state (i.e., an institution) will be further described in Chapter 3.   
The focus of this dissertation is on the attempted social construction of 
institutional legitimacy.  Specifically, I am interested in the constitution of ISIL’s 
legitimacy through the organizational communication process of institutional 
positioning.  Institutional positioning is a “communication flow” (McPhee & Zaug, 
2000) that is supra-organizational or inter-organizational, but has organization-
constituting features.  Institutional positioning messages, thus, are known to help 
constitute organizations ontologically (McPhee & Zaug, 2000).  Here, ontology is used 




resides within the confluence of communication processes.  In other words, in the spirit 
of CCO theory, these messages construct and help maintain an organization’s identity 
and “place” in inter-organizational settings or larger social systems (McPhee & Zaug, 
2000, para. 37).  Institutional positioning is, thus, crucial in the symbolic constitution of 
organizations and institutions.  However, institutional positioning tends to assume a 
sender-oriented perspective of organizing and communicating.  Emphasis has 
traditionally been placed on the messages an organization sends to the outside 
environment, or external stakeholders essential in evaluating an organization’s identity 
and legitimacy.  Yet as observed in the present case of ISIL, it is important to 
understand institutional positioning as a reflexive process because doing so emphasizes 
both the transactional and socially-constructed nature of organizational identity and 
positioning in an organizational field (i.e., the communicative activities occurring 
within and between ISIL and the West).  The study of ISIL directs our attention to the 
idea that institutional positioning need not be regarded merely as an outward, message-
sender-to-audience process.  There is always the possibility for messages to be created 
and perpetuated from outside the organization, which challenge an organization’s 
institutional positioning and thus its legitimacy.  And, as aforementioned, material 
resources will also play into the types of positioning messages that organizations have 
access to sending on their own behalf.   
ISIL is unlike terrorist organizations of the past—it has land, thousands of 
members, money, and infrastructure.  As Davidson and Brooking, writing for the 
Council on Foreign Relations note, “[ISIL] now controls a volume of resources and 




added).  For example, Cronin (2015) explains exactly how much territory and resources 
ISIL has at its disposal, citing, “beginning in 2012, [ISIL] gradually took over key oil 
assets in eastern Syria; it now controls an estimated 60 percent of the country's oil 
production capacity.  Meanwhile, during its push into Iraq last summer, [ISIL] also 
seized seven oil-producing operations in that country” (n.p.).  Put succinctly, Cronin 
argues, “Holding territory has allowed the group to build a self-sustaining financial 
model unthinkable for most terrorist groups” (n.p.; emphasis added).  While other 
terrorist organizations, such as Hezbollah for example, might have access to significant 
material resources, the scope of ISIL’s material gains is unprecedented.  Thus, access to 
and control over such material assets make ISIL different from other terrorist 
organizations that the United States (US) has dealt with in the past, and undoubtedly 
plays a role in the types of messaging it can persuasively produce and perpetuate.  In 
this dissertation, I demonstrate that institutional positioning messages can be shaped by 
the expectation that others in an institutional field will likely challenge an 
organization’s legitimacy claims.  For example, given the publication of the English-
language version of Dabiq calling for the establishment of a Caliphate (e.g., an Islamic 
State), ISIL’s messaging may reflect a preemptive preparedness for the outright 
rejection by others in its institutional field, including the US.  In other words, ISIL 
explicitly challenges and denies US claims that ISIL “is not Islamic,” and “is certainly 
not a state” (Office of the Press Secretary, 10 September 2014, n.p.).  Thus, for ISIL, 
the exigency into which they produce institutional positioning messages encourages 
their efforts to be transactional in nature.  These messages, therefore, take into account, 




So what can the case of ISIL teach us about organizational communication, 
generally, and institutional positioning, specifically?  The significance of this 
dissertation will lie in its contribution to our understanding of how communication is 
constitutive of organizing (hereafter referred to as CCO).  To do this, I highlight the 
ways in which the inherent reflexivity of institutional positioning and legitimation 
attempts shape and alter the constitutive forces of organizing.  Bisel (2010) contends 
that additional CCO theorizing is needed to articulate the “necessary and sufficient 
conditions” by which organizations are constituted (p. 129).  Bitektine (2011) 
comments that organizational legitimation is a social construction process, based on 
rhetorical, discursive means, or collective action.  Understanding institutional 
positioning as transactional, therefore, responds to Bisel’s call for further articulation of 
the necessary and sufficient conditions for organizational constitution, and encourages 
us to view organizational legitimation as a socially constructed phenomenon.  
Establishing organizational legitimacy implies strategic and calculated symbolic action, 
especially for institutions perceived by many to be illegitimate.   
Thus, the purpose of this research is to examine the ways in which seemingly 
illegitimate organizations—in this case, ISIL—attempt to create and maintain 
legitimacy in the face of adversarial discourse attempting to prove otherwise.  In the 
next chapter, Chapter 2, I will present a review of the literature regarding theories 
relating to communication is constitutive of organizing (CCO), sociomateriality, the 
social construction of reality, legitimacy, organizational identity and image, and 
confrontational rhetoric.  In Chapter 3, I will explain the organizational context for this 




methods, and in Chapter 5, I will present the findings.  Chapters 6 and 7 provide a 
discussion and conclusion, respectively, including limitations and directions for future 
research.  Appendices, including References and selected images from the Dabiq texts, 
will follow.  
Although the focus of my analysis will be on the set of texts produced and 
disseminated by ISIL, (via the Dabiq magazine series, which has constitutive force), 
there will be mention of deconstitutive discourses presented by the West, vis-à-vis 
official White House correspondence.  Many of these deconstitutive discourses 
produced by the West are embedded within the pages of Dabiq.  Thus, I verified such 
claims from official White House documents (e.g., documents cited from the Office of 





Chapter 2: Literature Review 
In this chapter, I explain the following: (1) how communication is constitutive 
of organizing, (2) the sociomateriality debate in the CCO literature, and (3) the social 
construction of institutional legitimacy.  I then define how the terms (4) legitimation, 
(5) organizational identity, and (6) confrontational rhetoric are applied within the 
context of this dissertation.  
(1) McPhee and Zaug’s (2000) Four Flows Model of CCO 
The notion that communication is constitutive of organizing (CCO) is a complex 
and contested one (Putnam, Nicotera, & McPhee, 2009).  Although CCO is 
multidisciplinary in nature, where it is often conceptualized as discourse, the theory has 
gained “considerable attention” in organizational communication research (Putnam et 
al., 2009; Schoeneborn, Blaschke, Cooren, McPhee, Seidl, & Taylor, 2014).  In order to 
understand the key aspects of CCO theory, two terms must first be explained: 
constitutive and organization.  I define constitution in this dissertation as a process that 
“highlights the forming, composing, or making of something, in addition to describing 
the phenomenon that is constituted” (Putnam et al., 2009, p. 3).  Thus, this definition 
follows the work of established CCO theorists, Putnam, Nicotera, and McPhee (2009).  
In the context of CCO theory, constitution is the process by which organizations are 
formed or, more simply, called into being (Bisel, 2010).  Constitution, therefore, deals 
with patterns of interactions that “make organizations what they are” (McPhee & Zaug, 
2000, para. 12).  Drawing on the work of Hacking (1999), defining constitution in this 




organizations emerge through “framing, making, and comprising” as accomplished 
through language use (Putnam et al., 2009, p. 4).  
 I define organization as a deliberately created and maintained social institution, 
with coordinated behaviors among members aimed at producing intended outcomes, 
persisting across time and space (Jelinek & Litterner, 1994; McPhee, Corman, & 
Dooley, 1999; McPhee & Zaug, 2000).  McPhee and Zaug (2000) define an 
organization as, “a social interaction system, influenced by prevailing economic and 
legal institutional practices, and including coordinated action and interaction within and 
across a socially constructed system boundary, manifestly directed toward a privileged 
set of outcomes” (para. 13).  Both of these definitions imply that an organization’s 
ontological status is located at the site and surface of communication processes (Taylor 
& Van Every, 2000).  Those communication processes include interaction between 
members, between members and what they perceive to be the organization’s identity, 
and between organizational members and outsiders.  
 McPhee and Zaug’s (2000) CCO model is only one of three dominant 
theoretical traditions currently applied in organizational communication research 
(Schoeneborn, Blaschke, Cooren, McPhee, Seidl, & Taylor, 2014).  McPhee and Zaug’s 
four flows model was highly influenced by Giddens’s structuration theory (Giddens, 
1984).  Concomitantly, Taylor and Van Every (2000) postulated a CCO theory that 
described the associations between organizational texts and conversations.  Their 
theorizing also included claims that the semiotic nature of language and language use 
lends itself, inherently, to organizing processes.  These theorists also introduced the 




relationship (Taylor & Van Every, 2000).  The ABX insight later was used by the 
Montreal School of CCO theorists to propose the role of non-human agency in the 
constitution of organizations (Cooren, 2000; Robichaud, Giroux, & Taylor, 2004; 
Taylor, 1999; Taylor, Cooren, Giroux, & Robichaud, 1996).  The third, and perhaps 
least well known of the CCO traditions, is the body of CCO literature inspired by 
Luhmann’s (1995) theory of social systems (Cooren, Kuhn, Cornelissen, & Clark, 2011; 
Schoeneborn, 2011).  Theorists in this tradition explore Luhmann’s (1995) model of 
self-organization, where “organizations are systems that produce themselves as systems 
by distinguishing themselves from their environments” (Cooren et al., 2011, p. 1155).   
Importantly, various traditions of CCO theorizing have been applied to the study 
of clandestine and terrorist organizations (Bean & Buikema, 2015; Schoeneborn & 
Scherer, 2010, 2012; Stohl & Stohl, 2011).  Stohl and Stohl (2011), for example, extend 
the Montreal School tradition in their analysis of the phenomenon of clandestine 
(terrorist) organizations, such as al Qaeda.  They argue that the existence of such 
organizations challenges the Montreal school’s implicit assumption that visibility is 
necessary for the communicative constitution of organizations, citing the hidden nature 
of many of al Qaeda’s leadership and governing bodies.  However, Schoeneborn and 
Scherer (2012) respond to Stohl and Stohl’s (2011) findings, claiming that their 
research does not make “full use” of the Montreal School’s theoretical potential (p. 
964).  Schoeneborn and Scherer (2012) draw on both the Montreal School and 
Luhmann’s theory of social systems in their study of al Qaeda, emphasizing that 
although al Qaeda’s governance structures are extremely invisible, (as Stohl and Stohl 




act to ensure its perpetuation (p. 969).  Thus, they argue that it is the “reversion of the 
relation between invisibility and visibility” that differentiates al Qaeda and ensures its 
perpetuation (p. 963).  This dissertation, however, extends the work of McPhee and 
Zaug’s (2000) four flows model of CCO.  In contrast with the other CCO traditions, 
McPhee and Zaug’s theorizing is especially parsimonious and has already been shown 
to be useful in investigating the role of communication in constituting terrorist 
organizations (Bean & Buikema, 2015).  
 McPhee and Zaug (2000) posit that organizations are the result of four 
interacting communicative exchanges, or what they refer to as “flows” (para. 1).  Those 
flows are activity coordination, self-structuring, membership negotiation, and 
institutional positioning (See Figure 1).  With reference to Grice’s (1975) maxims, 
McPhee and Zaug suggest that, although all communication has constitutive force, not 
all communication is actually organizational.  To explain, the theorists provide an 
example of a communicative event: a casual conversation between a group of friends.  
Although the group may be considered a “communication system” in that their 
perspectives may be coordinated and there might even be some conversational 
organization occurring as they talk, the friends are usually not considered an 
“organization,” especially in the prima facie meaning of the term (Bisel, 2010).  
McPhee and Zaug (2000) explain that the key to understanding CCO, in terms of 
how communication constitutes organizing, is the four flows model.  They suggest, 




Each flow, they explain, “is actually a kind of interactive communication episode, 
usually amounting to multi-way conversation or text passage, typically involving 
reproduction of as well as resistance to the rules and resources of the organization” 
(para. 22).  The four flows, described in detail below, summarize the following 
relationships.  The flows explain how an organization is linked to its members through 
(1) membership negotiation and itself, reflexively, through (2) self-structuring.  The 
flow of (3) activity coordination explains how an organization adapts interdependent 
activity to specific work situations, and the last flow, (4) institutional positioning, 
explains how the organization is linked to the outside environment.  McPhee and Zaug 
(2000) contend that organization is not simply communication, as clarified via the 
friend example above, but the result of the associations among these four constitutive 
flows of communication.   
 
Figure 1.  Explanation of the Four Flows Model (McPhee & Zaug, 2000). 
The four flows are outlined as follows: 
Membership negotiation deals with membership recruitment and socialization 




because organizations exist only as a result of human agency.  “By many definitions of 
communication,” they note, “only individual humans can communicate” (McPhee & 
Zaug, 2000, para. 27).  Thus, “when communication constitutes organization, the 
relation of the communicators to the organization is important” (para. 27). 
Similarly, self-structuring, the second flow of communication imperative to 
organizing, is important because organizations need individuals, or groups of people, to 
bring organizations into being.  “Organizations do not draw members and coordinate 
work automatically or as a result of natural tendency,” they explain (McPhee & Zaug, 
2000, para. 28).  Specifically, members of the organization work to “bring the 
organization into being, make decisions about such matters as member time and 
resource investment” (para. 28).  McPhee and Zaug (2000) cite common examples of 
self-structuring types of communication, which may include organizational charters, 
charts, policy and procedure manuals, orders, directives, and even casual 
announcements such as employee evaluation and feedback, budgeting and accounting 
forms, and other formalized control processes.  
Activity coordination, as referenced earlier, is important for organization, as 
many common definitions of “organization” involve a process of resources working 
together.  “Organizations, by definition,” McPhee and Zaug (2000) posit, “have at least 
one manifest purpose, and the activity of members and subgroups is partly directed 
toward it” (para. 33).  Thus, they continue, “these activities are coordinated as a result 
of the organization’s self-structuring, which creates a division of labor, a standard task-




Finally, the fourth flow of institutional positioning, one of the main focal points 
of this dissertation, deals with communication outside the organization, or 
communication “at the macro level” (para. 37).  As McPhee and Zaug (2000) suggest, 
although the term “identity negotiation” could be used to label this type of 
communication instead of institutional positioning, they chose the latter, “broader term 
‘positioning,’ because the latter includes both identity establishment and development 
and maintenance of a ‘place’ in the inter-organizational or larger social system” (para. 
37).  They argue that: 
This sort of communication is vital for constituting organizations because 
organizations exist in human societies that already are organized, that already 
have institutional ways of maintaining order, allocating material resources, 
regulating trade, and dividing labor—and, of course, that already have ways of 
communicating about all these practices.  (para. 40)   
 
Arguably, what needs to be added to McPhee and Zaug’s (2000) discussion of 
institutional positioning is the idea that institutional positioning messages may be 
transactional.  In other words, the flow of institutional positioning may be considered 
the result of reflexive communication processes involving messages sent to society 
from both the organization itself, as well as messages sent from non-members or other 
organizations in the institutional field.  Considering institutional positioning messages 
in this way might be a helpful starting place for tackling Bisel’s (2010) suggestion that 
“future pioneering work in CCO theory will test and articulate the necessary and 
sufficient conditions under which organization is constituted” (p. 129).  As Bisel (2010) 
contends, “CCO theories patterned after McPhee and Zaug (2000, 2009) seem to begin 
from the assumption that the four flows are the necessary conditions for organizing, 




2010, p. 128; emphasis added).  Furthermore, if we define this process of organizing to 
be one that is socially constructed, then the competing messages from entities outside 
the organizations may, in fact, work to deconstitute the organization at the same time.  
In terms of an organization’s attempt at establishing legitimacy within the realm of an 
already-existing institutional field, the messages from both sources (i.e., the 
organization itself as well as its competition) are important to consider.  Thus, an 
understanding of institutional positioning as transactional may be particularly important 
when considering how discursive processes can be employed to “degrade and ultimately 
destroy” organizations such as ISIL (Cronin, 2015, n.p.; Office of the Press Secretary, 
10 September, 2014, n.p.) 
 Bean and Buikema (2015) pioneered this effort, seeking to apply 
communication theory, specifically CCO theory, to the decline and dissolution of 
terrorist organizations.  They argued that “CCO possesses untapped potential for 
understanding and accelerating the decline and dissolution of terrorist organizations” (p. 
6).  Their recent study sought to “advance a perspective on organizing, communicative 
constitution of organization, as a theoretical intervention that can enable stakeholders to 
use communication to better understand and accelerate the decline and dissolution of 
hidden organizations,” in their case, al Qaeda (p. 2).  Bean and Buikema (2015) explain 
how organizational leaders “try to coordinate and control” the self-representations of 
their organizations because those representations are “vital for helping to secure 
resources and legitimacy” (p. 15).  For example, Bean and Buikema analyzed the set of 
declassified Abbottabad documents captured during the raid of Osama bin Laden’s 




bin Laden) attempted to use texts to “coordinate and control the communicative flows 
of membership negotiation, self-structuring, activity coordination, and institutional 
positing” (p. 17).  Importantly, they concluded, al Qaeda’s incapacity to control these 
flows led to the organization’s decline.   
 However, many theorists argue that it is not simply “communication flows” that 
lead to the constitution (or dissolution) of organizing; that there are physical, material 
entities that play a major role in these processes—a role which often gets overlooked by 
scholars focused on the symbolic aspects of organizational life.  Bisel (2010) for 
example, argues that “the gap between communication’s constitution of interpersonal 
relationships and communication’s constitution of organizing should be proving ground 
for CCO theory to clarify and qualify the mechanisms and processes by which 
communication comes to constitute organizing” (p. 129).  This gap may be bridged, 
Bisel (2010) continues, by an “evaluation of how communication relates to the material 
necessities of organizing” (p. 129; emphasis added).   
One reason why many scholars argue that ISIL surpassed al Qaeda in terms of 
being the terrorist organization of greatest concern is the fact that ISIL controls more 
land and has more money and fighters than al Qaeda did on September 11th, 2001 or any 
other time.  Thus, part of this dissertation seeks to address Bisel’s (2010) call for an 
addendum to CCO theorizing: “communication is a necessary condition for the 
constitution of organizing, but it is not sufficient to ensure organizing will be called into 
being” (p. 129; emphasis added).  In the following section, I outline the sociomateriality 
debate that is taking root in CCO theorizing that will shed light on the material 




(2) Sociomaterial Configurations and Implications for CCO Theorizing  
 The linguistic turn of the early 20th century focused scholars’ attention on 
recognizing the importance of the role of language and discourse on the constitution of 
social reality.  As Searle (1995) explains in The Construction of Social Reality, 
communication does not merely reflect, but creates social reality.  As Ashcraft, Kuhn, 
and Cooren (2009) note, the linguistic turn in organizational communication studies 
treated language as “a basic ontological condition in that it is actively involved in the 
production, rather than a mere reflection, of social realities” resulting in an 
understanding of communication as “the dynamic, interactive negotiation of meaning 
through symbol use”  (p. 6).  Considering language as constitutive is clearly the 
underlying epistemological assumption of CCO as delineated above: organizations are 
constituted in communication.  However, recent organizational communication research 
has called into question the centrality of symbolism and language in the constitution of 
organizations.  As Ashcraft et al. (2009) put it, “communicative explanations [of 
organizational constitution] exaggerate the muscle of symbolism” (p. 24; emphasis 
added).  To be more accepted and reach a wider audience, they contend, CCO theorists 
must take into account the “symbolic-material relation” (Ashcraft et al., 2009, p. 24).   
LeBaron (2013) summarizes the debate at hand, explaining that although 
organizational scholars (i.e., organizational communication scholars, particularly those 
contributing to CCO literature) have traditionally privileged language use and discourse 
as the empirical basis for their analysis, “a growing number are turning their attention 
towards the artifacts and bodies that become unavoidably entangled with discourse” 




would be incomplete, if not misleading, if it were to not address the role of objects 
(such as flags), sites (such as the actual land accrued by the State), or the number of 
members the State has attracted (the thousands of individuals emigrating to Syria and 
Iraq).  Thus, the following section outlines the current sociomateriality debate, and 
highlights some of the key arguments inherent in this discussion.  
A good point of departure for this discussion is Reed’s (2004) assertion that if 
we are to “get real” about the role and power of organizational discourse, we must 
recognize the material conditions and social structures that aid in the constitution of 
organizations.  He explains that “language does not exhaust our interest in social reality; 
it merely provides the primary communicative mechanism and medium through which 
social reality can be assessed and described” (Reed, 2004, p. 415).  There is more to the 
constitution of organizations than just discourse, although talk and text are a large 
component (Taylor, Cooren, Giroux, & Robichaud, 1996).  As Ashcraft et al. (2009) 
contend, 
Clearly organizations exist not only when people invoke them in 
communication, but also in tangible architecture, artifacts, and technologies; the 
conduct of tasks by actual bodies and machines; and so forth.  However 
seductive, reducing the constitution of organization to communication as defined 
here runs the risk of naive constructivism.  After all, organizations are more than 
what we say they are.  (p. 23) 
  
This is where the notion of the sociomaterial comes into play.  Leonardi (2013) 
explained that the simplest response to the question, “What does it mean to say 
something is sociomaterial” is to respond that the phenomena in question are 
simultaneously social and material (p.  60).  This notion needs to be unpacked.  The 




sociomaterial to the communicative constitution of organizations as employed 
throughout this dissertation.  
Ashcraft and colleagues (2009) claim that there are three aspects of 
“materiality” that must be considered if we are to, in the words of Reed (2004), “get 
real” about the constitution of organizations.  In short, materiality matters to 
organization theorists as they try to explore the boundaries of organizations’ social 
construction.  In other words, materiality is a means of critiquing the belief that 
organizations are nothing more than symbolic and communication processes.  So what 
kinds of materials might help constitute organizations?  Ashcraft et al. (2009) suggest 
that materiality can take three forms: objects, sites, and bodies, defined as follows:  
First, materiality is experienced through the artifacts and technologies with which we 
interact, or, in other words objects (Ashcraft et al., 2009).  Artifacts, in particular, are 
the organizational objects that “come to influence individual behavior and attitudes 
towards organizations” (Rafaeli & Vilnai-Yavetz, 2004, p. 681).  Organizational objects 
can include memos, checklists, work orders, meeting minutes, testing instruments, and 
other similar documents.   
 The physical location, be it territory, buildings, or otherwise, is also important to 
understanding the constitution of organization.  Sociomateriality scholars refer to these 
locations as sites.  As Ashcraft et al. (2009) iterate, “what lies ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ 
organization is a longstanding concern for management scholars” (p. 31).  Importantly, 
they argue, the material place and space of an organization influences the resources 




models “probe the dynamics of this mutual constitution [of discourse and site] in 
specific movements” thus creating organizational place in interaction (p. 31).   
 The third and final element of sociomaterial configurations important to 
incorporate into the discussion of organizational constitution is bodies.  We work 
through our human bodies.  As Ashcraft et al. (2009) explain, “communication has 
material force not only because ‘speech acts’, but also because (a) it is an embodied 
process situated in space and time; and (b) the physical body can be transformed […] as 
a result of communication” (p. 33).  Bodies, they claim, are more than “brute facts” (p. 
34).  “In this sense,” they continue, “communication is constrained by the body: 
performances of identity are limited by physical capacities; and all available options are 
not available to all people” (p. 34).  
 Leonardi (2012) contends that while the most recent applications of 
sociomaterial resources focus on non-physical information technology artifacts, other 
physical technological artifacts (for example, “hammers and bicycles”) can also be 
studied (p. 26).  Leonardi (2012) reminds us that the term “sociomaterial” is derived 
from the fusion of two words: “social” and “material.”  Drawing from a developed line 
of literature in sociolinguistics, the fusion of these two words makes sense: that, which 
is social, has material aspects (de Saussure, 1983).  For example, material 
configurations are always open to interpretation, as material is created through social 
processes and interpreted within social contexts.  As Leonardi (2012) explains, “all 
social action is possible because of some materiality” (p. 32).  In short, sociomateriality 




norms, discourses, and all other phenomena we typically define as social” (Leonardi, 
2012, p. 42).  
What is important to note is that the term “sociomateriality” used in this context, 
was coined relatively recently (Jones, 2014).  Although many published papers 
referenced the term, the “sociomaterial” was used primarily as a call for greater 
attention to be paid to sociomateriality in organizational research (Jones, 2014).  As 
Ashcraft et al. (2009) contend, early CCO literature takes seriously the importance of 
discourse and language in understanding the constitution of organization.  However, 
with the acknowledgment of the importance of materiality, they argue that researchers 
must now “consider how taking materiality seriously challenges communicational 
explanations” (p. 35).  Furthermore, they note that earlier versions of CCO theory are 
not entirely wrong, but they are “just not entirely right” (p. 35).  In this dissertation, 
then, I attempt to contribute to the CCO literatures as I incorporate the notion of 
sociomateriality into the discussion of the communicative constitution of ISIL as 
observed through its attempts to claim institutional legitimacy.  
(3) The Social Construction of Legitimacy: Application of Institutional Theory 
According to Aldrich (1979), when considering the development of any 
organization, “the major factors that organizations must take into account are other 
organizations” (p. 265).  These “other organizations” are what make up an institutional 
field.  Again, this dissertation attempts to extend CCO literature by emphasizing the 
reflexive, transactional processes of institutional positioning.  Conceptualizing 
institutional positioning in such a way calls our attention to the importance of 




produced by other organizations in the institutional field.  For example, when 
considering ISIL’s positioning, importance lies in both the messages produced by ISIL 
and in the counter-messaging produced by its enemy, the US, as well.  Put in another 
way, how ISIL is positioned by the US and the West is an important consideration when 
analyzing the discursive construction of ISIL’s positioning.  Due to the reflexive, 
transactional nature of this process, organizations must compete not only for resources 
and customers, (or in this case, members), but for political power, institutional 
legitimacy, social, and economic fit (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).  ISIL’s need for these 
resources is clearly implied through the words of President Obama in the opening quote 
of this dissertation—that ISIL is “desperate for legitimacy.”  
The term “institution” can be defined in many ways.  As Lammers and Barbour 
(2006) explain, institution, in everyday language, can be defined as reference to:  (1) a 
specific church, school, college, mission; (2) supraorganizational entities or governing 
bodies such as the economy, state, or religion; (3) traditional professions, such as 
medicine, law, clergy; (4) specific customs and practices (i.e., marriage) or laws (i.e., 
criminal justice); (5) as an adjective, referring to arrangements that are fixed, 
established, or enduring; or (6) institutionalized individuals (i.e., inmates, patients, or 
soldiers) under some compulsory rule (p. 358).  Scott (2001) summarizes these 
references, explaining that institutions are social structures that have attained high 
degrees of resilience in society.  He notes how institutions are composed of “cultured-
cognitive, normative, and regulative elements,” that together with associated activities 
and resources, provide stability and meaning to social life (p. 48).  These culture-




Lammers and Barbour (2006) further explain that institutions can be thought of 
in terms of six interrelated aspects: institutions (1) are manifested in practice (i.e., 
observable routines); (2) are manifested in beliefs (i.e., they are cognitive and emotional 
elements in decisions and choices that individuals make); (3) involve individuals as 
actors and carriers of aforementioned beliefs; (4) are characterized by low rates of 
change (i.e., they endure); (5) are relevant to organizational communication are often 
formalized (i.e., written and achieved); and finally, (6) reflect a rational purpose (i.e., 
they involve prescriptions for how to get tasks done).   
In summary, I apply Lammers and Barbour (2006) definition of institutions as 
“constellations of established practices guided by formalized, rational beliefs that 
transcend particular organizations and situations” (p. 364).  This definition calls 
attention to specific features of ISIL’s construction of organizational identity through 
Dabiq.  Further, this conceptualization emphasizes how ISIL wants to position its 
actions institutionally (i.e., transcending particular organizations and situations).  For 
example, ISIL’s decision to call itself a “Caliphate” suggests an appeal to historic 
grandeur—a proposed nation-state comprised of all “real” Muslims, unified once again.  
Additionally, Dabiq provides its audience with both the rational purpose behind the 
reestablishment of a Caliphate, as well as the glory that will come with that 
establishment.  
Berger and Luckmann (1966) identified institutionalization as a core process in 
the creation and perpetuation of enduring social groups.  This conceptualization of 
institutionalization is important as we consider the role of ISIL and its subsequent 




legitimate an organization is perceived to be, the more powerful its status becomes 
within its institutional field (Parsons, 1951).  If ISIL is deemed legitimate by society at 
large, its access to members and resources, and thus, its permanency, may endure.  
Thus, understanding the communicative processes that enable and constrain the 
development of legitimacy is important in terms of the creation of organizations as well 
as their destruction.  
 Foundational to this discussion is Berger and Luckmann’s (1966) work on the 
social construction of reality.  To understand legitimation as a social construction, it is 
important to understand their conceptualization of identity, and subsequently, identity 
negotiation.  Berger and Luckmann (1966) argue, “identity is formed by social 
processes” (p. 173).  Thus, identity stands in a “dialectical relationship with society” (p. 
173).  Transferring this understanding of identity from an emphasis on individuals to the 
context of organizations, allows for an understanding of organizational identity as 
“maintained, modified, or even reshaped by social relations” (Berger & Luckmann, 
1966, p. 173).  Further discussion of organizational identity will be delineated in the 
next section of this chapter.  
Berger and Luckmann (1966) further argue that the social processes involved in 
the formation and maintenance of [an organization’s] identity may be determined by the 
social structures at play.  Especially important, then, are the discourses produced by 
such organizations.  As Phillips, Lawrence, and Hardy (2004) explain, 
“institutionalization occurs as actors interact and come to accept shared definitions of 
reality, and it is through linguistic process that definitions of reality are constituted” (p. 




been defined in terms of patterns of action.  However, Phillips and colleagues reason 
that institutions are constituted through discourse.  They argue, “it is not action per se 
that provides the basis for institutionalization but, rather, the texts that describe and 
communicate those actions” (p. 635; emphasis added).  
Viewing institutions through this lens is precisely why organizational texts, such 
as Dabiq, are so imperative to our understanding of this phenomenon.  In fact, Taylor et 
al. (1996) put forth a theory of CCO by focusing on this very connection—what they 
label as a “discourse theory of organization” (p. 7).  They argue the key to creating 
effective organizations is, in a sense, to organize illocutionary force.  “It is the force of 
an act that produces its illocutionary, and then its perlocutionary effect, and hence 
makes directed coordinated action possible” (Taylor et al., 1996, p. 22).  Organizations, 
as Taylor et al. (1996) contend, are more than just getting people to do what they are 
told to do.  The social structures at play (i.e., factors which characterize large, complex 
organizations) must always be grounded in the everyday talk of members if those 
structures are to be assumed meaningful at all.  “It always comes back to the 
conversation” (Taylor et al., 1996, p. 5).  The making of that conversation involves the 
translation of texts into everyday conversation, which again emphasizes the socially 
constructed nature of institutions.  “Institutions are not just social constructions,” 
Phillips et al. (2004) note, “but social constructions constituted through discourse” (p. 
638).  Put simply, institutionalization is the “social process by which individuals come 
to accept a shared definition of social reality” (Scott, 1987, p. 496).  A discursive 




interpretation, and subsequent conversation around texts in the construction of 
institutions (Phillips et al., 2004).  
Important to this understanding of institutions, is their inherently communicative 
nature.  The aforementioned definitions of institution emphasize their capacity to 
control and constrain behavior (Scott, 2001).  Thinking about the communicative nature 
of institutions is essential to the discussion at hand, as, Scott (2001) explains, 
“institutions impose restrictions by defining legal, moral, and cultural boundaries setting 
off legitimate from illegitimate activities” (p. 50).  Further, he claims, “it is essential to 
recognize that institutions also support and empower activities and actors.  Institutions 
provide guidelines and resources for acting as well as prohibitions and constraints on 
actions” (Scott, 2001, p. 50).  Scott (2001) emphasizes Berger and Luckmann’s claim 
that institutions are “dead” if they are only represented in verbal designations and in 
physical objects; they need to be “brought to life” through human communication and 
interaction (p. 75).  Again, we can see why the legitimation efforts of groups such as 
ISIL are so important.  And at the same time, we can see why the Obama administration 
attempts to delegitimize such groups through its counter-discourse.  As Scott et al. 
(2000) explain, “organizations require more than material resources and technical 
information if they are to survive and thrive in their social environments.  They also 
need social acceptability and credibility” (p. 327).  Scott (2001) provides a framework 
for understanding how institutions may be “brought to life” via human communicative 





The first pillar is the regulative pillar.  Scott (2001) describes the regulative 
pillar as an approach to understanding how institutions regularize and constrain human 
behavior.  Through explicit regulatory processes, such as rule-setting, monitoring, and 
sanctioning activities, force, fear, and expedience are central ingredients of the 
regulatory pillar (Scott, 2001).  He quotes Weber (1924), explaining that few, if any, 
leaders are content to base their regime on force alone, but all attempt to cultivate a 
belief in their legitimacy.  Therefore, the most common way to control behavior 
involves the use of authority “in which coercive power is legitimated by a normative 
framework that both supports and constrains the exercise of power” (Scott, 2001, p. 53).   
The second pillar is the normative pillar, which Scott (2001) explains as the 
normative rules that introduce a prescriptive, evaluative, and obligatory dimension into 
social life.  This aspect of institutionalism includes an evaluation and adoption of the 
values and norms of the social milieu.  By values, Scott refers to the “conceptions of the 
preferred or desirable, together with the construction of standards to which existing 
structures of behavior can be compared and assessed” (Scott, 2001, p. 54).  By norms, 
he is referring to “how things should be done; define legitimate means to pursue valued 
ends” (Scott, 2001, p. 55).  In defining how things should be done, the normative pillar 
speaks to the ways in which “individuals come to accept a shared definition of social 
reality” (Scott, 1987, p. 496).  Selznick (1957) notes that one of the most significant 
meanings of institutionalization is to “infuse with value beyond the technical 
requirements of the task at hand” (p. 17).  Importantly, he claims that institutionalism 




The final pillar is the cultural-cognitive pillar, which stresses the “shared 
conceptions that constitute the nature of social reality and the frames through which 
meaning is made” (Scott, 2001, p. 57).  This pillar draws on the historical work of 
anthropologists (e.g., Geertz, 1973) as well as sociologists (e.g., Berger & Luckmann, 
1966; Goffman, 1959) in pointing to the importance of socially constructed 
“frameworks of meaning” (Scott, 2001, p. 58).  The cultural-cognitive pillar highlights 
behavior regulation in the sense that compliance occurs because acting in any other way 
would be “inconceivable” (Scott, 2001, p. 58).  Routines are followed because “that’s 
the way we do things” (p. 58).  Institutionalization, here, can therefore be viewed as the 
social process by which individuals come to accept a shared definition of reality, 
independent of the individual’s own views or action, but become taken for granted as 
the way things are and the way things ought to be (Scott, 1987, p. 496).   
Thinking about the processes of institutionalization in this way calls attention to 
both the aims and actions of an organization, as well as the effects of those aims and 
actions on society at large (i.e., the institutional field).  In thinking about the current 
case of ISIL, it becomes ever more apparent why their legitimation efforts are so 
important to their organizational agenda.  Likewise, the reasons why the Obama 
administration would attempt to delegitimize such groups become evident as well.  
Reiterating Scott et al.’s (2000) assertion, “organizations require more than material 
resources and technical information if they are to survive and thrive in their social 
environments” (p. 327).  Importantly, such organizations also need to establish their 





(4) Organizational Legitimacy: Definitions and Application 
 According to Suchman (1995), many researchers use the term “legitimacy,” but 
few actually define it.  Because the term is so fundamental to the discussions in this 
dissertation, it is imperative that it is defined rather than simply “evoked”—a complaint 
Suchman (1995) puts forth in his analysis of contemporary organizational theory (p. 
573).  I apply Suchman’s (1995) definition of legitimacy within this dissertation: 
“Legitimacy is a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are 
desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, 
values, beliefs, and definitions” (p. 574).  Furthermore,  
Legitimacy is socially constructed in that it reflects a congruence between the 
behaviors of the legitimated entity and the shared (or assumedly shared) beliefs 
of some social group; thus, legitimacy is dependent on a collective audience, yet 
independent of particular observers.  (Suchman, 1995, p. 574) 
 
Perceptions of legitimacy are important to organizations because legitimate 
organizations have access to the symbolic resources that legitimacy affords.  Likewise, 
illegitimate organizations do not have access to such resources.   
Recognizing that institutional positioning can unfold as a process implicating 
more than text and conversation is essential to our understanding of the ways in which 
ISIL positions itself in the social milieu.  Suchman (1995) alludes to Parsons’ (1960) 
contention that one of the fundamental aspects as to why legitimacy is so important is 
that “legitimacy leads to persistence because audiences are most likely to supply 
resources to organizations that appear desirable, proper, or appropriate” (p. 574).  Thus, 
Suchman argues legitimacy affects both how people act toward organizations and also 




more worthy,” Suchman (1995) argues, “but also as more meaningful, more predictable, 
and more trustworthy” (p. 575).   
Suchman (1995) further explains that there are three broad types of legitimacy; 
all of which abide by the assumption that organizational activities are desirable, proper, 
or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and 
definitions.  The first type of legitimacy he explains is pragmatic legitimacy, which 
“rests on the self-interested calculations of an organization's most immediate audiences” 
(Suchman, 1995, p. 578).  In other words, do the actions of the organization benefit its 
constituencies?  Are their interests being attended to?  The second major type of 
legitimacy is moral legitimacy, which “reflects a positive normative evaluation of the 
organization and its activities” (Suchman, 1995, p. 579).  Unlike pragmatic legitimacy, 
Suchman explains that moral legitimacy is “sociotropic;” or, in other words, “it rests not 
on judgments about whether a given activity benefits the evaluator, but rather on 
judgments about whether the activity is ‘the right thing to do’” (p. 579).  This aspect of 
legitimacy is important as it relates to ISIL because ISIL employs moral and religious 
justification to persuade audience’s judgments about their militaristic activities and 
organization’s being.  (Despite the author’s and many reader’s convictions about the 
immorality of ISIL’s actions.)  Finally, there is cognitive legitimacy, which Suchman 
(1995) explains is based on cognition rather than on interest or evaluation.  If an 
organization is “cognitively legitimate,” Suchman explains, audiences (or society) 
accept it as necessary or even inevitable.  
To be perceived as legitimate is important to an organization’s position in its 




that organizations deemed illegitimate are not able to ensure.  As Cheney and 
Christensen (2000) argue, “to secure and maintain a legitimate and recognizable place 
in material and symbolic markets, many organizations of today pursue a variety of 
complex communicative activities” (p. 232).  These communicative activities are often 
complex due to the varied nature of an organization’s audience.  Organizations have to 
communicate with both the organizational members, as well as external audiences.  
Cheney and Christiansen (2000) contend that organizations have to therefore develop 
ways to communicate consistently to their many audiences.  Without such consistency, 
they argue, it is difficult for organizations to “sustain and confirm a coherent sense of 
‘self’” (p. 232).  Thus, many organizational communicative activities become integrated 
around one overall concern: organizational identity (Cheney & Christiansen, 2000).  In 
the next section, I explain how the construction of organizational identity and image is 
important to understanding the social construction of organizational legitimacy.   
(5) Organizational Image and Identity 
 
People experience organizations as having an identity, or a set of defining 
characteristics that help to create a sense of oneness and coherence within a group 
(Dutten & Dukerich, 1991).  As Scott (2007) summarizes, it is through communication 
that individuals express their belonging to various collectives and assess the reputation 
and image of those collectives.  An organization’s identity, as defined by Albert and 
Whetten (1985), is what organizational members believe to be an organization’s central, 
enduring, and distinctive character.  This sense of identity is created and maintained in 
communication.  Specifically, the development of unifying symbols (e.g., logos and 




defining features are, who is part of the group, and likewise, who is not (Cheney, 1983; 
DiSanza & Bullis, 1999).  As Alvesson (2002) explains, an organization’s identity deals 
with the “essence or core” of an organization (p. 177).  Organizational identity is 
coherent over time and space, and marks one organization as distinct from other 
organizations (Alvesson, 2001).   
However, organizational identity is “usually counterposed to [organizational] 
image, with the latter seen as a less stable or reliable projection, but one that is 
nevertheless very important in public settings” (Cheney, Christensen, & Daily, 2014, p. 
698).  Organizational image has to do with the way organizational members believe 
others (e.g., outsiders) see the organization, and is used to gauge how those outside the 
organization are judging the organization and its members (Dutton & Dukerich, 1991).  
As observed in the case of ISIL, for example, Dabiq is the editors’ (and, by extension, 
the State’s) attempt to create and maintain a certain image.  In order to do so, the editors 
combat messages that are trying to foster a different image explicitly.  The images that 
members hold of their respective organizations, then, are unique to each member and 
may or may not match the collective organizational identity espoused by the 
organization itself in terms of what members define as distinctive, central and enduring 
about their organization (Albert & Whetten, 1985; Dutton, Dukerich, & Harquail, 
1994).  
Important to the establishment of institutional legitimacy are the means by 
which organizational actors work to define their image, and, consequently, how 
organizational members identify with that image.  Dutton et al. (1994) define 




and the attributes he or she associates with his or her organization’s identity.  In other 
words, organizational identification is “the degree to which a member defines him- or 
herself by the same attributes he or she believes define the organization” (Dutton et al., 
1994, p. 239).  These defining characteristics make up, in part, the organization’s 
identity.  
There is thus a recursive relationship between an organization’s image and 
organizational members’ identification, such that when external publics think highly of 
an organization, it can encourage members to define themselves in terms of that 
identity, and vise versa; if an organizational image is negative, members tend to 
dissociate with that particular organization.  For example, Dutton et al. (1994) suggest 
that outsiders actively judge organizational members by the characteristics attributed to 
the organization through its public reputation.  They present the case of the Port 
Authority of New York and New Jersey (PA), explaining how PA workers often have to 
come to terms with PA’s image as being dirty, inhumane, and dangerous due to the 
homelessness problems.  Members of an organization, then, have to “interpret and infer 
the reputation of their organization and react to the external image they construe of their 
organization,” particularly focusing on how the organization is portrayed in the media 
(p. 241).   
However, the case of ISIL is unique.  Usually, organizational members 
increasingly identify with organizations with a positive image and disassociate with 
those portrayed as negative.  This pattern appears to be more complicated in the case of 
ISIL.  ISIL is a militant organization that desires confrontation and actively works to 




stark contrast to the West.  Here, to be thought ill of may actually be seen as desirable, 
and thus may enhance the identification of certain members or potential members. 
(6) Confrontational Rhetoric 
 Part of what makes ISIL so unique in terms of its purported organizational 
identity is the notion that its raison d'être is a confrontation with the West.  As will be 
illustrated in the findings chapter of this dissertation, the language employed within the 
pages of Dabiq emphasizes this sense of confrontation.  Importantly, Scott and Smith 
(1969) argue that part of the attraction of confrontation generally, and confrontational 
rhetoric specifically, is the strong sense of success that can be shared by those who 
think of themselves as outsiders.  This sense of success is “so strong, that it may be a 
can’t-lose strategy” (Scott & Smith, 1969, p. 5).  Further, confrontational sentimentality 
espouses the belief that there is nowhere to go but up, especially after having suffered 
being down for so long.  As Scott and Smith (1969) explain, “confrontation,” as used 
here, deals with a radical, dramatic, and revolutionary sense of division or separation; 
this sense of division is very much apparent within the texts of Dabiq.  
Interestingly, Short (1991) analyzes the confrontational rhetoric of the Earth 
First! movement of the early 1980s.  Members of this movement stressed the necessity 
of confrontational action to save the environment from over-development.  According 
to Short (1991), “by supporting agitation and condoning sabotage in public forums, 
Earth Firsters! help construct an extremist image that is an important part of the 
group’s self-identity and mission” (p. 176). Short concludes that although agitative 
rhetoric is generated for audiences outside the movement, it is received and interpreted 




purposes in creating a counter-response inside as well as outside the social movement” 
(p. 185).  Specifically, Short provides an example of the movement taking on the 
counter-positioning rhetoric: 
After Senator McClure assailed Earth First! on the floor of the United States 
senate, calling the group's tactics “no more noble than those of hostage-takers 
and kidnappers,” Foreman [one of the founders of the Earth First! movement] 
tells one reporter, “For someone like Jim McClure to acknowledge our existence 
and then condemn it, he couldn't give us a nicer compliment.” (“McClure 
blasts,” 1987, p. C7; as cited in Short, 1991, p. 185) 
 
Short concluded that Earth First’s! use of confrontational rhetoric was successful in 
helping shape public attention and attitudes toward it.  Furthermore, he concluded that 
“the group which probably lacks respect in most quarters of that mainstream 
environmental movement […] certainly has the attention of movement leaders” (p. 
185).  Thus, confrontational rhetoric functions to raise awareness and bring attention to 
an otherwise ignored issue or concern.  The attention raised gives group members a 
sense of power and efficacy, and strengthens the organization’s identity—even if, or 
perhaps because, powerful outsiders disparage that identity.  ISIL’s use of 
confrontational rhetoric may function similarly.  Organizational members strongly 
identify with ISIL.  Yet, at the same time, that identity is constantly being threatened by 





Chapter 3: Organizational Context 
This chapter outlines the rise of ISIL in the Islamic community and the world, as 
well as how and why it has become such a contentious organization “desperate for 
legitimacy” (Office of the Press Secretary, 18 February 2015, n.p.).  I first explain the 
controversy surrounding its name.  Then, I will justify why I chose to refer to ISIL as 
such, as opposed to the many other names the media, political correspondents, and 
Western leaders invoke.  I then describe ISIL’s organizational background, and explain 
why its efforts towards organizational legitimacy are so essential to its existence.  
Organizational Naming: ISIL, ISIS, The Islamic State, and Daesh 
Lynn Berg argues in her 2008 paper titled, The Importance of Names and 
Naming in Religion, Literature, and Librarianship, that “language, culture, and religion 
are the context within which our identities are established” (p. 195).  Therefore, she 
claims, language, culture, and religion “are naturally the prime source for names and 
naming practice, and the key to understanding and using them” (p. 195).  Furthermore, 
Berg contends naming is an “act of power” because of its role in “creation, order, and 
control” (p. 202).  The importance of naming is clearly evident in the wrangle over 
names used to refer to the terrorist organization that is the subject of this dissertation.  
On the one hand, there is a set of labels used by Western audiences to refer to the 
terrorist organization, and on the other, there is the name by which the organization 
refers to itself.  There are two key issues associated with ISIL that will be discussed in 
this chapter: (1) the labeling of the group as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) by 
the US Secretary of State and (2) the naming of the group (e.g., ISIL, ISIS, and the 




The US Secretary of State designated the Islamic State as an FTO officially on 
December 17, 2004 (US Department of State, n.d.).  Labeling it as such was important, 
because, according to the Bureau of Counter Terrorism, “FTO designations play a 
critical role in our fight against terrorism and are an effective means of curtailing 
support for terrorist activities and pressuring groups to get out of the terrorism business” 
(US Department of State, n.d., n.p.).  Before the rise of the Islamic State, al Qaeda was 
the jihadist group thought by most Americans to be the largest threat to international 
peace and security.  Yet, although al Qaeda still remains dangerous to present, the 
Islamic State now represents the largest “post-al Qaeda jihadist threat” (Cronin, 2015, 
para. 3).  By the summer of 2014, the Islamic State had expanded from a relatively 
little-known, obscure terrorist group, to one that controls between 12,000 and 35,000 
square miles of territory formerly held by Syria and Iraq (Cordall, 2014).  The atrocities 
conducted at the hands of this terrorist organization have surpassed what was ever 
expected.  They are no longer considered a “jayvee” squad of terrorists (Sinha, 2015).  
The events of November 13th, 2015 serve as the point of departure for the 
remainder of this chapter.  On November 13th, 2015, the Islamic State launched a series 
of terrorist attacks on civilians in Paris, France.  Many, including the French President 
Francois Hollande, considered the attacks as an “act of war” (Dalton, Horobin, Varela, 
& Landauro, 2015).  Prior to the Paris attacks, the terrorist group had been referred to in 
one of two ways: as “ISIS,” by US news and media correspondents, and as “ISIL,” by 
the US President, his staff, and many military officials.  However, the attacks on Paris 
on November 13th seemed to usher a new term into the mouths of world leaders and 




President Hollande shortly after the attacks: “It is an act of war that was waged by a 
terrorist army, a jihadist army, by Daesh, against France,” (Dalton et al., 2015; 
emphasis added).  Although the name Daesh had been used for quite some time, 
particularly by military leaders, it was not used either in the media or by world leaders 
until after these attacks on Paris.  The following pages outline the history of the various 
names and labels associated with the terrorist group that has declared itself The Islamic 
State. 
“ISIS,” “ISIL,” and the “Islamic State” 
A brief perusal of the major news headlines throughout the period of 2014-2015 
suggests scholars, politicians, and news broadcasters alike were not in agreement over 
how to refer to this group.  Further, they were not in agreement as to what the group 
actually is: Is “ISIS” a terrorist organization?  Is “ISIL” a nation-state?  The Islamic 
State? A Caliphate?  As Bruscella (2015) contends, “we call organizations, terrorist 
groups included, ‘into being’ by naming them as organizations and by paying homage 
to the names we give to them” (p. 5).  What we name and label organizations matters, as 
it shapes the way we conceptualize and come to understand them and their actions.  In 
the pages that follow, I provide some context in terms of delineating when and where 
the different names (specifically, ISIL, ISIS, and the Islamic State) have been used, and 
the reasons why.  Following that discussion, I introduce the latest of names, Daesh, and 
explain the controversy over its use.   
The jihadist group refers to itself as the “Islamic State,” or, al-Dawla al-
Islamiya in Arabic.  Sometimes, the name is truncated, and they refer to themselves as 




aspirations of creating a global caliphate across national borders, not just in Syria and 
Iraq (Sanchez, 23 January 2015).  It is for this reason that the Western world tends to 
steer clear of that particular naming practice.   
Since the group began to receive global attention, however, the most common 
way to refer it has been with the label: “ISIS.”  This was the term most frequently used 
by the media, and thus, ISIS was the term most widely recognized by the general public.  
The President of the United States, however, consistently referred to this same group by 
the name ISIL (at least, prior to the November 13th Paris attacks).  This inconsistency in 
what to call the terrorist organization undoubtedly sparked confusion for many in the 
lay public.  
“ISIS” is actually an acronym for the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria.  “ISIL,” 
then, is an acronym for the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant.  Jamie Fuller (2015), 
writing for the Washington Post, notes that many politicians and media organizations 
have chosen the label ISIL over ISIS have done so as a paean to grammar.  As Stern and 
Berger (2015) explain, the differences between ISIS and ISIL stem from “issues of 
technical transliteration and geography” (p. 8).  When you translate the Arabic name for 
the group of insurgents, “Al-Dawla Al-Islamiya fi al-Iraq wa al-Sham” into English, 
using “the Levant” (a.k.a. ISIL), as opposed to “Syria” (a.k.a. ISIS) to describe the 
region is most accurate (Fuller, 20 January 2015).  CNN Global Affairs Correspondent, 
Elise Labott further explains that we should use the acronym ISIL because the group 
appears to have to set it sights beyond Iraq and Syria (Sanchez, 2015).  The “Levant” 
thus accurately reflects the group’s aspirations to rule over a broader region of the 




Additionally, many argue that using ISIL acknowledges Washington’s decision 
not to recognize ISIL’s plans for a caliphate, by not referring to them as an “Islamic 
State” in Iraq and Syria, or elsewhere (Sanchez, 2015).  For this reason, President 
Obama has used the term ISIL when referring to the group at hand.  Washington Post 
reporter Jaime Fuller, in an early 2015 article titled ‘ISIS’ vs. ‘ISIL’ vs. ‘Islamic State’: 
The Political Importance of a Much-Debated Acronym, highlights the importance of 
this naming debate.  She explains, “the ISIL-ISIS debate continues in large part because 
the Islamic State is not internationally recognized, and officials wouldn’t want to 
recognize the existence of a state that remains an ambition of a group they hope 
to extinguish” (Fuller, 2015, n.p.).  Put simply, referring to the Islamic State by its self-
appointed name, the Islamic State, “legitimizes its declaration of a Caliphate” (Stern & 
Berger, 2015, p. 8).  
There are other cited reasons for the switch to using the acronym ISIL, over ISIS 
or the Islamic State.  The name “Isis” had first been used to refer to an Egyptian 
goddess, and many women go by Isis as a first name.  One case that had gained 
considerable attention is that of a female scientist, Isis Anchalee, who had been blocked 
by the social media site Facebook because of her name.  She tweeted, “Facebook thinks 
I’m a terrorist” (Kircher, 2015, n.p.).  Prior to this tweet, Anchalee had gained social 
media stardom when she started the hashtag #ILookLikeAnEngineer, promoting women 
in the sciences, but as a result of the growing attention that the terrorist group ISIS had 
been receiving in the media, her page was blocked by Facebook administrators.  Other 




have supported the petition to have the media to stop using the acronym ISIS 
(Care2Petitions, 2015). 
Not only are individuals affected by the naming dilemma, but organizations, too, 
have been forced to take action.  Isis Gifts and Books in Denver, Colorado, has been in 
business for over 35 years.  Recently, however, the bookstore has been the target of 
threats and vandalism.  The owner of the store, Karen Charboneau-Harrison, explained 
that she had named her store after the Egyptian goddess Isis, who represents women, 
healing, and magic.  Instead of changing the store’s name, though, Charboneau-
Harrison hopes everyone would just change the way they refer to the terrorist 
organization, so as not to conflate terrorists with an Egyptian goddess (Erdahl, 2015). 
Another organization, however, Isis Pharmaceuticals, founded nearly 25 years ago, is 
seriously considering changing its name.  D. Wade Walke, the company’s Vice 
President for Corporate Communications and Investor Relations, says that the company 
regularly finds emails from the public requesting a name change (Weintraub, 2015).  
But Walke said the change would not be easy.  “We’ve had the name Isis for 27 years.  
She’s an Egyptian goddess of health.  We’re attached to this name” (Weintraub, 2015, 
n.p.).   
For the reasons stated above, I have chosen to use the term “ISIL” when 
referring to the organization referenced within this dissertation.  Namely, because 
“ISIL” is the label used most often by the US President and the government.  As the 
discussion thus far indicates, naming and identity go hand-in-hand.  The ISIS-ISIL-IS 




sources still refer to the group as ISIS.  However, a fourth term, “Daesh,” may provide a 
solution for the organizational naming dilemma.  
 “Daesh” 
Although only gaining traction in media and political discourses after the 
November 13th Paris attacks, the term “Daesh” has been used for quite some time as a 
derogatory way to refer to the terrorist organization at hand.  Army Lt. Gen. James 
Terry, commander of the US war effort in Iraq and Syria, explains the West should be 
employing the use of the term Daesh because it is a term “that our partners in the Gulf 
use” (Tilghman, 2014, n.p.).  Terry claims that Western allies in the Gulf “ask us to use 
that [term], because they feel that if you use ISIL, that you legitimize a self-declared 
caliphate.  [...]  They feel pretty strongly that we should not be doing that” (Tilghman, 
2014, n.p.).  Furthermore, as Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius notes, “this is a terrorist 
group and not a state,” and “I do not recommend using the term Islamic State because it 
blurs the lines between Islam, Muslims and Islamists.  The Arabs call it ‘Daesh’ and I 
will be calling them the ‘Daesh cutthroats’” (Tilghman, 2014, n.p.).  Kahn, writing for 
the Boston Globe (prior to the Paris attacks) pointedly declared: “The Obama 
Administration should switch to this nomenclature, too, because how we talk about this 
group is central to defeating them” (Kahn, 2014, n.p.). 
So what does Daesh mean?  According to Alice Guthrie, an Arabic translator, 
“D.A.E.S.H. is a transliteration of the Arabic acronym formed of the same words that 
make up I.S.I.S in English: ‘Islamic State in Iraq and Syria,’ or ‘al-dowla al-
islaamiyya fii-il-i'raaq wa-ash-shaam’” (Garrity, 2015, n.p.).  But the term, which, at 




on how it is used in Arabic, the term “daesh” in Arabic can mean, “to trample down 
and crush” or also, “a bigot.”  Obviously, it is not a term well liked by the terrorist 
group.  It is disliked so strongly that ISIL has threatened to cut the tongues out of 
anyone using the term (Garrity, 2015).   
Evan Hohlman, a national security analyst, explains that government officials 
have chosen to use the term “Daesh” to avoid using other, more common, names for 
the group (e.g., ISIS and ISIL).  As previously discussed, using words such as 
“Islamic” and “State” should be cautioned against for two reasons: first, due to the 
conflation of the ideals of Islam, as a religion, and the terrorist organization, and 
second, due to the legitimacy offered to the group’s desire for an actual “state,” i.e., a 
Caliphate.  As the translator, Guthrie, mentioned, she believes that the group hates 
being referred to as Daesh because “they hear it, quite rightly, as a challenge to their 
legitimacy” (Garrity, 2015, n.p.).  The use of the term is quite overtly “a dismissal of 
their aspirations to define Islamic practice, to be ‘a state for all Muslims’ and –
crucially—as a refusal to acknowledge and address them as such” (Garrity, 2015, 
n.p.).   
Finally, Kahn (2015) argues that the term “Daesh” is strategically a better choice 
than ISIS, ISIL, or IS for two reasons thus far elucidated: First, “it is still accurate in 
that it spells out the acronym of the group’s full Arabic name, al-Dawla al-Islamiya fi 
al-Iraq wa al-Sham” and second, as aforementioned, “Daesh” is both a play on words 
and an insult (n.p.).  Importantly, propaganda is central to the group’s growth and 
spread.  Kahn (2015) argues that “whether hijacking popular Twitter hashtags or using 




that the war of words online is just as key to increasing its power and influence as the 
actual gruesome acts they commit on the ground” (n.p.).  Importantly, she contends, 
“By using the militants’ preferred names, the US government implicitly gives them 
legitimacy.  But referring to the group as Daesh doesn’t just withhold validity. It also 
might help the United States craft better policy” (Kahn, 2015, n.p.).    
The discussion thus far suggests that organizational naming and labeling 
practices have implications for not only policy implementation, but also for the 
construction of organizational identity and legitimacy.  Attending to these various 
names and the socio-historic reasoning behind their use is important as we attempt to 
discredit and delegitimize organizations such as ISIL.  As Kahn (2015) contends, 
“changing what the United States calls this band of militants is not going to make them 
go away.  Yet we also know from over a decade of war that military tactics do not 
stamp out extremism either” (n.p.).  And as Corman, Trethewey, and Goodall (2008) 
advocate, there seems to be a disconnect—both theoretically as well as practically—in 
terms of the government’s and military’s understanding of the role of communication 
and media in extremist recruitment and development.  Specifically, they label the war 
on terrorism as a “war of ideas” which is, in their view, primarily a communication 
struggle.  Expounding Khan’s claim mentioned previously, Corman, et al. (2008) argue 
that this war,  
cannot be won militarily on the battlefield, but must be won rhetorically and 
narratively in the heart and in the minds of those on all sides of this ideological 
front who can—who must—come to believe that finding a better way of 
respectfully exchanging views is preferable to finding better ways of destroying 





The ways in which we talk about and discuss terrorism and counter-terrorism measures, 
are inherently communicative.  “Words,” and as argued here, specifically, names, “are 
weapons in the struggle against violent extremism” (Goodall et al., 2008, p. 19). 
Organizational Exigency: The study of ISIL and Legitimacy  
As Turner (2014) notes, “legitimacy to rule the Islamic world has historically 
been highly contentious” (p. 3).  Since the time of Muhammad, there has been a strong 
desire for the unity of the Islamic community—a single Muslim state.  However, there 
has also been constant competition over who should lead that theocratic nation.  The 
struggle for power of authority remained solely in the Islamic world until the latter part 
of the twentieth century.  At that time, the contemporary international power system 
that “privileges state sovereignty” began to interrupt their internal politics (Tuner, 2014, 
p. 3).  This interruption made a politically unified Muslim community, legitimized by 
God’s will, a distant possibility for Muslims (Tuner, 2014).  “The creation of artificial 
modern states by outside powers and the consolidation of the international system,” 
Tuner (2014) explains, “brought political struggles indigenous to the Middle East into 
the international sphere” (p. 3).   
These struggles, however, influenced the rise of contemporary Salafi Jihadismii 
and what is now referred to as Islamic extremism.  The terms Islamic extremism and 
Islamism, however, are not one and the same.  Saltman and Winter (2014) explain that 
the term “Islamism” refers to a broad rage of political ideologies that have roots dating 
back to the 19th century.  Again, it was at this time that many Muslim intellectuals 
sought to right the wrongs they believed Muslims suffered because of imperialism 




years, more extremist Islamist trends began to take form (Saltman & Winter, 2014).  
Today, many of the Islamist trends “tend to repudiate, rather than embrace, modernity” 
(Saltman & Winter, 2014, p. 13).  Thus, Jihadism, a form of religiously sanctioned 
militancy, began to emerge from this “loose spectrum of [Islamist] ideologies” (Saltman 
& Winter, 2014, p. 13).   
Despite their current enmity, al Qaeda and ISIL are linked through their similar 
jihadist ideology and violent interpretation of Islam (Saltman & Winter, 2014).  
According to the Quilliam Foundation, Islamist extremism may be defined as “the 
belief that Islam is a totalitarian political ideology” (as cited in Saltman & Winter, 2014, 
p. 6).  This ideology claims that, “political sovereignty belongs to God rather than 
people.  Islamists believe that their reading of Shariah should be state law and that it is 
the religious duty of all Muslims to create and pledge allegiance to an Islamic state that 
reflects these principles” (Saltman & Winter, 2014, p. 6).  What all jihadists have in 
common, then, is a rigid worldview: 
Sanctions political violence, pitting Muslims (“Good”) against non-Muslims 
(“Evil”) and necessitating the reestablishment of the caliphate as a solution to 
injustice and Muslim disempowerment.  Jihadist groups and their sympathizer 
networks view their political programs, whatever form they take, as part of a 
‘struggle for God’s sovereignty on earth that eliminates the middle ground and 
sets the stage for a millennial, eschatological battle between good and evil.  
(Saltman & Winter, 2014, p. 13) 
 
ISIL is no different.  ISIL’s adherents hold that “they are merely practicing Islam fully, 
pronouncing those who disagree with them takfir [heretics]” (Clarion Project, 
November 2014, p. 5).  ISIL favors a “direct approach” to the building of an Islamic 
State, “seeking to seize territory, build a state and enforce Sharia immediately” (p. 9).  




2014, ISIL entered the world stage as a known terrorist organization associated with 
feelings of extreme fear, distrust, and barbarity.  As Stern and Berger (2015) contend, 
ISIL has used public beheadings and other highly publicized, symbolic acts of violence 
as “a form of marketing, manipulation, and recruitment, determined to bring the public 
display of savagery into our lives, trying to instill in us a state of terror” (p. 3).  For this 
reason, ISIL continues to be at the forefront of socio-political and military discussions, 
in an ever-changing world and a growing “war on terror.iii”   
ISIL is “a movement and an organization that sits at the nexus of a rapidly 
changing region and world” (Stern & Berger, 2015, p. 11).  Stern and Berger’s book, 
published early in 2015, is one of the first texts to be written about this group.  The 
authors point out that, at the time of their writing, ISIL was “fully emerged in the world, 
but before its ultimate fate ha[d] become clear” (Stern & Berger, 2015, p. 6).  A similar 
situation is the case for this dissertation which is why the organizational context 
provides such an important site of exigency.  Understanding the ways in which ISIL 
positions itself to claim legitimacy may, in fact, help our ability to delegitimize, and 
thus, destroy it.  
In a nationally televised speech in September of 2014, President Obama drew a 
straight line between ISIL and al Qaeda, as he explained his plan to “degrade and 
ultimately destroy” the organization (Cronin, 2015, para. 4).  Again, up until that point, 
al Qaeda had been the better known and more intensely feared terrorist group.  
(Interestingly, Osama bin Laden disassociated with ISIL due to ISIL’s excessive 
brutality and ruthlessness; see Cronin, 2015).  In his speech, President Obama claimed 




assessment was mistaken.  ISIL does not fit the traditional description of a terrorist 
organization (Cronin, 2015).  Although ISIL uses terrorism as a tactic, it is not “simply” 
a terrorist organization.  If ISIL is simply anything, “it is a pseudo-state led by a 
conventional army” (Cronin, 2015, para. 4; emphasis added).  As Stern and Berger 
(2015) contend, the group is “a hybrid of terrorism and insurgency” (p. 6) and is “a 
movement and an organization” (p. 11; emphasis added).   
Cronin (2015) explains that terrorist networks, such as al Qaeda for example, 
“generally have only dozens or hundreds of members, attack civilians, do not hold 
territory, and cannot directly confront military forces” (para. 4).  ISIL, however, “boasts 
some 30,000 fighters, holds territory in both Iraq and Syria, maintains extensive 
military capabilities, controls lines of communication, commands infrastructure, funds 
itself, and engages in sophisticated military operations” (Cronin, 2015, para. 4).  Put 
simply, ISIL is more than a terrorist group.  ISIL is an organization, emerging as a de 
facto state “led by a conventional army” (Cronin, 2015, para. 4).  Cronin goes on to 
argue that as ISIL has grown, its goals and intentions have become more clearly 
articulated.  In turn, ISIL’s identity claims and attempts at legitimacy have also become 
more clearly articulated.  She explains how the group, 
seeks to control territory and create a ‘pure’ Sunni Islamist state governed by a 
brutal interpretation of sharia; to immediately obliterate the political borders of 
the Middle East that were created by Western powers in the twentieth century; 
and to position itself as the sole political, religious, and military authority over 
all of the world’s Muslims. (Cronin, 2015, para. 10; emphasis added)  
 
In June of 2014, ISIL made their intentions more obvious: they declared themselves a 




Interpretations surrounding the definition and motivations for the 
reestablishment of a caliphate differ.  Liebl (2009) quotes a “caliphate specialist,” Ali 
Abd al-Raziq, who stated that there was actually no basis for the caliphate in the Qur’an 
or the Hadith, concluding that, “while there may not be anything un-Islamic about 
having a caliphate, there also was nothing un-Islamic about not having one either” (p. 
374).  However, as Furlow, Fleisher, and Corman (2014) note, calls for a restoration of 
the caliphate are a “regular feature of Islamist extremist communication” (p. 2).  
According to Furlow et al., “extremists construct a narrative of an ideal system of 
government that will unite all Muslims under God’s just rule,” (i.e., a Caliphate, p. 2).  
The narratives romanticize previous Caliphates, which extremists claim were 
undermined by Westerners determined to destroy Islam.  Furlow et al. (2014) argue that 
these narratives rely on three important devices in order to appeal to their audience: the 
narratives stress the importance of (1) the “imagined community” of Muslims, united 
across the world; (2) “unified diversity” in which the idea of the Caliphate is presented 
in a general way to which everyone agrees; and (3) a “romanticized history” of the 
Caliphate (p. 2).  This romanticized history is one in which the Caliphate is portrayed as 
a “glorious, shining kingdom on a hill” while leaving out actual historical details of 
fighting, civil wars, territorial losses, and assassination (p. 2).   
With the declaration of a Caliphate, ISIL embarked on the construction of a 
narrative and called for the immediate loyalty of all Muslims throughout the world 
(Clarion Project, November 2014).  In an audio recording by ISIL’s chief spokesman, 
Abu Muhammad al Adnani, ISIL declared that the new Caliphate would  “simply be 




reflect its global claim of dominion” (Stern & Berger, 2015, pp. 46-47).  Again, 
referring to itself as “The Islamic State,” as opposed to ISIL or ISIS, is significantly 
symbolic.  “While most observers view [ISIL’s] ‘state’ as a dystopia, [ISIL] claims to 
have formed as a refuge from an impure world, a place where believers can be secure in 
the knowledge that they are living in accordance with Islam, at least as interpreted by 
[ISIL]” (Stern & Berger, 2015, p. 6).  The group itself regards themselves as a 
Caliphate, regardless of how outside observers view it.  
 Immediately following the declaration of the new Caliphate, a humanitarian 
crisis ensued.  Beheadings, institutionalized slavery of women and children, sexual 
abuse of captured women, and public displays of aggression aside, ISIL continued to 
take over land that was home to a large populations of ethnic and religious minorities, 
who, because they were not Sunni Muslims, were seen as “devil worshipers” and 
exterminated (Stern & Berger, 2015, p. 48).  As a result, President Barack Obama 
announced that the US would take military action against ISIL in Iraq.  Faced with US 
air strikes and military force, ISIL began to implement a strategy called “paying the 
price,” whereby they responded to any and all aggression with extreme violence (Stern 
& Berger, 2015, p. 48).  Much of these acts were filmed and subsequently posted online 
for the world to see.   
 In September of 2014, an international coalition was formed to fight ISIL, with 
participants coming from the United Kingdom, France, Australia, Canada, Germany, 
and the Netherlands (Stern & Berger, 2015).  Bahrain, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, 
Qatar, and The United Arab Emirates also joined, Sunni-majority countries that have 




(Stern & Berger, 2015, p. 49).  However, ISIL still stands strong.  Stern and Berger 
(2015), at the time of their writing, note that ISIL had “approximately 25,000 fighters, 
including terrorist and insurgent divisions, as well as a force more resembling a 
traditional army’s infantry” (p. 51).  This number has continued to increase.  ISIL 
controls territory from the Aleppo region of Syria, to the Salah ad Din province in Iraq 
(Stern & Berger, 2015).  They rule their land using a structure of wilayat, or provinces, 
each with their own governor and local government beneath it (Stern & Berger, 2015).  
Stern and Berger (2015) also note that “the structure [of ISIL] is designed to survive the 
death of Baghdadi [the current Caliph]” (p. 51).  Importantly, however, even if ISIL’s 
current leadership were removed, it would be by no means certain that ISIL would be 
crippled (Stern & Berger, 2015).   
Finally, it is important to note ISIL’s rapid growth and spread of publicity (Stern 
& Berger, 2015).  “Through a media strategy as aggressive as its military tactics,” ISIL 
“seeks to extend its influence around the world” (Stern & Berger, 2015, p. 51).  Part of 
this media strategy serves as the object of study in this dissertation.  Thus, the potential 
is strong for important theoretical lessons to be learned from the case study of ISIL.  As 
aforementioned, ISIL does not fit most traditional conceptualizations of a terrorist 
organization (Cronin, 2015).  Conventional terrorist organizations, such as al Qaeda, 
generally only have dozens or hundreds of members, do not hold territory, and do not 
often confront military forces.  ISIL, on the other hand, “boasts some 30,000 fighters, 
holds territory in both Iraq and Syria, maintains extensive military capabilities, controls 
lines of communications, commands infrastructure, funds itself, and engages in 




resources and socio-material configurations, ISIL poses “a great threat to America and 
its allies” (President Obama, 10 September 2014, n.p.).  ISIL has “no vision or goal than 
to slaughter all who stand in its way” (President Obama, 10 September 2014, n.p.).  
Aside from this obvious organizational exigency, ISIL’s propaganda magazine, Dabiq, 
provides a comprehensive and multifaceted account of ISIL’s self-promotion.   
Understanding the ways in which ISIL attempts to position itself on the 
international stage and to English speaking audiences is important, particularly in terms 
of counter-terrorism efforts.  Publishing the magazine in English allows ISIL to reach 
out to potential recruits who may have citizenship in English-speaking countries.  As 
Cronin (2015) argues, ISIL has been successful in offering “short-term, primitive 
gratification” (para. 25) as demonstrated by the thousands of individuals migrating to 
Syria to join the fight, including recruits from Western Europe as well as the US.  In 
other words, ISIL’s efforts to recruit new members and attract foreign fighters to Syria 
from English speaking countries have been effective and useful for their organizational 
constitution efforts.iv  Richard Barrett, Senior Vice President of the Soufan Group—a 
strategic security intelligence service headquartered in New York—remarks that the 
continual rise in the number of foreign fighters entering Syria have been the cause for 
increasing international concern.  He contends, “given the potential scale of [this] 
problem and the limited resources available to deal with it,” policies must be based on 
as “full an understanding of the phenomenon as possible” (Barrett, 2014, p. 3).  Thus, 
this dissertation is an attempt to contribute to that end: a full[er] understanding of ISIL’s 
ontological status and legitimacy.  In addition, reflecting on the rising socio-materiality 




to begin understanding the ways in which organizational constitution and institutional 
positioning unfold.  Therefore, the research question that this dissertation seeks to 
answer is as follows:   
RQ: What strategies does ISIL employ in an effort to construct its ontological 






Chapter 4: Method  
Description of Texts 
To answer the aforementioned research question, I analyzed the first set of 
eleven digitally produced and circulated propaganda magazines, titled Dabiq, published 
by the Islamic State.  Subsequent issues have been distributed since the time of this 
writing (e.g., Issue 12, titled Just Terror).  
The introductory pages of the first issue outline the purpose of the magazine: “a 
periodical magazine focusing on the issues of tawhid [unity], manhaj [truth-
seeking], hijrah [migration], jihad [holy war], and jama'ah [community],” five 
fundamental concerns of the new self-declared Islamic Caliphate (Issue 1, p. 3).  
According to the editorial staff of the magazine, Dabiq “will also contain photo reports, 
current events, and informative articles on matters relating to the Islamic State” (p. 3).  
Importantly, as researchers for the Clarion Project explain, the series “portrays the 
Islamic State as they see themselves: boasting of their victories and painting a romantic 
image of the restoration of an Islamic golden age and the heralding of a ‘glorious’ new 
caliphate based on holy war” (Clarion Project, September 2014, n.p.).  The series 
functions, therefore, as a set of crucial organizational texts through which the emerging 
state attempts to position itself as legitimate to external entities across the globe.  
The first issue of Dabiq was published on July 5th, 2014, a month after the 
shocking fall of Mosul (Cronin, 2015; Gambhir, 2014).  Subsequent issues were not 
published at regular intervals; the first two issues were published in July of 2015, and 
monthly thereafter until December of 2014.  Then, the subsequent six issues were 




clear impetus to get the magazine out to the public; the initial publications correspond to 
the official declaration of the State and its subsequent rally for territorial gains.  This 
particular collection of documents, comprised of the first 11 issues in the series, totals 
646 pages, complete with in-depth articles, interviews, news briefs, and gruesome 
frontline images alongside professional-quality photographs of daily life in the State.  
Dabiq is published simultaneously in English and Arabic, but each issue has also been 
translated and later published in additional languages.  For the purposes of this 
dissertation, however, I analyzed the English-language series.   
Within the pages of Dabiq, the editors usually include English-language 
translation(s) where phrases or concepts are left in Arabic.  Gambhir (2014) suggests 
that because the series is, in fact, crafted in conventional, standard written English, it is 
likely that the magazine aims to communicate both to Arabic-speaking supporters and 
sympathizers in the West and world-wide, as well as to their enemies, including the 
United States and Western nations.  Compared to the well-known al Qaeda equivalent, 
Inspire, the intended audience of Dabiq is much more extensive.  Whereas Inspire 
served as a “how-to” guide for “lone-wolf Western-based terrorists” whose aim is to 
harm Westerners, the Dabiq series is much “farther-reaching,” as it attempts lay out the 
social, political, and religious warrants for a Caliphate, as well as encourage all 
believing Muslims to support and emigrate to the new State (Gambhir, 2014, p. 2).  
Analysis 
The analytic method used in this dissertation can be best described as an 
iterative, problem-based approach to qualitative data analysis as advocated by the 




(2013).  Different from traditional grounded methods of constant comparative data 
analysis (e.g., Charmaz, 2006; Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss & Corbin, 1990), an 
iterative, problem-based approach “alternates between emic, or emergent, readings of 
the data, and etic use of existing models, explanations, and theories” (Tracy, 2013, p. 
184).  “Rather than grounding the meaning solely in the emerging data,” Tracy 
explains, “an iterative approach encourages reflection upon the active interests, current 
literature, priorities, and theories the researcher brings to the data” (p. 184; emphasis 
added).  As applied to the research at hand, previous work in organizational 
communication (e.g., CCO theory and institutional theory), research on terrorist and 
clandestine organizations (e.g., Bean & Buikema, 2015; Stohl & Stohl, 2007), as well as 
emerging news regarding ISIL and its adherents were read prior to and concurrent with 
analysis.   
Using Bean and Buikema’s (2015) paper as an exemplary model for this 
research, I chose the aforementioned Dabiq texts to serve as representative 
organizational documents by which ISIL attempts to position its organizational image to 
the world.  Other organizational communication scholars have conducted similar case 
studies successfully by using the CCO four-flows model to investigate the constitutive 
force of organizational documents (e.g., Browning, Greene, Sitkin, Sutcliffe, & 
Obstfeld, 2009; Lutgen-Sandvik & McDermott, 2008).  Bean and Buikema (2015) 
selected and analyzed a key collection of al Qaeda’s organizational texts—the 17 
Abbottabad documents acquired during the raid on Bin Laden’s compound.  Their 
analysis examined how clandestine terrorist organizations’ production of organizational 




noted that the documents they chose for their analysis were significant because they 
“provide a rare glimpse of communication among members of a hidden organization” 
(p. 7).  Although ISIL is by no means a “hidden organization,” many comparisons have 
been made between ISIL and al Qaeda in efforts to study the communication within and 
amongst terrorist networks and organizations, as well as in applying the CCO four flows 
model to understanding communication within large terrorist organizations (e.g., Bean 
& Buikema, 2015).  Thus, previous research suggests that this particular approach to 
data collection and subsequent analysis is appropriate for the aims of this dissertation.  
Cochran and Dolan (1984) allege that scholars have become increasingly 
concerned about the fact that much research conducted appears to be “dominated by a 
concern for methodology rather than a concern for the means and consequences of 
research” (p. 25).  Thus, the method proposed for the present research attempts to 
analyze the texts both comprehensively and rigorously while keeping the end result of 
the research in mind.  The goal of this research was to learn more about the discursive 
means through which ISIL attempts to position itself and subsequently legitimize its 
existence on a global scale.  Such insight might help to develop possible communicative 
strategies for challenging those claims to institutional positioning and legitimacy.  
Although interpreting qualitative data is often an “indescribably ambiguous process,” 
researchers have the responsibility and obligation to describe their analysis paths as 
transparently as possible (Tracy, 2013, p. 10).  This, as Tracy notes, is particularly true 
for credibility and pedagogical reasons.   
To begin, I read through the first three issues of Dabiq to immerse myself in the 




process is to “absorb and marinate in the data, jotting down reflections and hunches, but 
reserving judgment” (p. 188).  Here, my goal was to determine what was “going on” in 
the data (Carbaugh, 2007).  Unlike traditional grounded theory practices, throughout 
this analytic process I continued to read news stories involving ISIL, as well as related 
scholarly work.  Thinking about these materials as I immersed myself in the texts aided 
in my sensemaking processes, allowing me to think about potential directions that the 
ensuing research could follow (Tracy, 2013, p. 188).  Tracy (2013) cites the importance 
of asking Weik’s infamous question, i.e., “What is a story here” (Weick, 2001, p. 461) 
in order to ensure the analyst remains open to multiple meanings (p. 188).  As I read, I 
took notes related to this question to refer back to when coding and further analyzing 
the texts.   
Next, a PDF version of each Dabiq magazine was uploaded to NVivo, a 
computer software program designed to aid in data management.  NVivo is particularly 
helpful for organizing large amounts of qualitative data.  NVivo, itself, does not 
proscribe a method; Bazeley (2007) argues that software, such as NVivo, supports a 
wide range of analytic approaches to qualitative data.  “The use of a computer 
[program] is not intended to supplant time-honored ways of learning from the data” 
Bazeley contends (p. 2).  Rather, the use of such programs is intended “to increase the 
effectiveness and efficiency of such learning” (Bazeley, 2007, p. 2).  Bazeley further 
argues that using computer programs, such as NVivo, helps to certify rigor in the 
analysis process, as the use aids the researcher in working more “methodically, more 
thoroughly, and more attentively” than she would be able to work if she was working 




Once all the texts were uploaded to NVivo, I began primary cycle coding 
(Tracy, 2013), similar to what grounded theorists refer to as “open coding” (Charmaz, 
2006).  Tracy (2013) explains the process of coding as the “active process of identifying 
data as belonging to, or representing, some type of phenomenon”—be it a concept, 
belief, action, theme, cultural practice, or relationship (p. 189).  Code labels capture the 
essence of the data, and primary-cycle coding consists of creating first-level codes, 
focusing on summarizing what is present in the data (Tracy, 2013).  Importantly, coding 
is not a passive, repetitive, mechanical task; rather, the process is reflexive, as the 
researcher reads through and revisits the data throughout the analysis (Tracy, 2013).   
As I progressed through the primary cycle coding, I returned to re-read 
previously-coded issues of Dabiq to re-examine and re-code the content, if needed, as 
my understanding of the patterns within the texts evolved.  Referred to as a “constant 
comparative” method of analysis (Charmaz, 2006), this iterative process of going back 
through the data is reflexive and circular.  Analyzing the data in this manner allowed me 
to compare and sort the data applicable to each code, modify code definitions and 
explanations, and add new codes as I progressed through the analysis and read through 
new data (Tracy, 2013).  To remain focused on the research questions at hand, as I read 
through the Dabiq documents I asked myself an analytic question: “How is ISIL 
attempting to legitimize itself here?”  With this question in mind, as new codes 
emerged, I was able to go back and re-read the magazines to cross check examples and 
anecdotes.  As Bisel, Barge, Dougherty, Lucas, and Tracy (2014) contend, when dealing 
with “big” qualitative data, (i.e., data that is large in sheer number, is highly complex, 




checking the analysis is important, particularly when the researcher cannot member 
check their analysis or go back to collect more data (p. 636).   
The next stage of the analysis process was secondary cycle coding, where I 
“critically examine[d] the codes already identified in primary codes and [began] to 
organize, synthesize, and categorize them into interpretive concepts” (Tracy, 2013, p. 
194).  As I read through the data, codes, and themes, I kept the following analytic 
question in mind: “In what ways do these legitimacy claims indicate a sense of 
recognition, on the part of ISIL, that their claims of legitimacy will be contested?”  
Thinking about this question as I read through the Dabiq dataset helped me reflect on 
the transactional nature of institutional positioning, one of the central considerations of 
this research.  Secondary cycle coding is similar to what Strauss and Corbin (1990) 
refer to as “axial coding,” or, the process of bringing the data back together into a 
coherent whole after it had been fractured into codes.  This process is also referred to as 
“focused coding” (Charmaz, 2006, p. 60).  Focused coding, or as used in this 
dissertation, secondary cycle coding, aims to link codes with subcategories, and asks, 
“How are they related?”  (Charmaz, 2006, p. 61).  Importantly, however, my analytic 
process differs from that of traditional grounded methods of analysis in that I drew from 
outside disciplinary concepts; in other words, concepts that would only emerge and be 
understood with knowledge of associated outside literature (Tracy, 2013).  For example, 
as I read through my primary codes, I readily identified instances of “materiality,” 
which enabled me to draw on the socio-materiality literature relevant to my analysis.  
This understanding of the literature on materiality helped parse out examples of 




In other words, reading relevant literature helped me remain sensitive to what was 
known and unknown about the codes that were being identified in the texts as I 
analyzed them.  
Important to this secondary coding phase was the identification of “poignant 
examples” that illustrated the complexity of the data and analysis (Tracy, 2013, p. 207).  
Tracy (2013) describes exemplars (“significant and multi-faceted examples”) and 
vignettes (“focused description of a series of events taken to be representative, typical, 
or emblematic”), which serve as “embodiments” of inductive constructs or claims (pp. 
207-208).  I noted these examples on my notepad, as well as in NVivo, to ensure that I 
would return to them when finalizing my analysis.   
The final stages of analysis consisted of theorizing about the interrelationships 
amongst the legitimacy appeals that constituted the thematic categories.  My goal in this 
stage of analysis was to uncover a “sensitizing concept” (Blumer, 1969) to bring the 
analysis together, providing a theoretical contribution for the overall analysis.  As 
Christians and Carey (1989) explain, the development of concepts is important for 
formulating categories that are both meaningful and sufficiently powerful to explain 
large domains of social experience.  Sensitized concepts are defined by Christians and 
Carey as “taxonomical systems that discover an integrating scheme within the data 
themselves,” and refer to an orientation “short of formal definition, yet apropos enough 
to help us cultivate facts vigorously” (p. 370).  Finally, sensitizing concepts are the 
“building blocks of qualitative research,” which help to capture meaning at different 





Qualitative Rigor and Moving Beyond “Themes” 
Both Creswell (2007) and Howe and Eisenhart (1990) provide a set of standards 
and strategies to enhance the rigor and credibility of qualitative research—what 
Creswell labels “validation strategies.”  Creswell (2007) suggests that at least two of his 
eight strategies be employed; I incorporated four into the research design of this 
dissertation, namely: triangulation, transferability, peer review, and researcher 
reflexivity.  
Similar to what Creswell (2007) and other qualitative scholars refer to as 
“triangulation” (p. 208), or multiple bases of evidence, I balanced my analysis and 
rendering of results with “broader knowledge bases from other bodies of knowledge,” 
(Tucker, Powell, & Meyer, 1995, p. 388).  Given the complexity and relevancy of the 
topic at hand, I found it necessary to employ a research method that did not limit my 
access and ability to incorporate extant literature and varied sources of knowledge on 
the subject.  As Howe and Eisenhart (1990) contend, simply linking research questions 
with data collection and analysis techniques “do[es] not ensure that a study will render 
warranted conclusions, for studies must be judged against a background of existent 
knowledge” (p. 7). Taking their recommendation, I remained attentive and willing to 
employ insights from outside the particular perspective and tradition within which I was 
working throughout my analysis.  
Second, the ability of my research to be transferable to similar contexts was 
essential as I designed the method adhered to within this dissertation.  Thus, throughout 
my analysis, I incorporated “rich, thick description” to allow readers to determine, for 




organizational contexts (Creswell, 2007, p. 209).  To this end, I attempted to answer the 
“so what?” question, focusing both on creating new knowledge and contributing to 
theory building in specific ways.  My goal was always to “provide a cogent assessment 
of the value of research findings” (Tucker et al., 1995, p. 388).  To accomplish this, I 
“move[d] beyond the themes” throughout the various stages of analysis, keeping in 
mind an end goal of a contribution to theory building (Lucas & D’Enbeau, 2013, p. 
214).  Although the establishment of themes are a staple of qualitative research, Lucas 
and D’Enbeau (2013) urge scholars to perform deeper analysis and interpretation that 
requires “extensive engagement with [the texts], emerging theory, and the contexts in 
which they are all embedded” (p. 214) and subsequent synthesis with the literature.  
Thus, as my method section outlines, I completed multiple levels of coding and analysis 
before reaching any conclusions advocated in this dissertation.  
The third strategy I integrated into my research design was incorporating peer 
review and expert consultation.  In terms of peer review as defined by Creswell (2007), 
I worked closely with my faculty advisor, Dr. Ryan Bisel, throughout the analysis 
process.  Bisel played the role of “devil’s advocate,” asking hard questions about the 
methods used and the meanings and interpretations of the data (Creswell, 2007, p. 208).  
I also consulted with two scholars from outside my department: Dr. Charles Kimball 
and Dr. Joshua Landis.  Neither Kimball nor Landis had specific connections to the 
research project, but both are experts in their particular fields relating to topics 
discussed within this dissertation.  Kimball is an expert on religion, and wrote one of 
the books on Islam and extremism used as a resource in this research.  Landis is an 




East Studies at the University of Oklahoma.  Landis provided me with resources 
regarding the socio-political climate and growing tensions in Syria. 
Finally, Creswell (2007) recommends researchers clarify and indicate any 
researcher bias that might influence their analysis from the onset of the work.  Creswell 
(2007) notes that the researcher should “comment on any past experiences, biases, 
prejudices, and orientations that have likely shaped the interpretation and approach to 
the study” (p. 208).  While I limited any outside influences that may affect my ability to 
analyze the text(s) for what it is, it is difficult, if not impossible, to approach a value-
laden topic objectively.  I bore witness to the terrorist attacks in Paris, France and San 
Bernardino, California by ISIL members and sympathizers, respectively.  Further, my 
apprehension shrouding such organizations existed for years; I was a middle school 
student living in the suburbs of New York City during the World Trade Center attacks 
on September 11th.  Further, the most optimistic end goal of my research is to help bring 
an end to the organization serving as the subject for this dissertation.  Given those aims, 
however, I have done my best to remain faithful to the text, and avoid unwarranted 
conjectures.  
To conclude, Lucas and D’Enbeau (2013) identify several “harmful habits” that 
result in surface-level analyses, which I avoided specifically throughout this endeavor.  
First, they warn that qualitative analysis is inherently slow; so I paced my analysis in an 
attempt to avoid rushing and moving too quickly in order to meet deadlines.  Similarly, 
they also warn scholars not to “privilege the product” and “marginalize the process” of 
analysis; data analysis is a “messy, circuitous, and iterative process” and does not result 




ensure my method was rigorous and my findings were rich was at the forefront of my 
research agenda.  The results should be intricate, detail-oriented, and context-rich.  
Third, Lucas and D’Enbeau (2013) call for qualitative researchers to strike a balance 
between technique and artistry.  In other words, it is important for researchers not to get 
caught in a method’s strictness so as to blind themselves to the data and theory-building 
opportunities present within it.  Tracy’s (2013) description of an iterative analysis 
recognizes, at the same time, the limitations of following a strict, rigid method, as well 
as the importance of a rigorous analysis.  I chose Tracy’s iterative method of analysis 





Chapter 5: Findings 
 
Analysis of the Dabiq series revealed ISIL’s institutional positioning conformed 
to a communication pattern I define as a transactional organizational identity narrative 
(see Figure 2).  The transactional organizational identity narrative is comprised of a set 
of legitimacy appeals that, together, socially construct the unfolding of a collective’s 
defining characteristics across time, and anticipate and refute other collectives’ 
delegitimation attempts.  Across the pages of the magazines, the transactional 
organizational identity narrative consisted of three broad categories of institutional 








Figure 2.  Transactional Organizational Identity Narrative 
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constitution with a antagonistic reason for being.  These three appeals, together, 
communicate a narrative that positions ISIL’s organizational image as unfolding across 
time and in constant competition with the West (e.g., ISIL’s present, past, and future).  
In other words, the appeals together tell the transactional organizational identity 
narrative that symbolically constructs the organization’s ontology.  In constructing its 
image in this way, ISIL is able to employ the power of narrative to position its 
organizational image as temporally distributed and therefore more permanent, thus 
establishing its “place” in the larger social system (McPhee & Zaug, 2000).   
In the pages that follow, I explain the three types of institutional legitimacy 
appeals used by ISIL in the pages of Dabiq, and illustrate how those appeals function 
together to form a transactional organizational identity narrative.  I begin, first, by 
discussing how ISIL constructs its narrative in the present.  It is through the 
construction of this present narrative that ISIL establishes a framework by which to 
situate their past and project into its future, symbolically demonstrating their 
organization’s enduring sense of ontological recalcitrance and the legitimacy that image 
creates.   
Material Appeals to Institutional Legitimacy: Providing credibility to ISIL’s 
Organizational Identity Narrative in the Present 
ISIL is unlike any other terrorist organization that the West has had to deal with 
to date (Cronin, 2015).  ISIL managed to amass a large swath of land, harvest natural 
and energy resources, and gain financial security.  Additionally, ISIL secured social 
services for its members and has built civilian infrastructure.  These material assets 




attempts to claim legitimacy.  ISIL’s control over material resources has resulted in two 
discursive considerations:  (1) in influencing the means by which ISIL is able to 
legitimize itself globally and (2) in shifting the ways in which the West positions ISIL.  
In other words, ISIL’s access to material resources influences both the ways ISIL is able 
to position its own organizational image, and the ways ISIL gets positioned by 
[outsider] superpowers.   
In what follows, I present the appeals the editors of Dabiq use in their attempts 
to position ISIL’s organizational image as legitimate based on their present status as an 
emerging de facto nation state.  Important for establishing its ontological constitution, 
ISIL’s main emphasis in the present is on its use of organizational and material appeals.  
That is, it is important for ISIL to first position itself as a State in its institutional field, 
in order to then position itself as a legitimate one that has a place in the larger social 
system and international politics of the world stage.   
ISIL and its Emergence as a De Facto Nation-State 
Current Western rhetoric surrounding the emergence of ISIL on a global scale 
centered on President Obama’s initial assessment of the group: that the terrorist 
organization emerging in Iraq and Syria is “certainly not a state” (Office of the Press 
Secretary, 10 September 2014, n.p.).  However, since the President’s initial statement a 
year and a half ago, there has been much discussion as to how to label and name the 
group that calls itself the Islamic State (see the discussion on the importance of naming 
in the previous chapter).  ISIL, however, has been aware of Obama’s assessment from 
the beginning, and worked explicitly to counter claims made by the West, which 




successful in its attempts to challenge Obama’s initial assessment.  As more intelligence 
about ISIL is gathered, and as its devastating influence on the global socio-political 
stage increases, Western scholars and policy makers alike altered those initial 
assessments of the organization.  Although many warn against this terminology (Furlow 
et al., 2014), there is now wide recognition that ISIL, in many ways, is emerging as de 
facto nation state (Cronin, 2015).  As a result of its recent social and material gains, not 
only has ISIL countered President Obama’s preliminary assessments, but it has also 
begun to change the ways in which the West positions the organization.    
One common method ISIL employed to counter Western claims discrediting 
their statehood is by quoting Western officials who themselves indicate how their 
positioning of ISIL had changed.  In terms of building ISIL’s legitimacy based on 
organizational and material assets, much of the work has already been done for them 
through their reappropriation of Western discourses.  In every issue of Dabiq, there is a 
section titled “In the Words of the Enemy,” where editors insert direct quotations from 
Western politicians, leaders, military strategists, and journalists.  Dabiq editors chose to 
channel extremely poignant excerpts from Western leaders’ remarks which tend to 
focus on one of two main issues: (1) recent successes of ISIL (particularly in terms of 
their material gains) and (2) failures of the US and the West in response to advances 
made by ISIL.  As explained in the pages that follow, this “In the Words of the Enemy” 
section included in each issue of the magazine reminds readers of the strength of the 
Islamic State’s material assets.  Those reminders provide credibility to their subsequent 
claims to institutional legitimacy.  One of the most alarming examples of this 




the RAND Corporation, and Gary Bernsten, a former CIA intelligence officer, “on an 
interview with Fox News on the 9th March” (Issue 9, p. 74).  The excerpt is as follows:  
Say one group is very good at bomb making and the other group is very good at 
propaganda,” says Jonah Blank from the US “think-tank” RAND Corporation.  
“If you put the right bomb in the right place for the right propaganda effect, that 
can be far more important than either of these things on their own.”  “This isn’t 
just propaganda,” said Gary Bernsten, a former CIA intelligence officer on an 
interview with Fox News on 9th March.  “ISIS has billions of dollars.  They 
have a network of communications for reaching out to these groups.  And it 
shows you how deadly and effective ISIS is.  They are truly the most successful 
Sunni terrorist group in history because they’ve carved out a space for a nation 
state, and these other groups recognize that.  It shows Obama’s statement that 
‘this isn’t Islam’ is a false narrative.  ISIS has been brilliant at selling itself to 
the hundreds of millions of people out there looking for a message.  What’s 
happening now is a pooling of skills and experience that poses the greatest 
danger the West has seen in modern times.  When you have that amount of 
battle-hardened mujāhidīn all cooperating and exchanging information for the 
first time under one flag, the potential for operations on a previously unseen 
level rises exponentially. (p. 75) 
 
Although long, this excerpt is particularly important in terms of summarizing the way 
ISIL positions itself within the pages of Dabiq.  The appeal uses a Westerner’s 
assessment to position ISIL as “deadly,” “effective,” and, most of all, resource rich. The 
Westerner evaluates the organization in terms of its successful propaganda and 
communication strategies, its wealth, its training, and its perpetuation and spread of a 
violent ideology used to frame itself as legitimate.  
Another example of using “In the Words of the Enemy” to bolster ISIL’s 
legitimacy comes from the first issue of Dabiq, titled “The Return of the Khilafah 
[Caliphate].”  The editors quote Douglas Ollivant, former director for Iraq at the US 
National Security Council, and Brian Fishman, former Director of Research for the 
Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point.  The Dabiq team provides several excerpts 




as well as other important cities and towns in Iraq” (Issue 1, p. 32).  The quotes the 
Dabiq editorial team chose to include are as follows:  
Out of the crucible of the Syrian civil war and the discontent in Iraq’s Sunni 
regions, something new is emerging.  The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) 
is no longer a state in name only.  It is a physical, if extra-legal, reality on the 
ground.  Unacknowledged by the world community, ISIS has carved a de facto 
state in the borderlands of Syria and Iraq.  […] this former Al Qaeda affiliate 
holds territory, provides limited services, dispenses a form of justice (loosely 
defined), most definitely has an army, and flies its own flag.  (Issue 1, p. 32; 
emphasis added) 
 
ISIL reminds us of their resource rich status by continuing to use Ollivant and 
Fishman’s words: 
This new reality presents a challenge that rises above a mere counter-terrorism 
problem.  ISIS no longer exists in small cells that can be neutralized by missiles 
or small groups of commandos.  It is now a real, if nascent and unrecognized, 
state actor—more akin in organization and power to the Taliban of the late 
1990s than Al Qaeda.  (Issue 1, p. 32; emphasis added) 
 
The two conclude, noting: “The group does not have a safe haven within a state.  It is a 
de facto state that is a safe haven” (Issue 1, p. 32).  Interestingly, the Dabiq team 
provides no further commentary about these excerpts; there is not much explanation 
needed, as the text, in the words of [ISIL’s] enemy itself, conveys the incipient 
challenge the West faces when presented with ISIL’s material accomplishments.  
Although ISIL was once considered a “jayvee squad of terrorists” (Sinha, 2015, n.p.), 
they are no longer a “mere counter-terrorism problem,” but a territory holding, service 
providing, and army training, de facto nation-state (Issue 1, p. 32).  As will next be 
made even more explicit, the language used in Ollivant and Fishman’s message seems 
to communicate a clear shift in the ways the West constructed the Islamic State 
discursively (e.g., “new reality,” “it is now,” “it is no longer”).  Again, this unique 




material gains have been recognized and acknowledged by the West.  Additionally, this 
recognition has resulted in a shift in the level of credibility the West affords to the 
Islamic State.  The implication is that the reader should follow suit.  
This shift in the West’s construction of ISIL is most explicitly supported in John 
Cantlie’sv article in Issue 8 of Dabiq, an article he titled: “Paradigm Shift.”  In that 
issue, the Dabiq team continues to emphasize ISIL’s status as a “new,” yet powerful, 
state actor, again doing so in the words of Westerners themselves.  The subheading of 
Cantlie’s article here reads as follows: “…there appears now a grudging acceptance by 
many Western politicians that the Islamic State is different to anything they’ve seen 
before.  Their response, by necessity, has to be different too” (Issue 8, p. 64).  In the 
article that follows, Cantlie outlines several of the major material assets that ISIL 
secured, emphasizing that in many ways, ISIL developed into what Westerners would 
normally consider a “country” (Issue 8, p. 64).  For example, he explains how ISIL 
“produce[s] their own currency, primary schools for the young, and [has] a functioning 
court system” (Issue 8, p. 64).  ISIL, using Cantlie’s words, reminds readers that these 
civic innovations are “surely”: 
Hallmarks of (whisper it if you dare) a country. […] Ah, the C-word.  It’s being 
used sporadically by the media, slowly at first, but its use is gather[ing] pace. 
Could the Islamic State, the Caliphate that was only announced in June, really 
be a country?  As uncomfortable as it may be for many in the West, there’s little 
reason why the State shouldn’t be considered a country.  Countries can be born 
in days, in hours during a coup, or in minutes at the signing of a paper, they have 
been for centuries.  So there’s no reason this one shouldn’t have been born the 
way it was.  (Issue 8, p. 64) 
 
In this excerpt, ISIL uses Cantlie’s—a Westerner—words to attempt to legitimate 
ISIL’s “birth” by first acknowledging how ISIL emerged in much the same way as other 




“paradigm shift,” in that the West must begin to acknowledge that “at some stage [it 
will] have to face the Islamic State as a country” (Issue 8, p. 66).  “Although the West 
might never admit such a thing,” the article continues,  
There are Western politicians who are beginning to realize this fact and thus, 
little by little, we’re seeing a changing of vernacular, a paradigm shift in how 
those leaders talk about the State, because if it is a country – whether recognized 
by anyone or not (and the Islamic State doesn’t care either way) – then that 
changes things, dramatically.  (p. 66; emphasis added) 
  
These excerpts from Cantlie’s article accomplish three simultaneous functions related to 
advocating for ISIL’s present, organizational reality and thus legitimacy.  First, 
Cantlie’s narrative provides a powerful example of the transactional nature of ISIL’s 
institutional positioning attempts: The Islamic State declares itself a Caliphate, a label 
that the US, at first, rejected openly.  This rejection, however, is contested by ISIL 
through their material advances and territorial gains, resulting in their legitimacy 
positioning being challenged by the US discursively.  This observation illustrates how 
institutional positioning can be transactional.   
Second, ISIL, in using Cantlie’s article, directs the reader’s attention to his 
conclusion that ISIL is more than just a “terrorist organization” and more importantly, 
that there is no reason why ISIL should not be labeled as a country.  Significant to this 
point is Cantlie’s statement regarding the West’s hesitation to refer to the organization 
as such.  The importance of naming and labeling organizations is important to be 
reiterated, here; the mere label of a “state” might in and of itself serve to legitimize the 
existence of a Caliphate.  Interestingly, however, Cantlie’s article also adds that the 
Islamic State does not care whether or not the West refers to it as a “State”—the very 




it is important to recognize that ISIL is effectively speaking through Cantlie here.  In 
terms of ISIL’s attempts to be perceived as a legitimate threat to the West and its assets, 
the mere fact that this discussion is taking place there, in the West, is a step forward for 
ISIL.   
Finally, ISIL, in using Cantlie’s article, explains that the paradigm shift of 
conceptualizing ISIL as a “State” would not only result in a change in vernacular, but 
would also affect policies aimed at defeating the group as well as efforts aimed at 
influencing public perception.  “You can’t just conveniently write it off as merely ‘a 
terrorist organization,’” Cantlie’s article expresses, “because [that] doesn’t wash with 
the public” (p. 66).  To refer to ISIL as just a terrorist organization does not do justice to 
its amassing influence and power, but, at the same time, for the West to refer to it as a 
nation, would be equating it with what the West holds to be true of modern-nation 
states, thus giving ISIL some measure of symbolic legitimacy.  
The Dabiq editorial team, too, works to position ISIL as a powerful emerging 
nation-state, as supported by the discursive choices and narrative structure used 
throughout the magazine.  The team rejects the given label of “just” another terrorist 
group, or as noted below, “guerillas or gangsters,” and promotes ISIL’s advances by 
reminding readers of material gains as a way to reconcile its attempts at gaining 
legitimacy in the eyes of the West.  For example, the Dabiq editors write, “The Islamic 
State is not some bunch of guerillas or gangsters.  They have 32,000 fighters, tanks, 
missile system, law courts, a police force, and they control the second largest city in 
Iraq.  Surely they must be considered large enough and serious enough for any 




functions with this one excerpt:  First, Dabiq recited and then counters the Western 
labels given to ISIL: they are not “guerillas or gangsters.”  Second, they again highlight 
the material assets of the State, including courts of law and a police force—suggesting 
to many Westerners a semblance of structure, order, and stability.  And finally, as 
evidenced by the latter part of the statement (i.e., “surely they must…”) the editors 
emphasize that ISIL’s material size and strength should be large enough for the 
organization to be taken seriously.  The linguistic choice of the word “surely,” here, 
may also be read as sarcasm—the Dabiq team is once again calling attention to the 
West’s initial assessment of ISIL explicitly, resulting in their refusal to see the group as 
a threat from the beginning.  Thus, by reminding readers of ISIL’s material assets in the 
present, the Dabiq team carves out a present context from which it can simultaneously 
build its own credibility as an emerging de facto nation-state and, as detailed next, 
challenge Western claims that deride their ontological status as a state.  
Therefore, another way the Islamic State attempts to position itself as legitimate 
is by responding explicitly to the West’s delegitimizing efforts.  In doing so, the 
potentially transactional nature of institutional positioning is made apparent in ISIL’s 
construction of their organizational identity narrative.  In the following excerpt, for 
example, the Dabiq editors comment on the West’s use of the term “Daesh,” a labeling 
practice employed by Western leaders and the media in their attempts to delegitimize 
the group.vi  In the passage that follows, the editorial team attempts to thwart the 
institutional delegitimizing efforts of the United States.  In a feature article of Issue 4, 
titled “Reflections on the Final Crusade,” Dabiq editors write: 
Since the beginning of this crusade on the media frontline, self-styled jihadist 




is neither Islamic State nor Sahwah [US funded Iraqi militia]… only to be 
sucked into the trenches of the apostate media and religious scholarship of the 
Arab tawāghīt [rulers of the Arab States].  They even imitated the nusayriyyah 
and secularist opposition by labeling the Islamic State as “Daesh” and 
“Tandhīm ad-Dawlah,” in a manner precisely mimicking the satellite channels 
and palace scholars of Āl Salūl and Qatar.  One of the top “jihadist ideologues” 
presented a verdict entailing ways to confront the “extremism and takfīr” of 
“Jamā’at ad-Dawlah” matching those expressed by Obama, Chuck Hagel, 
Dempsey, and the US State Department.  His suggestions included preventing 
financial and human resources from reaching the Islamic State as well as 
religiously delegitimizing the State in a manner US officials said “Muslim” 
scholars must do. (Issue 4, p. 43; emphasis added) 
 
In this passage, ISIL references the antagonistic label of “Daesh” used by Western 
powers to disparage and delegitimize the organization and decrease its religious 
legitimacy.  Additionally, they put the term Muslim in quotes (i.e., “in a manner US 
officials said ‘Muslim’ scholars must do”) to remind their readers that these “scholars” 
are not true Muslims, but instead, are associated with apostate media and religious 
scholarship of the West.  Furthermore, they cite Western policies aimed at weakening 
ISIL, such as preventing financial and human resources from getting to Iraq and Syria.  
In doing so, the Dabiq team again acknowledges the importance of securing the 
“material” assets needed in order for the West to consider ISIL a state; assets that the 
present narrative being constructed privileges.  
Building Credibility Through Material Assets 
The notion of materiality (e.g., access to land and resources) is essential in 
ISIL’s attempts at institutional positioning.  Land ownership, an army, and financial 
security provide ISIL’s communicative constitution (i.e., declaring themselves a 
Caliphate) with significant interpretive benefits.  However, it is not only that ISIL has, 
or claims to have, these material assets; rather, it is that ISIL leverages the symbolic 




constitution and existence.  Thus, throughout the pages of Dabiq, the editors go to great 
lengths to remind readers of ISIL’s state building efforts by presenting photographs and 
establishing their present narrative involving the material conditions they have secured.  
The physical existence and distribution of the magazine, itself, serves as a testament to 
these material accomplishments.  The glossy pages of Dabiq are full of high-resolution 
photographs depicting ISIL’s growing infrastructure and population.  For example, the 
Dabiq editors provide images of their new currency and children at play in the 
Caliphate (See Appendix A).  Furthermore, the “paradigm shift,” as previously 
discussed, emphasized ISIL’s amassing of material gains.  Importantly, the resultant 
image of a wealthy, secure, and material-possessing State is presented in an attempt to 
legitimize ISIL to the West as well as to an audience of potential foreign fighter 
recruits.  For ISIL to encourage people to perform hijrah [migration] would be difficult 
if they did not have any resources or security to offer.  Thus, in the pages that follow, I 
highlight the ways in which the Dabiq team constructed ISIL’s organizational identity 
narrative in the present based on the credibility provided by the acquisition of material 
assets.  
First, the façade ISIL built through its sophisticated and multifaceted media 
campaigns perpetuates its image as a seemingly legitimate nation state to both potential 
recruits as well as enemies.vii  Specifically, ISIL’s successful media campaigns were 
established and broadcasted by the Al Hayat (“Life”) Media Center—what could be 
considered a department of the Islamic State organization (See Appendix B).  In the 
first issue of Dabiq, the editors explain one of the main reasons for the magazine’s 




Islamic State News and Islamic State Report, Al Hayat Media Center decided to carry 
on the effort – in sha’allah [God willing]– into a periodical magazine focusing on issues 
of tawhid [unity], manhaj [truth-seeking], hijrah [migration], jihad [holy war], and 
jama’ah [community]”  (Issue 1, p. 3; translations from Clarion Project, September 
2014).  Therefore, the Dabiq magazine, in and of itself, serves as an artifact through 
which ISIL is able to position itself in the eyes of its enemies as well as its supporters, 
constructing its image as stable and permanent enough to produce such professional 
communiqués.   
As will be noted in the excerpt to follow, the combination of ultraviolence, a 
sense of civil order, and successful media messaging has been noted by Westerners to 
be a potentially dangerous combination.  In the sixth issue’s “In the Words of the 
Enemy” chapter, Dabiq editors quote former Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel’s 
synthesis of this dangerous combination: 
I think our capacity is different because the threats and the challenges are far 
more diffuse and varied.  I talked about asymmetric threats.  I mean the 
sophistication of ISIL – just take that for a moment.  We’ve never seen an 
organization like ISIL that is so well-organized, so well-trained, so well-funded, 
so strategic, so brutal, so completely ruthless.  We’ve never seen anything quite 
like that in one institution. Then they blend in ideology which will eventually 
lose*, we get that, and social media.  The sophistication of their social media 
program is something that we’ve never seen before.  You blend all of that 
together, that is an incredibly powerful new threat.  So we’re adjusting to this 
and we’re trying to – we can’t do it alone.  (Issue 6, p. 57)   
 
Here, Hagel addresses ISIL’s sophisticated social media platform, its well-trained and 
ruthless army, and its well-funded and strategic organizational strategies.  Additionally, 
ISIL uses his words to present itself as a new and powerful organizational threat—one 
that the US will need to adjust to.  Similar to the Cantlie excerpt presented earlier, the 




that the US has had to deal with in the past, suggesting also, that maybe the US has not 
recognized the potential threat ISIL poses.  The repetition of the phrase “so well” in 
regards to ISIL’s training and funding, coupled with words such as “sophisticated,” and 
“incredibly powerful” perpetuate this emergent image of ISIL both as an institution 
unlike anything the West has seen before, but also, as extremely advanced.  Further, 
ISIL uses Hagel words to reinforce for readers that the group is an incredibly well 
organized organization.  ISIL’s discursive choice here to re-employ the words of the US 
that take for granted its organization’s existence, reinforce the substance and legitimacy 
of its organizational image.  
Moreover, this particular excerpt is important in terms of understanding ISIL’s 
response to Western rhetoric as it presents, for the first time in the series, Dabiq’s direct 
response to the “words of the enemy.”  Interestingly, the Dabiq team challenges a 
portion of Hagel’s assertions, which is offset by a footnote (as denoted in the excerpt 
above with the “*”).  After Hagel’s declaration that, in the end, ISIL’s ideology will 
lose, the Dabiq team writes, “Allah said, ‘It is He who has sent His Messenger with 
guidance and the religion of truth to manifest it over all religion, even if the mushrikīn 
despise such’ [At-Tawbah: 33].”  Although Hagel is steadfast in his assessment that 
ISIL’s ideology is inherently going to lose, the Dabiq team evokes God’s will (a trope 
used throughout the series, as seen in the next section,) to reject and counter Hagel’s 
claims.  In this way, the Dabiq editors are able to reappropriate portions of Western 
voices for the legitimation appeals, while also discounting portions of those voices.  
One of the most shocking examples of ISIL’s appeal to their material 




for the State’s medical and scientific infrastructure—two institutions Westerners would 
associate with nation-building, not mere terrorist networks.  Alongside images of 
pristine and technologically-equipped hospitals, the Dabiq team describes the 
developing healthcare system and various preparations being considered for the future 
of the State (See Appendix C).  Taking the tone of an informational brochure about the 
Islamic State, the editors write:   
The Islamic State provides the Muslims with extensive healthcare by running a 
host of medical facilities including hospitals and clinics in all major cities 
through which it is offering a wide range of medical services, from various types 
of complicated surgery to simpler services such as hijāmah [cupping].  This 
infrastructure is aided by a widespread network of pharmacies run by qualified 
pharmacists and managed under the supervision and control of the Health Dīwān 
[department].  Just as the medical staff in the hospitals and clinics are made up 
of qualified, trained professionals, the pharmacies are likewise only run by 
qualified and certified pharmacists. (Issue 9, p. 25) 
 
Additionally, 
In order to ensure a steady supply of qualified medical personnel in the future as 
well as expanding and enhancing the current medical services from a 
professional as well as Islamic point of view, the Islamic State recently opened 
the Medical College in ar-Raqqah as well as the College for Medical Studies in 
Mosul.  (Issue 9, p. 25) 
 
Thus, the Islamic State touts its supposed present access to medical infrastructure 
intended for its citizenry.  Additionally, the pages of Dabiq present ISIL’s preparations 
for the future through their establishment of teaching hospitals to train the next 
generation of medical service professionals in the Islamic tradition.  According to 
Dabiq, this school is open to both women and men who seek a medical career with the 
eventual goal of helping Muslims in the Caliphate.  These ideas work to perpetuate the 
notion of inclusion that the editorial staff is attempting to establish, as well as position 




present and future.  Finally, this excerpt emphasizes the preparedness of all the 
professionals working in the state—the pharmacists are well qualified and there is what 
appears to be a Health Department (e.g., in Islamic societies, the term “Dīwān” is 
similar to a department; a chief administrative office or regional governing body).  
Reminding readers of these advances in the medical sciences (whether actually real or 
not) provides further evidence that the state is establishing itself in the present and 
preparing for the future.  In constructing ISIL’s existence in the present discursively, as 
well as their preparations for the future, the pages of Dabiq serve to reinforce ISIL’s 
organizational image as more credible and more permanent.    
The positioning of the State as able to provide for their inhabitants right now, as 
well as in the future, is an obvious persuasive legitimacy appeal for ISIL.  The editors of 
Dabiq make a convincing case to all potential recruits that their needs will be met once 
arriving in the State; medical, financial, security, religious, and educational needs are 
each discussed.  Although the thought of hijrah [migration to the Islamic State] might 
be daunting to many, especially to those traveling from afar, the Dabiq team makes it 
clear that the Islamic State will provide for those willing to make the journey.  For 
example, “Do not worry about money or accommodations for yourself and your 
family,” the team writes, “There are plenty of homes and resources to cover you and 
your family” (Issue 3, p. 33).  Although the editors acknowledge the warzone 
surrounding them, they attempt to dissipate the potential apprehension of prospective 
recruits.  As the editors explain, “in the midst of a raging war with multiple fronts and 
numerous enemies, life goes on in the Islamic State” (Issue 4, p. 27).  They go on to 




care of and their needs met:  “The soldiers of Allah do not liberate a village, town or 
city, only to abandon its residents and ignore their needs” (Issue 4, p. 27).  This appeal 
is then followed by a series of images, portraying the amenities and provisions offered, 
including: “Restoring electricity in the city of Ar-Raqqah,” “Cancer treatment for 
children in Ninawa,”  “Street cleaning services,”  “A care home for the elderly in 
Ninawa” (Issue 4, pp. 27-29; See Appendix D).  The Dabiq editors make the call to 
perform hijrah [migration] overtly, asserting: “The Islamic State offers everything that 
you need to live and work here, so what are you waiting for?”  (Issue 9, p. 26).    
The “shocking swiftness” by which ISIL was able to capture cities in Iraq and 
Syria was frequently discussed by the West in regards to ISIL’s emergence as a global 
threat (Saltman & Winter, 2014, p. 7).  Their military advances were unprecedented and 
unexpected.  One final way ISIL uses its material assets to position itself institutionally 
is through presenting its history of military successes; ISIL frames itself as a powerful 
and influential military stronghold that can no longer be ignored, or demoted to the 
level of a “jayvee squad” of terrorists (Sinha, 2015).  ISIL’s dedication to military jihad 
is supported by its sudden and successful military seizes of cities across the region and 
also in its strategic planning and organizational strategies as described in Dabiq.  As the 
Dabiq team implores, all Muslims are encouraged to “perform jihad in the path of Allah 
in order to terrorize His enemies” (Issue 6, p. 26).  The preparation for this jihad, they 
explain, covers all areas, including “physical preparation, tactical and strategic 
preparation, resource and logistics preparation, and most importantly religious 
preparation” (p. 26).  Some of this preparation can be completed in one’s hometown, 




be properly trained.  As the editors further rationalize,  “the Islamic State has 
established numerous training camps dedicated to providing an essential level of 
training to its mujāhidīn [i.e, Muslim who engages in (armed) jihad], including physical, 
tactical, weapons, and shar’ī training, before sending them into battle or assigning them 
to specific units for more specialized training” (Issue 6, p. 26).  All mujāhidīn, then, will 
be properly trained and prepared for battle.  
The Dabiq series touts its violent successes.  The first issue of Dabiq, for 
example, highlights ISIL’s military advances, positioning the State as battle-ready and 
destined to win.  Directly following two “Breaking News” articles, titled “The World is 
Divided into Two Camps” (Issue 1, p. 10) and “A Call to Hijrah [migration]” (Issue 1, 
p. 11), the Dabiq editors put together a detailed report describing the successes of the 
State thus far.  They first explain how ISIL has an “extensive history” of building 
relations with the tribes within its borders in an effort to strengthen the unity of all 
Muslims.  ISIL’s Head of Tribal Affairs, the team reports, explained the State’s 
successes, promoted the unity of all Muslims, and stressed the importance of 
implementing Shari’ah.  “He also spoke about the recent victories in Iraq,” the editors 
explained, 
Including the liberation of Wilayat Ninawa, the freeing of the prisoners of Ahlus 
Sunnah, taking control of Mosul airport and Maliki’s army bases, the demolition 
of the Sykes-Picot borders thus opening the way between Iraq and Sham, and 
much more.  In this regard, he stated: “We announce a new legacy of victories, 
further construction of the Islamic State and expansion of its territory.  (Issue 1, 
p. 13)  
  
Again, the Dabiq editors make it clear that the most recent victories are only a sign of 
what else is to come, as the Islamic State expands with its “new legacy of victories.”  




chronological ties to the past (a “history of successes”) and present (the “liberation of 
Wilayat Ninawa” and the “freeing of prisoners,” etc.), which help to explain ISIL’s 
“new legacy” of current victories.  
 This “new legacy of victories” is flaunted throughout the magazine, as, for 
example, the editors write, “despite what the Islamic State faces of economic, military, 
political, and media war, and despite all the different parties unified against it […] it 
advances from victory to victory” (Issue 2, p. 26).  They then dictate all of the State’s 
numerous victories: 
• It liberated all the eastern region of Syria from the sahwāt.  
• It liberated the wilāyāt of Nīnawā and al-Anbār as well as vast regions of 
other wilāyāt.  
• It caused the safawi army to disband, disperse, and disappear.  
• It killed rāfidah (“Muslims” according to the new al-Qā’idah leadership) by 
the thousands.  
• It kept to its promise and destroyed the border obstacles that formerly 
separated the lands of Iraq from Shām.  
• Its numbers continue to grow.  
• It announced the Khilāfah and people have begun to pledge allegiance to it 
in Algeria, Sudan, Indonesia, the Philippines, Waziristan, and other places.  
(Issue 2, p. 26) 
 
The fact that the Islamic State, in their terms, “liberated” so many regions and killed so 
many of their enemies serves as a crucial component in their ongoing legitimacy-
building narrative.  ISIL’s demonstrated military achievements function as yet another 
example of the sociomaterial resources they have at their disposal to be used as 
legitimacy-building appeals.  Additional examples can be noted from the 11th issue of 
Dabiq, where the editors continue to espouse to readers ISIL’s advances.  They share 
the events occurring in various wilāyats [territories] in the Caliphate: 
This month, the soldiers of the Khilāfah made a steady and persistent advance 
through the Qadam neighborhood of Dimashq over the course of several days. 




in which Sahwah fighters were entrenched, killing and wounding dozens of them 
and forcing the rest to flee in defeat. The mujāhidīn continue to advance against 
the Sahwah forces in Qadam in a bid to capture the entire area, which would 
place the Islamic State just a stone’s throw from the heart of Dimashq.  (Issue 
11, p. 30) 
 
And, 
The past month has seen a major advance by the Islamic State in the Halab 
countryside towards the Sahwah stronghold of Māri’. In a campaign dubbed 
“The Battle to Free the Prisoners,” the soldiers of the Khilāfah succeeded in 
capturing a number of villages in the region surrounding Māri’, including the 
villages of Harbal, Harjalah, Umm Hawsh, al-Wahshiyyah, Tallālayn, Shaykh 
‘Īsā, Kaljabrayn, and Sandaf, as well as the Māri’ grain silos. With the city of 
Māri’ surrounded on three sides, the soldiers of the Khilāfah have tightened the 
noose on the Sahwah factions allied to the crusaders and tawāghīt.  (Issue 11, p. 
30) 
 
As these excerpts suggest, the editorial staff does not limit itself to generating only 
sweeping generalizations of ISIL’s victories.  Rather, the Dabiq team discusses specific 
battle details and victories throughout the pages of the magazines, overly exaggerating 
ISIL’s success as the consequence of Western failures.   
The last example to be provided, below, comes from the eighth issue’s “In the 
Words of the Enemy” section.  The Dabiq editors quote “the Catholic crusader and 
American politician Rick Santorum” (Issue 8, p. 57).  Santorum’s words sum up the 
importance of recognizing the symbolic power that material assets have in building the 
credibility of the Islamic State.  Santorum said the following, as quoted by the Dabiq 
team:  
This is a caliphate that has been established and that means they are calling 
people from all over the world to come and fight this battle.  As long as they 
hold ground and continue to expand that ground, more and more will come.  The 
fact that we are delaying means that the Caliphate continues to exist.  They are 
not losing ground.  They are not being discredited in the eyes of the Muslim 
world.  They will get stronger. […] This is really important to understand.  The 
reason the West had a thousand year war with Islam is that Islam was ever 




eliminated.  Now they have established a caliphate.  They are dead serious about 
expanding it.  Unless we begin to take back that ground and make this caliphate 
just irrelevant in the eyes of the radical Muslim world, we are going to have a 
bigger and bigger problem.  (Issue 8, p. 57) 
 
The inclusion of this excerpt from Rick Santorum is important for two reasons, 
especially in light of ISIL’s military successes in various territories of Iraq and Syria.  
First, the Islamic State does not need to boast of its own achievements in terms of its 
messaging to potential recruits.  As is the case here, the “words of the enemy” seems to 
do this for them, as noted in the lines “they are not losing ground” and “they will get 
stronger.  This is really important to understand” (Issue 8, p. 57).  Santorum’s insistence 
on emphasizing ISIL’s expansion and material acquisitions contributes to this sense of 
legitimacy.  Second, this excerpt seems to position the West as inferior, having to catch 
up to the advances of the Caliphate.  Santorum’s tone, here, is urgent.  The seriousness 
by which the Islamic State is taking its objective to create and expand its Caliphate is 
evident: as Santorum warns, the Caliphate is holding ground and it will continue to 
expand so long as the West delays.  In this way, the pages of Dabiq contain appeals to 
institutional legitimacy that are characterized by a transactional nature.  Using the 
words of the enemy provides a strong basis of evidence to support their claim regarding 
a present context in which organizational and material accomplishments reveal ISIL’s 
existence in the present.  
Religious Appeals to Institutional Legitimacy: Stretching ISIL’s Organizational 
Identity Narrative into the Past 
Because the Islamic State is able to establish its present-day legitimacy through 
the use of appeals to materiality, it is able to create a position from which to narrate its 




its symbolic constitution and legitimacy into the historical past, thereby strengthening 
and lengthening its ontological claim to constitution.  In other words, Dabiq presents 
the Islamic State’s emergence today as the newest chapter in Islam’s enduring identity 
narrative.  Through the evocation of a history imbued with one particular (and in their 
view, only) interpretation of Islamic traditions and divine reinforcement, ISIL attempts 
to legitimize its present organizational identity (e.g., members of the Islamic State are 
Allah’s holy warriors) within an ongoing historical narrative of establishing a global 
Islamic Caliphate.   
However, while ISIL continues to construct its organizational identity as one 
evolving out of a deeply rooted religious foundation, the West works simultaneously to 
challenge that narrative.  “No religion condones the killing of innocents,” President 
Obama declared after ISIL’s initial declaration of the Caliphate in the summer of 2104 
(Office of the Press Secretary, 10 September 2014, n.p.).  Importantly, it is this 
recurring response that served as part of the foundation by which Western leaders and 
the media attempted to challenge ISIL’s legitimacy claims.  Yet, regardless of the 
West’s consistent assertion that while “this group may call itself the ‘Islamic State,’” 
and that it is certainly “not ‘Islamic’,” (President Obama, 10 September 2014, n.p.), 
ISIL continued to evoke its interpretation of Islamic doctrine as one of the most 
prevalent grounds it uses to construct both its organizational identity and institutional 
legitimacy.viii  Thus, in this next section, I explain how ISIL constructs its identity based 
on a historical, and particularly sacred foundation, in its attempts to legitimize a 




ISIL integrates sacred appeals into the pages of Dabiq in primarily three ways:  
First, the editorial team challenges present-day Western counter-positioning explicitly.  
Namely, since Islam is a religion of peace, ISIL cannot, therefore, be Islamic.  Second, 
ISIL emphasizes how the West underestimates and undervalues the role Allah has, and 
will continue to have, in ISIL’s ultimate future triumph over the West.  Third, the 
incorporation of Islamic doctrine into the magazine and the foundation by which ISIL 
has been constituted perpetuates the organizational identity narrative of an us-versus-
them dichotomy, or as the Dabiq team presents it: “the kufr and īmān” (i.e., the non-
believers and the believers).  
To begin, an overarching theme across the many examples of religious-based 
appeals is ISIL’s rejection of the Western narrative that Islam is a religion of peace.  
Throughout the pages of Dabiq, the editorial staff rejects this counter-positioning both 
implicitly and explicitly.  One of the most obvious examples of this rejection comes 
through Dabiq’s direct inclusion of the “verse of the sword,” the fifth verse of the ninth 
sura of the Quran.ix  Although previous examinations of extremist rhetoric suggest that 
Islamists tend to omit this passage from their stories, or at least, employ it very rarely, 
just a cursory glance through the Dabiq magazines indicate that references to this verse 
are profuse.x  As the following examples suggest, the verse, and references to it, are 
employed by the editorial team to justify violence in the name of Islam, and thus, the 
violent actions of ISIL.  For example, in Issue 4, the Dabiq team writes: 
Upon conquering the region of Sinjar in Wilāyat Nīnawā, the Islamic State 
faced a population of Yazidis, a pagan minority existent for ages in regions of 
Iraq and Shām. Their continual existence to this day is a matter that Muslims 
should question as they will be asked about it on Judgment Day, considering that 
Allah had revealed Āyat as-Sayf (the verse of the sword) over 1400 years ago.  




wherever you find them, and capture them, and besiege them, and sit in wait for 
them at every place of ambush.  But if they should repent, establish prayer, and 
give zakah, let them [go] on their way.  Indeed, Allah is Forgiving and 
Merciful.}  [At-Tawbah: 5].  (p. 14; emphasis added)  
 
Here, the Dabiq team condones the destruction of the Yazidis population as merely one 
example of the mushrikīn (polytheists; enemies of Islam) who, according to ISIL, need 
to be destroyed.  The passage quoted above suggests that Allah will question the 
Yazidis’ existence on judgment day; thus, they need to be destroyed today.  While this 
excerpt mentions the verse of the sword explicitly, additional implicit references to the 
verse are included throughout the pages of Dabiq.  For example: “Everyone who 
opposes this goal or stands in the path of this goal is an enemy for us and a target for 
our swords, whatever his name may be and whatever his lineage may be,” (Issue 8, p. 
3).  The constant reference to this verse delivers ISIL’s obvious call to arms and their 
sense of justification for inflicting death on the mushrikīn.  
Another explicit example comes from Issue 7, in which there is an entire chapter 
titled, “Islam is the Religion of the Sword, Not Pacifism.”  Although the title of this 
chapter, alone, serves to counter Western interpretations of Islam as a religion of peace, 
the institutional legitimacy appeals to religion presented within this chapter further 
challenge those Western discourses.  The Dabiq editorial team contends, for example, 
that, 
There is a slogan repeated continuously by apologetic “du’āt” [preachers] when 
flirting with the West and that is their statement: ‘Islam is the religion of peace’ 
[…] They have repeated this slogan so much to the extent that some of them 
alleged that Islam calls to permanent peace with kufr and the kāfirīn.  How far is 
their claim from the truth, for Allah has revealed Islam to be the religion of the 
sword, and the evidence for this is so profuse that only a zindīq (heretic) would 





As observed in this example, the writers argue that Allah demonstrated, quite 
exhaustively, that Islam is the religion of the sword and “only heretics would argue 
otherwise.”  The editors also suggest that Islamic preachers (i.e., the du’āt) in the West, 
as well as those sympathetic towards Western objectives, tolerate this interpretation of 
Islam as a religion of peace.  ISIL, on the other hand, claims this interpretation “so far 
from the truth.”  Importantly, however, this passage serves as another poignant example 
of the transactional nature of ISIL’s positioning: this excerpt challenges the West’s 
interpretation of Islam explicitly and suggests that Western sympathizers are misguided 
in their understanding of Islam as Allah revealed.  Furthermore, there is a degree of 
sarcasm and certainty evoked associated with their assertions here that Islam is the 
religion of the sword.  The sarcasm is indicated through ISIL’s discursive choices, 
including word choice such as “profuse evidence,” and “how far is their claim from the 
truth.”  For readers, the certainty evoked through the editors’ diction as exemplified 
here serves to reaffirm that ISIL’s interpretation of Islam, as portrayed throughout 
Dabiq, is authoritative, definitive, and true.  
Throughout the magazine, the Dabiq team provides additional references to the 
verse of the sword and other calls to arms.  For example, in Issue 7, the team writes, 
“Alī Ibn Abī Tālib  said, ‘Allah’s Messenger […] was sent with four swords: a sword 
for the mushrikīn [polytheists; enemies of Islam], {And when the sacred months have 
passed, then kill the mushrikīn [polytheists; enemies of Islam], wherever you find 
them}’” (p. 20).  The killing of the mushrikīn is a recurring coda throughout the 
magazine, further intensifying ISIL’s violent interpretation of the religious texts and 




There is no place for the mushrikīn in the peninsula of Muhammad […]  Draw 
your swords. Deal with the Rāfidah [those who reject] first, wherever you find 
them, then Āl Salūl and their soldiers before the crusaders and their bases.  Deal 
with the Rāfidah, Āl Salūl, and their soldiers.  Dismember their limbs. Snatch 
them as groups and individuals.  Embitter their lives and make them occupied 
with themselves instead of us.  Be patient and do not hasten.  Soon […] the 
vanguards of the Islamic State will reach you.  (Issue 5, p. 27)  
 
This excerpt, especially when delivered alongside the previous examples, highlights the 
gruesome, yet fundamentally imperative, call to action for religiously-devoted Muslims 
to “draw their swords,” and that “every Muslim should get out of his house, find a 
crusader, and kill him” (Issue 4, p. 44).  In these two examples, the team again makes it 
clear that Allah mandated all Dabiq readers (as indicated by the second person pronoun 
“you,” here) should kill the mushrikīn and Rāfidah  (i.e., “rejecters”) wherever they are 
found.  The graphic detail by which readers are asked to “dismember,” “snatch,” and 
“embitter” the lives of these crusaders, may be read at the same time as revolting to 
Western readers and powerfully motivating for ISIL sympathizers.  Furthermore, the 
obligation to “kill the mushrikīn wherever you find them” (Issue 7, p. 20) has been 
quoted by many Westerners as the proof needed to declare ISIL “a terrorist 
organization, pure and simple,” specifically, one with “no vision other than the 
slaughter of all who stand in its way” (President Obama, 10 September 2014). President 
Obama’s assessment of ISIL’s vision here is particularly narrow, based on what has 
thus far been described.  However, this understanding of ISIL’s vision may have 
influenced the West’s initial labeling of ISIL as a “pure and simple terrorist 
organization,” as opposed to an emerging nation-state.  
The narrative crafted by the Dabiq editorial team here serves to both counter the 




while, at the same time, legitimize ISIL’s extreme violence by quoting the Quranic 
verse of the sword.  But another way the Dabiq team attempts to position itself as 
legitimate is by drawing on an extensive history of performing Allah’s will and acting 
on His behalf.   
Throughout the pages of Dabiq, the rally for military mobilization, and the 
subsequent mandate to act on behalf of the Islamic State in the name of Allah, is often 
couched in the language of doing so in accordance with Allah’s “permission and grace.”  
The phrase, “by Allah’s permission” can be thought of as a coda that performs a sense 
of devoutness and faith that might resonate with many of the magazine’s intended 
readers.  For example, the following quote appears on the first page of every issue of 
Dabiq:  “The spark has been lit here in Iraq, and its heat will continue to intensify – by 
Allah’s permission – until it burns the crusader armies in Dabiq.”  Albeit brief, this 
message serves at least two functions:  First, the message attempts to position the 
extreme actions undertaken by the Islamic State as justified: the battle between the 
Muslims and the crusaders is permitted by the Divine.  Thus, the Islamic State is 
guaranteed victory, since it is the Divine’s will that they will succeed.  Second, the 
message serves as yet another example of the ways ISIL evokes its organizational 
identity narrative: the “brothers” of the Islamic State are Allah’s holy warriors, again, 
acting in accordance with Allah’s will (e.g., “Allah brought their hearts together, and 
thus, they became brothers by His grace, loving each other for the sake of Allah, 
standing in a single trench, defending and guarding each other, and sacrificing 
themselves for one another” [Issue 1, p. 7]).  Moreover, the choice of the word 




not only the magazine series, but of the Islamic State itself.  The word in context 
suggests the long history of a quest for an Islamic Caliphate entreated by Allah; ISIL is 
the first and so far only attempt at resurrecting a Caliphate (Clarion Project, November 
2015).  Thus, the quote symbolizes a major appeal to legitimacy for the Islamic State—
that of religious authority.  To ask permission is to acquiesce to a higher power; 
therefore ISIL’s use of the term “permission” here conveys to Dabiq readers that ISIL 
has the approval to act and is acting through Allah’s guidance and support.  In other 
words, ISIL’s motivations come from a higher being; one that is, presumably, already 
believed to be legitimate.  
The Dabiq team uses this notion of acting in accordance with Allah’s will in 
their descriptions of the military successes achieved by the Islamic State.  For example, 
they describe the conquering of the Tabaqah military Airbase as an “achievement Allah 
saved for the Islamic State by His grace” (Issue 3, p. 21).  The magazine series is full of 
this type of language, conveying Allah’s support for military advances and 
sociomaterial gains.  The following are excerpts from various issues of Dabiq:  
The advances made by the Islamic State in al-Anbār and Hims, by Allah’s grace, 
demonstrate the mujāhidīn’s resilience towards crusader coalition airstrikes, and 
their determination to punish the enemies of Allah wherever they find them no 
matter how many obstacles they must pass through to reach them – and this 
without the need to declare a “storm of resolve.”  The crusaders heavily 
underestimated the firmness and strength of the mujāhidīn, and their plans – by 
Allah’s permission – will soon crumble.  (Issue 9, p. 32; emphasis added) 
 
And, 
On Wednesday 2 Rabī’ al-Awwal 1436, an apostate pilot flying for the crusader 
alliance was captured by the Islamic State after his plane was shot down with a 
heat-seeking anti-aircraft missile.  The successful hitting of the target and 
subsequent crash was by Allah’s permission.  All praise and thanks is due to 





These excerpts suggest that the success of the Islamic State is divinely mandated, 
supported, (e.g., “advances made by the Islamic State…by Allah’s grace” and “their 
[the crusaders] plans—by Allah’s permission—will soon crumble”), and achieved (e.g., 
“resilience towards crusader coalition airstrikes” and “the successful hitting of the 
target and subsequent crash”).  The Dabiq team further constructs the ongoing contest 
between the Islamic State and the West, emphasizing that (a) Allah supports ISIL in 
their efforts, thus facilitating their eventual triumph, and (b) that the West has not 
prepared for ISIL’s success, and does not seem to realize the strength Allah has given 
ISIL.  Therefore, the US is engaging in a blinded and futile battle against the Divine.  
The rhetoric of the Islamic State seems to perpetuate its organizational identity 
narrative by emphasizing its connection with a religion across a long stretch of history.  
Dabiq demands readers choose between one of “two camps,” as “no third camp [is] 
present” (Issue 1, p. 10).  First, there is the “camp of Islam and faith,” and second, there 
is the “camp of the kufr (disbelief and hypocrisy—the camp of the Muslims and the 
mujahidin everywhere, and the camp of the [J]ews, the crusaders, their allies, and with 
them the rest of the nations and religions of kufr, all being led by America and Russia, 
and being mobilized by the [J]ews)” (Issue 1, p. 10).  Inevitably, passages such as this 
work to create and preserve the false dichotomy of us-verse-them.  In other words, if the 
reader is not a believer doing the work of Allah, then he or she is obviously working 
against the Divine and, by extension, ISIL.  Using a false dichotomy, ISIL further 
legitimizes their organization by creating this sense of limited options for its readers’ 
beliefs about ISIL.  For example, the Dabiq team explains how the West, including the 




seeks to undermine the goals of the Islamic State.  “The best thing you can do is to 
strive to your best and kill any disbeliever, whether he be French, American, or from 
any of their allies” (Issue 4, p. 9).  Additional examples of the enforcement and 
perpetuation of this dichotomy and presentation of a limited set of options include: 
• “And upon them is to understand that The Islamic State – on account of what 
Allah has blessed it with of victory, consolidation and establishing the religion – 
is regarded as an unquestionable imamah [i.e., Shia doctrine].  As such, anyone 
who rebels against its authority inside its territory is considered a renegade, and 
it is permissible to fight him after establishing the hujjah against him [i.e., 
clarifying his error to him with proof].”  (Issue 1, p. 27) 
 
• “[…] If you can kill a disbelieving American or European – especially the 
spiteful and filthy French – or an Australian, or a Canadian, or any other 
disbeliever from the disbelievers waging war, including the citizens of the 
countries that entered into a coalition against the Islamic State, then rely upon 
Allah, and kill him in any manner or way however it may be.  Do not ask for 
anyone’s advice and do not seek anyone’s verdict.  Kill the disbeliever whether 
he is civilian or military, for they have the same ruling.”  (Issue 4, p. 9) 
 
• “This bay’ah [i.e., oath of allegiance] comes at a time when the Islamic State is 
facing a growing list of enemies, and it further underscores the fact that the lines 
are being drawn and the camps of īmān [i.e., believers] and kufr [i.e., non-
believers] are both being cleansed.  This will eventually lead to a camp of kufr 
with no trace of īmān, and a camp of īmān with no trace of hypocrisy, as per the 
statement of the Prophet (sallallāhu ‘alayhi wa sallam) [i.e., “peace be upon 
him”]. There will be no room to sit on the fence, and all parties will soon be 
forced to make a choice between the two.”  (Issue 4, p. 21) 
 
• “The Muslims in the West will quickly find themselves between one of two 
choices, they either apostatize and adopt the kufrī [i.e., non-believer] religion 
propagated by Bush, Obama, Blair, Cameron, Sarkozy, and Hollande in the 
name of Islam so as to live amongst the kuffār without hardship, or they perform 
hijrah [i.e., migration] to the Islamic State and thereby escape persecution from 
the crusader governments and citizens.”  (Issue 7, p. 62) 
 
• “Everyone who opposes this goal or stands in the path of this goal is an enemy 
for us and a target for our swords, whatever his name may be and whatever his 
lineage may be.”  (Issue 8, p. 3) 
 
Interestingly, the messaging presented in these examples from various issues of Dabiq 




against [Islamic] terrorists.  For example, there is a chapter in Issue 4 of Dabiq, titled, 
“Reflections on the Final Crusade,” in which the Dabiq team again stresses the case for 
an us-versus-them dichotomy by presenting quotations from American political figures.  
The chapter begins similar to most feature sections in the magazines, asking for the 
grace of God, (i.e., “All praise is due to Allah, the Lord of the worlds.  May blessings 
and peace be upon His messenger, Muhammad, and upon his family and companions.  
As to what follows…”  [Issue 4, p. 32]).  The Dabiq team, however, then explains 
explicitly that “there is no gray zone in this crusade against the Islamic State, and that 
the world has split into two encampments, one for the people of faith, the other for the 
people of kufr” (Issue 4, p. 44).  Then, using the language of President Bush, the writers 
of Dabiq actually echo his logic, reasoning:  
This crusade against the Islamic State is the greatest testimony from Allah for 
the proper manhaj of this Khilāfah.  Anyone who says otherwise now should 
review his faith before death suddenly takes him while he stands with one foot 
in the trench of the crusaders and the other in the trench of the hypocrites whilst 
claiming he is in the grayzone!  The mujāhid knows no grayzone. As the liar 
Bush truthfully said, “Either you are with us or you are with the terrorists.”   
Shaykh Usāmah Ibn Lādin commented, “So the world today is divided 
into two camps. Bush spoke the truth when he said, ‘Either you are with us or 
you are with the terrorists.’  I.e. either you are with the crusade or you are with 
Islam.  Bush today is in the frontline carrying a huge cross and treading.  I swear 
by Allah the Great that everyone who treads behind Bush in his plan has 
apostatized from the religion of Muhammad.”  
One with sincerity will realize that there is no grayzone in this crusade 
against the Islamic State, and that the world has split into two encampments, one 
for the people of faith, the other for the people of kufr, all in preparation for the 
final malhamah.  (Issue 4, pp. 43-44) 
 
The language used within this excerpt constructs Islam—and the Islamic State, by 
extension—as competition of a global superpower, specifically, the United States.  
ISIL’s organizational construction as competition to a global superpower may be read 




can no longer be ignored by global superpowers.  The growing schism between the US 
and “the terrorists,” here, has been socially constructed in preparation for the final 
battle—the battle which, according to ISIL’s organizational identity narrative, is sure to 
be won by the Islamic State.  
 Thus far, I explained how the Dabiq team has worked to position ISIL 
institutionally as a credible, legitimate nation-state in the present, through reminding 
readers about their material assets and resources.  The editors did so transactionally—as 
they both challenged existing counter-positions and anticipated future rebuttals by the 
West, specifically, the United States.  In establishing themselves as credible in the 
present, the Dabiq team then extends their organizational identity narrative into the past, 
connecting with religion and further increasing their legitimacy construction attempts 
based on their appropriation of a sacred set of texts and Islamic doctrine.  However, 
their narrative and the communication constitution it suggests does not end in the 
present.  As will be explained in the following section, ISIL positions itself to exist far 
into the future, as well.  Further, the transactional organizational identity narrative the 
Dabiq team has constructed envisions an intensifying clash between ISIL and the West, 
resulting in the final battle at the site of Dabiq where the West, according to ISIL’s 
narrative, will finally be defeated, and their own organizational identity will be forever 
transcendent. 
Confrontational Appeals to Institutional Legitimacy: Pushing ISIL’s Identity 
Narrative into the Future 
Finally, the editors of Dabiq and, by extension, the Islamic State, construct a 




Dabiq, where the unbelieving West will be defeated.  With the construction of this 
future clash between the Islamic State and all true Muslimsxi, and the Western world, 
ISIL’s organizational identity narrative positions the Caliphate as a threat to the West 
long into the future.  Ultimately, this cataclysmic clash between the West and the 
Caliphate is ISIL’s espoused reason for its organizational existence: To make a way for 
perfected Muslim existence once the destruction of the sinful West is accomplished.  
Therefore, the organizational identity narrative that the editors of Dabiq have thus far 
constructed acknowledges two so-called truths.  First, as I explain the paragraphs that 
follow, the editors of Dabiq attempt to portray the US and the West as entirely oriented 
towards materially defeating ISIL.  Second, the West has thus far failed in those 
attempts (again, ISIL’s defeat is impossible given the Divine is on their side).  Muslims 
have been preparing since the days of Muhammad for this final battle at Dabiq, in order 
to complete their long-awaited Caliphate.  The fact that ISIL exists, materially, in the 
present lends credence to their efforts towards defeating the US (and the West) in the 
future: they exist and they matter, especially in so far as the West has recognized them 
as a legitimate threat.   
As has thus far been described, however, ISIL positioned itself as a de facto 
nation-state in the present, emerging from a long religious history.  The final set of 
appeals used by ISIL in its attempts to build their legitimacy is confrontational in 
nature: ISIL constructs its organizational future as one that involves a clash with the 





“Dabiq” as the Title of Choice for a Constitutive Text 
 The final confrontation between the West and the Caliphate is ISIL’s espoused 
reason for its organizational existence: To make a way for perfected Muslim existence 
once the destruction of the West is accomplished.  The very title of the magazine series, 
“Dabiq,” is an obvious signifier of this goal.  “Dabiq” is not just the name of a city in 
Syria; it is the supposed location where the final battle between the West and the 
Muslims will take place according to Islamic apocalyptic writing (Clarion Project, 
September 2014).  Readers’ recognition of this end-time confrontational discourse is 
crucial for their understanding ISIL’s organizational raison d’etre.  Every issue of the 
magazine opens up with the following quote: “The spark has been lit here in Iraq, and 
its heat will continue to intensify—by Allah’s permission—until it burns the crusader 
armies in Dabiq” (Issue 1, p. 2; see appendix D).  This quote was evidently uttered by 
Abu Mus’ab az-Zarqawi, a “nationless freelance terrorist,” killed by American forces in 
2006 (Teslik, 2006).  As will be elaborated upon in the following paragraphs, this quote 
illustrates the coming confrontation between the West and Islam and signifies a Muslim 
victory at Dabiq. 
The very first pages of the first issue of the series explain the connection 
between the magazine’s title and the historical and future significance of the city of 
Dabiq.  The editors write,  
As for the name of the magazine, then it is taken from the area named Dabiq in 
the northern countryside of Halab (Aleppo) in Sham.  This place was mentioned 
in a hadith describing some of the events of the Malahim (what is sometimes 
referred to as Armageddon in English).  One of the greatest battles between the 





The editors then provide the hadith referencing Dabiq, and continue explaining the 
connection, citing: 
Shaykh Aby Mus’ab az-Zarqaqi anticipated the expansion of the blessed jihad 
from Iraq into Sham and linked it to this hadith saying, “The spark has been lit 
here in Iraq, and its heat will continue to intensify—by Allah’s permission—
until it burns the crusader armies in Dabiq” […] According to the hadith, the 
area will play a historical role in the battles leading up to the conquests of 
Constantinople, then Rome.  Presently, Dabiq is under the control of crusader-
backed sahwat [US sponsored security forces], close to the warfront between 
them and the Khilafah [Caliphate].  May Allah purify Dabiq from this treachery 
of the sawah and raise the flag of the Khilafah over its land.  Amin.  (Issue 1, p. 
5) 
 
These two passages serve to inform readers about the symbolically constructed final 
confrontation between the Muslims and the West, again, which will take place at Dabiq.  
Immediately following these passages, the editors compose a “breaking news” article, 
titled: “Khilafah Declared.”  In this article, the editors provide excerpts from the “most 
important” speeches recited during the establishment of the Caliphate (Issue 1, p. 7).  
The subheading reads: “glad tidings for the Muslim Ummah” [i.e., whole community of 
Muslims]).  Specifically, the editors provide “the first official speech” of Amirul-
Mu’minin Abu Bakr al-Husayni al-Qurashi al-Baghdadi [i.e., the leader of ISIL], which 
was said to have “filled the streets of the Islamic State with faithful joy” (Issue 1, p. 7).  
The editors also quote Abu Muhammad al-‘Adnani (i.e., the spokesman for the Islamic 
State) who was said to have declared, “the time has come for the Ummah of 
Muhammad to wake up from its sleep, remove the garments of dishonor, and shake off 
the dust of humiliation and disgrace, for the era of lamenting and moaning has gone, 
and the dawn of honor has emerged anew” (p. 9).  He continues, “The sun of jihad has 
risen.  The glad tidings of good are shining.  Triumph looms on the horizon.  The signs 




Together, these opening passages create rich imagery for the reader as a future 
vision that the battle at Dabiq is imminent, and the Ummah of Muhammad is destined to 
come out victorious.  Given the location of these passages in the overall context of the 
magazine, the editors presumably set the stage for the rest of the series.  Similarly, these 
opening stories help to make explicit ISIL’s espoused reason for organizational 
existence, which is then built upon and detailed in the subsequent issues of the 
magazine.  Particularly important to the construction of this part of their organizational 
identity narrative are the Dabiq team’s discursive choices, which attempt to both 
intensify the confrontation between the West and the Islamic State, and, at the same 
time, emphasize the inevitable victory of the Divine, and the organization by extension.  
Importantly, scholars have noted similar future-oriented discursive strategies of other 
end-time religious groups inspired by Christianity and are therefore not only associated 
with religious perversions of Islam (Bisel & Ford, 2008).  
Fighting Words: Constructing the Organization and Other  
 
 The editors of Dabiq reinforce their organizational vision for future conflict with 
the West through subtle language choices throughout the pages of their magazine.  The 
language choices invite the reader into an alternate world in which the US is weak and 
impotent and ISIL is strong, exacerbating the weaknesses of Western nations.  
Together, these language choices prepare the reader to align with a view of the future as 
a coming clash between ISIL and Western nations in which the Divine will assist the 
Muslim Ummah in their victory.  The word choices integrated into the pages of Dabiq 
are subtle, yet rhetorical; for example, throughout the pages of Dabiq, there is consistent 




describe the actions of both the US and ISIL.  Furthermore, the editors deprecate the US 
consistently, and differentiate between the West and the Caliphate, bolstering 
themselves by comparison. Many of the examples included below convey the 
transactional nature of ISIL’s endeavor to position itself as righteous, moral, and 
victorious, and the US as immoral, deceitful, and unsuccessful.  But what is arguably 
even more important is the fact that the editors presume this future in which the clash 
between the infidels of the West and the Caliphate is inevitable.  And as the following 
examples help to convey, the growing confrontation between the West and the 
Caliphate is discursively constructed: power is located in material resources as well as 
centered on control over discourse. 
There are a few examples of the editors’ use of illustrative action verbs that are 
made apparent through their narration of current events.  For example, the Dabiq team 
indicates that the US failed to respond to ISIL’s initial threats, and tried to hide 
evidence that ISIL warned them about Foley’s pending execution.  This again 
constructs the US undesirably; this time as deceitful.  The editors write, 
Upon receiving the threat and prior to the execution, Obama scurried to prevent 
knowledge of the affair from reaching his citizenry.  His administration 
immediately ordered a number of online social networks to shut down all 
Islamic State media accounts, including accounts of Islamic State supporters.  
(Issue 3, p. 4; emphasis added)   
 
The language used within this excerpt is especially powerful.  The image created by 
indicating that Obama “scurried” to prevent these events from reaching the people of 
the US is degrading; world leaders do not, typically, “scurry.”  Scurrying is most often 
used to describe the actions of rodents, moving rapidly and confusedly as they try to 




failing to protect its citizens.  The US is also positioned as weaker, intimidated by the 
rapidly growing threat presented by the Islamic State.  Importantly, this excerpt 
emphasizes the transactional nature of this confrontational appeal: ISIL is now such a 
significant threat, they affect US action and policy, causing the US to respond to ISIL’s 
increasing influence.   
The Dabiq editorial team also employs figurative language that aids in making it 
seem like the confrontation between the West and the emerging State is intensifying.  
The linguistic and writing style choices used throughout the Dabiq series emphasize 
ISIL’s successes while denigrating the US and their allies.  In what follows, I direct 
attention to some of the uses of figurative language pertaining to the transactional 
construction of ISIL’s organizational identity narrative. 
First, the Dabiq team often uses popular American military jargon, and re-
appropriates the meanings of those words to fit ISIL’s aims.  For example, in discussing 
ISIL’s overarching goals, the editors of Dabiq dictate that ISIL will employ “boots that 
will trample the idol of nationalism, destroy the idol of democracy, and uncover its 
deviant nature” (Issue 1, p. 8; emphasis added).  The imagery resulting from the use of 
this metaphor presents ISIL’s future success at the complete destruction of US forces.  
The imminent confrontation is conveyed through the editors’ word choice, including 
words such as “trample,” “destroy,” and “deviant.”  The “boots” metaphor is used again 
in Issue 10:   
The fall of American Kurdistan is therefore inevitable, and the crusaders will 
soon have no choice but to either pursue a truce or place their own boots on the 
ground.  The result, either way, will see the crusader coalition – in America’s 





This particular quotation is significant in a few ways.  The commonly articulated 
American metaphor, “boots on the ground,” is an idiomatic phrase often used to denote 
American ground forces engaged in military conflict.xii  Yet, for ISIL to use this 
common and quite often patriotic American phrase is biting and incongruous to an 
American or Western reader.  Furthermore, this excerpt explicitly emphasizes the 
transactional nature of institutional positioning.  The Dabiq team reappropriates 
President Obama’s coined expression—to degrade and destroy [ISIL]—using it 
ironically in opposition to American aims: the defeat of the West (i.e., the “crusader 
coalition”).  Finally, these lines also indicate the final, “inevitable” defeat of the West, 
yet another example of this pending confrontation.  As evidenced within these excerpts, 
the Dabiq team reappropriates the meaning of various discursive strategies used by the 
West to delegitimize ISIL in an attempt to promote their own agenda: that of the 
intensifying clash between themselves and the West.  
The Imminent Battle at Dabiq: Writing in the Future Tense 
Thus far, I have provided examples of how the Dabiq team structured their 
magazine linguistically to suggest the confrontational nature of ISIL’s organizational 
mission and therefore existence.  Significant, too, however, is the future-orientated 
nature of the editorial team’s writing—and by extension, of ISIL itself.  In the 
paragraphs to follow, I provide several excerpts from the magazine series that 
emphasize how pronounced this future-orientation is within the pages of Dabiq.  To put 
it in perspective, in the fourth issue alone, the future tense (as denoted through the use 
of the word, “will”) was noted over 220 times.  On average, this use of explicit future 




The use of the future tense signals both the imminent confrontation between the 
West and the Caliphate, as well as a semi-concealed threat.  In the following excerpt, 
the Dabiq team provides examples of a few “successful” ISIL campaigns of the past and 
indicates that there will be more “successful” campaigns to come.  This passage serves 
dual purposes.  First, the language used by the editorial staff poses an explicit threat to 
the West: e.g., there will be others to follow in the example [of past terrorists] and the 
Muslims will continue to defy the kāfir [war machine].  Second, to ISIL sympathizers 
reading Dabiq, the editors suggest that the West will not retaliate against advances by 
the Islamic State, but will instead, await the next attack: 
There will be others who follow the examples set by Man Haron Monis and 
Numan Haider in Australia, Martin Couture-Rouleau and Michael Zehaf-Bibeau 
in Canada, Zale Thompson in America, and Bertrand Nzohabonayo in France, 
and all that the West will be able to do is to anxiously await the next round of 
slaughter and then issue the same tired, cliché statements in condemnation of it 
when it occurs.  The Muslims will continue to defy the kāfir war machine, 
flanking the crusaders on their own streets and bringing the war back to their 
own soil.  (Issue 6, p. 4; emphasis added) 
 
The idea that the West “anxiously awaits” the next round of attacks again positions 
them as powerless and impotent in the matter, expecting the next round of attacks 
without being able to do much to prevent or counter them.  This sentiment is advanced 
by the claim that after the attacks occur, the reaction of the US will be to issue yet 
another round of overused statements of condemnation.  ISIL is again anticipating the 
others’ (e.g., the West’s) response to the appeal, and is therefore another example of 
transactionality in their institutional positioning.  
The following excerpts are from Issue 5 of Dabiq, and are found within a 
chapter titled, “If I were the US President Today,” written by John Cantlie.  Cantliexiii, 




British war journalist who was captured in 2012, along with James Foley, who was later 
executed.  “If I were the US President today,” Cantlie writes, “I’d probably switch off 
my cellphone, lock the oval office doors, and go play golf instead.  The war against the 
Islamic State just isn’t going to plan at all” (Issue 5, p. 36).  He continues,  
The governments are like a robot that is stuck on a loop, continually performing 
the wrong sequence despite repeated instructions by its master to the contrary.  
Master to robot: You have to find a different way of addressing the danger the 
mujāhidīn pose to the west.  “Cannot… compute…”  Military action doesn’t 
work, what about negotiations?  “Must… obey… programming…”  Everything 
you’ve done since 9/11 has put us in more danger, not less.  “Zzzzz… syntax… 
error…”  Of course, Robo-Obama doesn’t listen to voices of reason and thus 
programs himself with the same corrupted old data, making the same mistakes 
over and over again.  James Comey described the Islamic State mujāhidīn as 
“savages” in September (a classic example of prideful and conventionalist 
thinking that will progress absolutely nothing) while Nick Paton-Walsh 
described their tactics in CNN as “eerily sophisticated,” which is a much more 
educated comment and closer to the truth, except Nick’s just a journalist while 
James Comey is director of the FBI.  (Issue 5, p. 39)  
 
ISIL, using John Cantlie’s words, argues that President Obama should just give up his 
fight.  Importantly, the assumption here is that a fight is present…and will continue to 
persist.  The defeat of the West is framed as inevitable, as America’s chosen methods to 
deal with the Islamic State, thus far, have not been successful and will continue to be 
unsuccessful. 
A third example comes from the fourth issue of Dabiq.  In this passage, the 
editors discuss the inherent danger ISIL poses and the inevitability of a Muslim victory.  
Additionally, this passage ties together their distant past of struggle with their 
championed future of victory.  The editors write: 
O America, O allies of America, and O crusaders, know that the matter is more 
dangerous than you have imagined and greater than you have envisioned.  We 
have warned you that today we are in a new era, an era where the State, its 
soldiers, and its sons are leaders not slaves.  They are a people who through the 




they begin.  They have not prepared for a battle since the time of Noah except 
with absolute conviction of victory.  Being killed – according to their account – 
is a victory.  This is where the secret lies.  You fight a people who can never be 
defeated.  (Issue 4, p. 7) 
 
A consideration of audience is important in understanding the effects of this writing.  
Speaking to a Western (i.e., American) audience, this excerpt can be read as another 
warning or threat: the Islamic State will not be defeated: “you fight a people who can 
never be defeated”.  American efforts are therefore in vain.  To a potential ISIL 
sympathizer, however, this passage does more.  The passage speaks to the absolute 
conviction of victory—a rallying cry to those who are drawn to the fight on behalf of 
Allah and who will reap the benefits of inevitable success. 
 One final example that summarizes these aforementioned appeals comes from 
the fifth issue of Dabiq.  The editors write: 
The true religion – embodied by the Jamā’ah [prayer] of the Muslims (the 
Khilāfah) and their Imām (the Khalīfah) – will be manifest over all false 
religions, with proof and evidence and by the sword and spear, even if the 
kāfirīn and mushrikīn [non-Muslims] despise such, and despite all the military, 
economic, intelligence, political, and media opposition to the Islamic State from 
the coalition of the cross.  […]  The flag of Khilāfah [Caliphate] will rise over 
Makkah and al-Madīnah, even if the apostates and hypocrites despise such. The 
flag of Khilāfah will rise over Baytul-Maqdis and Rome, even if the Jews and 
Crusaders despise such.  The shade of this blessed flag will expand until it 
covers all eastern and western extents of the Earth, filling the world with the 
truth and justice of Islam and putting an end to the falsehood and tyranny of 
jāhiliyyah [impetuousness or ignorance], even if America and its coalition 
despise such...(Issue 5, p. 3) 
This passage serves as a comprehensive statement of ISIL’s plans for the future.  
Furthermore, it seems to call attention to many aspects of the organizational identity 
narrative that ISIL has constructed.  First, in keeping with the present discussion, the 
editors again suggest the imminent victory of the Caliphate (e.g., “the true religion […] 




until it covers all eastern and Western extents of the Earth…”).  This victory comes as a 
result of a final [armed] confrontation with the West (e.g., “by sword and spear”).  Here, 
too, the editors draw on the historical appeals to their past (e.g., “putting an end to the 
falsehood and tyranny” of the West [which has been in power for so long]).  And 
finally, these gains are achieved military (e.g., as evidenced by the sword and the 
spear).   
Accordingly, this third and final component of ISIL’s organizational identity 
narrative constructs a future in which the infidel West will be defeated.  With the 
construction of this future clash between the Islamic State and the Western world, 
ISIL’s organizational identity narrative positions the Caliphate as a threat to the West 
long into the future.  As the excerpts from Dabiq provided in this section suggest, 
Muslims have been preparing since the days of Muhammad for this final battle at Dabiq 
in order to complete their long-awaited Caliphate.  As ISIL sees it, the fact that they 
exist, materially, in the present legitimizes their efforts towards defeating the US in the 
future.  This eventual defeat, again, is ISIL’s espoused raison d’etre: to construct a 







Chapter 6: Discussion 
 
There were two main objectives in writing this dissertation.  First, this 
dissertation investigated the social construction of organizational legitimacy, 
particularly through the theoretical framework of CCO and the constitution of ISIL’s 
institutional positioning.  Second, in the field of organizational communication, a 
burgeoning interest in the role of sociomaterial resources in organizational constitution 
led to a close examination of how material assets may affect the types of messages that 
an organization, such as ISIL, is able to propagate.  
A close analysis of the Dabiq magazines revealed that ISIL’s institutional 
positioning conformed to a communication pattern I defined as a transactional 
organizational identity narrative—a set of legitimacy appeals that together, socially 
construct the unfolding of ISIL’s defining characteristics across time.  Furthermore, this 
narrative both anticipated and refuted the other’s (e.g., the West’s) delegitimizing 
attempts and is therefore transactional in nature.  For example, Dabiq editors 
reappropriated the words of the West to emphasize ISIL’s emerging organizational 
status.  ISIL is different from other terrorist organizations for the variety of reasons 
aforementioned.  However, one important consideration is the material assets of which 
it has been able to secure.  Importantly, this dissertation serves to highlight the ways in 
which ISIL garners credibility in the present as a result of reminding audiences of their 
procurement of material assets (e.g., organizational structure, access to money and 
infrastructure, propaganda, and municipal provisions provided for its members).  In the 




Zaug, 2000) and institutional theory, as well as the organizational identity and 
confrontational rhetoric literatures.  
(1) Institutional Positioning Can be Transactional 
First, these findings contribute to the CCO literature (McPhee & Zaug, 2000) by 
illustrating how the constitutive force of institutional positioning can be transactional in 
nature, and not just transmissional.  Bean and Buikema (2015) suggest that, to date, 
organizational communication researchers may not realize CCO’s potential in 
“shattering the container metaphor that continues to buttress organizational theorizing” 
(p. 17).  Specifically, they note, the CCO four-flows model usually depicts membership 
negotiation and institutional positioning as occurring in relation to outside audiences, 
publics, and entities, while self-structuring and activity coordination occur within 
organizational boundaries, thus, portraying organizations as containers for 
communication.  Bean and Buikema, therefore, illustrate how researchers can begin to 
dissolve “illusory and arbitrary internal and external boundaries” and radically rethink 
organizational constitution (p. 17).  “Persuading counterterrorism authorities to reject 
the container metaphor,” they argue, “remains only on the horizon of possibilities” (p. 
17).  Similarly, the findings within this dissertation, through recognizing that 
institutional positioning may, in fact, be transactional, contributes to McPhee and 
Zaug’s (2000) four-flows model of CCO theory in two central ways.   
These findings highlight the possibility that institutional positioning, in general, 
can buttress the social construction of an organization’s identity in ways that emphasize 
transactional communication, thus beginning to reimagine the container metaphor.  




identity-threatening messages that may be employed by external entities when they craft 
their own institutional positioning messages.  As Bean and Buikema (2015) note, 
“organizational leaders try to coordinate and control the self-representations of the 
organization because they are vital for helping to secure resources and legitimacy” (p. 
15).  Thus, the transactional nature of an organization’s institutional positioning 
transcends the organizational container itself by considering the ecology of messages 
circulating about the organization.   
The finding that institutional positioning can be transactional and not just 
transmissional, further contributes to CCO literature in that counter-institutional 
positioning messages also have constitutive force, albeit in an unintended way.  As 
aforementioned, my analysis of the Dabiq series revealed that even when the US tried 
to counter the institutional positioning messages of ISIL, they were actually providing 
them with fodder for supporting legitimacy claims.  A close analysis of the Dabiq series 
revealed that the editors reappropriated the use of Western superpowers’ own words in 
their magazines frequently, as observed with the “In the Words of the Enemy” section 
of every issue of the magazine.  While the West attempted to employ discourse to 
delegitimize ISIL, the editors of Dabiq used those attempts as a means of reinforcing 
impressions of their own legitimacy, and thus relevance in the eyes of superpowers.  
Future studies may then explore other instances of anticipatory and reactive institutional 
positioning by organizations as they respond to real or imagined audiences, publics, and 
outside entities.  Additionally, investigations into organizations’ uptake of external or 





(2) Organizational Identity Construction Attempts Can Involve the Cooptation of 
External Communication 
Similarly, a second contribution of this research is to the literature on 
organizational identity construction.  Following its declaration of an Islamic Caliphate, 
ISIL attempted to establish itself as a credible and legitimate organizational threat to the 
West.  Importantly, however, analysis of the Dabiq series revealed the editors employed 
the words of Western officials in their attempts to promote such an organizational 
image.  In other words, the Dabiq editors were skillful enough to use and reappropriate 
the words of their enemies in an attempt to craft a credible and legitimate organizational 
image.  Therefore, these findings suggest that an organization’s attempts at constructing 
its identity can involve the cooptation of external entities’ communication.  
Alvesson (2002) explains that an organization’s identity deals with the “essence 
or core” of its organizational agenda, including its “coherence over time and space and 
its distinctiveness from other organizations or units” (p. 177).  As illustrated by the 
present case, the Dabiq team inserted the words of the West into their magazine, 
appropriating them as their own and facilitating the construction ISIL’s organizational 
identity.  For example, the Dabiq team quotes former US Secretary of Defense Chuck 
Hagel, who comments on the “sophistication” of ISIL, noting how it is “so well 
organized,” “so well-trained,” “so well-funded,” resulting in an “incredibly powerful 
new threat” (Issue 6, p. 57).  Thus, while ISIL’s use of Hagel’s assessment is yet 
another example of transactional communication processes, this type of messaging 
additionally helps to construct ISIL’s organizational identity.  In terms of future 




external stakeholders’ messaging could be interesting to explore.  Investigating such 
processes could be particularly important for understanding identity construction 
relationships in non-terrorist organizations or less extreme cases.   
(3) Considering Sociomaterial Assets in Organizational Communication Research 
Third, these findings contribute to the burgeoning literature in organizational 
science regarding the importance of sociomaterial configurations.  These findings are 
some of the first of their kind to document, empirically, how organizational message 
crafters leverage material accomplishments, garnering credibility for their ontological 
status claims.  Further, the socio-configurations explored within this dissertation are 
unique, in that they consist not just of technology (e.g., hardware and software).  In 
other words, discussions of the socio-material are often found in relation to information 
systems and technological advancements, but the Dabiq magazine provides a different 
form of sociomaterial configuration, where money, land, and infrastructure are called on 
to create credibility.  
As Leonardi (2013) reminds us, the term “sociomaterial” comes from the joining 
of two words: social and materiality, the latter of which refers to the properties intrinsic 
to technological artifacts (p. 32).  More importantly, however, the “social” embedded in 
this term reminds researchers that all materiality is, in fact, social, in that it is created, 
interpreted, and used in social contexts, but also that social action is possible because of 
materiality.  In sum, sociomateriality is the “enactment of a particular set of activities 
that meld materiality with institutions, norms, discourses, and all other phenomena we 
typically define as ‘social’” (p. 42).  Thus, recent research in organizational 




communicative functions of constitution (e.g., symbolism) in ways not previously 
recognized.  For example, Orlikowski (2007), in a statement about sociomateriality, 
explains that the social and the material are constitutively entangled in everyday life: 
“the social and the material are considered to be inextricably related—there is no social 
that is not also material, and no material that is not only social” (p. 1437; as cited in 
Leonardi, 2012, p. 33).  As Leonardi (2013) contends, to say that an organization, or a 
technology or practice, is sociomaterial, is to say that the “organization is 
simultaneously social and material” (p. 61).  However, discussions of sociomateriality 
have remained “highly philosophical” (Leonardi, 2013, p. 73).  Referencing Sutton 
(2010), Leonardi contends that the current tendency to be “so ontologically-focused 
about the most practical of topics has led some critics to suggest that there is little 
practical value in a sociomaterial approach, and even less value in the language used to 
describe it” (p. 73).   
The findings of this dissertation, however, provide an empirical example of how 
social and material configurations matter to an organization’s communicative 
constitution attempts.  Sociomaterial assets were noted to be one of the three major 
appeals used by ISIL to render itself organizationally credible in the “present.”  
Specifically, the editors of Dabiq countered the West’s delegitimizing attempts by 
touting their symbolic credibility afforded by their access to material resources.  
Further, the extent to which ISIL utilized technology—including its momentous social 
media campaign and the magazine, Dabiq, itself—may serve to extend the literature on 
sociomateriality insofar as these artifacts are “unavoidably entangled with discourse” 




organizational identity narrative, situating ISIL in the present, but also extending its 
legitimacy symbolically across a past and a future.  The notion that the social and the 
material are inherently entwined, then, ties into a fourth contribution of this research: 
the idea that material resources can be used strategically in institutional positioning to 
garner credibility, which is discussed next.  Future research into materiality, however, 
should investigate how non-technological material assets influence organizational 
credibility, extending organizational communication research into understandings of 
interplay between the symbolic and the material.   
(4) Considering Material Resources in Studies of Organizational Constitution 
Developing out of the nascent interest of the sociomaterial in organizational 
science is the consideration of material assets in CCO theory (Reed, 2004; 2010).  
Reed’s (2004) assertion—that if we are to “get real” about discourse, we must recognize 
the material conditions and social structures that aid in the constitution of 
organizations—is important to this discussion.  Reed (2004) explains, “language does 
not exhaust our interest in social reality; it merely provides the primary communicative 
mechanism and medium through which social reality can be assessed and described” (p. 
415).  Specifically, he challenges how the CCO tradition/framework deals with 
materiality, as well as temporality, spatiality, and sociality of organizations (Reed, 
2010).  As Ashcraft et al. (2009) put it, “communicative explanations exaggerate the 
muscle of symbolism” (p. 24; emphasis added).  Thus, they argue, to be more accepted 
and reach a wider audience, CCO theorists must take into account the symbolic-material 
relation.  “After all, organizations are more than what we say they are” (Ashcraft et al., 




This dissertation suggests that there is, in fact, more to the constitution of 
organizations than just the communication itself, although talk and text are a large 
component and are inherently connected to the material (Taylor et al., 1996).  Thus, 
communication about the sociomaterial lends itself to the establishment of an 
organization’s ontological presence.  These findings suggest that material assets played 
a critical role in the constitution and, therefore, credibility of ISIL in the present (see 
Bisel, 2010).  As defined earlier, material appeals to organizational legitimacy are those 
messages that symbolically associate organizational constitution with physical objects, 
assets, and resources.  Between ISIL’s organizational structure, its access to money and 
infrastructure, its propaganda and recruitment strategies, and the municipal provisions 
that have been established for its members, ISIL’s material resources serve as a critical 
factor both in terms of influencing the means by which ISIL worked to legitimize itself 
globally, as well as shifting the ways in which the West positions ISIL.  In other words, 
these material assets amassed by the organization provided a set of brute facts that serve 
as the context for ISIL’s current organizational attempts to be projected as legitimate.   
Further extending this line of CCO research is encouraged.  As Bean and 
Buikema (2015) conclude, more attention to the shape and influence of the four-flows 
model of communication in organizational communication is warranted to help 
“authorities, citizens, and scholars enhance their understanding of the constitution, 
maintenance, and deconsititution of [hidden] organizations” (p. 24).  Although ISIL is 
not necessarily considered to be a “hidden” organization, extending this research is still 
important, as all organizations are dependent upon these flows of communication for 




(5) Organizational Identity Narratives Can Function to Stretch or Extend the 
Social Construction of Organizational Identity Across Time 
 The fifth contribution of this research attends to the construction of 
organizational identity narratives.  The importance of narrative is emphasized insofar as 
an emerging “de facto nation-state” was able to construct its current identity as 
stemming from a centuries-long past, and project that identity well into the future.  
Importantly, Berger and Luckmann’s (1966) The Social Construction of Reality reminds 
us that “identity is formed by social processes” (p. 173).  Through language use, they 
argue, “various motivational and interpretive schemes are internalized as institutionally 
defined” (Berger & Luckmann, 1966, p. 135).  Once formed, identity “is maintained, 
modified, or even reshaped by social relations” and  “the social processes involved in 
both the formation and the maintenance of identity are determined by the social 
structure” (p. 173).  ISIL constructs its organizational image as temporally-distributed 
across time, thus establishing its “place” in the larger social system (McPhee & Zaug, 
2000).  The “Islamic State,” as it had declared itself in the summer of 2014, did not 
exist in the past, nor, does it physically exist in the future—as the future has yet to be 
determined.   
However, the Dabiq team worked to construct ISIL’s organizational identity as 
existing in the present, as well as from a shared, sacred, ideological past, and extending 
into the future.  As Dailey and Browning (2014) note, narratives are distinct from other 
communicative forms in that they employ the “story” format, (e.g., a series of events 
that, together, have a beginning, middle, and end), and are thus situated in time and 




Weick and Browning (1986) elucidate, narratives “help people comprehend complex 
environments,” while effective narratives may be used to socialize newcomers, process 
data, convey values, and change [corporate] culture (p. 255).  In this way, the Dabiq 
editors constructed such a narrative to help readers “make sense” of the Islamic State’s 
identity as unfolding over large swaths of time.  Following the work of Daily and 
Browning (2014), Bruner (2005), and Boje (2001), this dissertation supports the notion 
that organizations are narratively constructed, and stories help to constitute 
organizations.  Specifically, the narrative approach to organizational constitution and, 
and thus legitimacy, is one example of how the social construction of an organization’s 
identity calls on the power of narrative to claim existence in a distant past, and project 
its identity into the future; thus, iterating how it is constructed and maintained across 
time.  
Considering the connections between the flow of institutional positioning and 
identity narratives is important for future CCO theorizing.  As Bean and Buikema 
(2015) conclude, their analysis of the Abbottabad documents suggest that the 
communicative processes of organizational decline and dissolution are neither simple 
nor straightforward because both organizational members and nonmembers “generate, 
control, or thwart constitutive communication in complex ways” (p. 17).  Schoeneborn 
and Scherer (2010) suggest organizational destruction occurs when constitutive 
communication about an organization ceases; thus, understanding the ways in which 





(6) Organizational Mimicry May be used in the Symbolic Establishment of 
Organizational Constitution 
Additionally, this study maintains DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) assertion 
referenced earlier, that organizations seeking legitimacy will tend to model themselves 
after similar organizations in their field, perceived to be more legitimate or successful.  
Although it may seem surprising, ISIL has attempted to gain legitimacy by mimicking 
bureaucratic styles of organizations.  This observation resonates with Bean and 
Buikema’s (2015) finding that al Qaeda, despite being thought of as a new form of 
networked organizing as far as terrorist organizations are concerned, was producing 
bureaucratic infrastructure through the creation of policies and organizational texts.  
Their analysis of the Abbottabad documents revealed the “stunningly mundane forms of 
organizational communication, for example letters, statements, memoranda, orders, 
directives, reports, and media releases” which Bean and Buikema (2015) found as 
“striking” in their revelation of the “mimetic character” and “imitative qualities” (p. 18).   
Thus, the sixth contribution of this research into the communicative constitution 
of ISIL is significant in that it both lends support for Bean and Buikema’s (2015) 
findings, as well as seems to pull together many of the aforementioned claims: ISIL 
worked to establish itself as credible in the present, by drawing on material assets that—
to the West—constitute organizations, and nations, as legitimate.  This can be observed 
in Cantlie’s article in Issue 8, where he notes that ISIL “produce[s] their own currency, 
primary schools for the young, and [has] a functioning court system” (Issue 8, p. 64).  
These civic innovations, Cantlie continues, are “surely hallmarks of (whisper it if you 




June, really be a country?”  (p. 64).  Even President Obama references this notion, 
stating, “and terrorist groups are all too happy to step into a void.  They offer salaries to 
their foot soldiers so they can support their families.  Sometimes they offer social 
services -- schools, health clinics -- to do what local governments cannot or will not do 
[…] (Office of the Press Secretary, 18 February 2015, n.p.; emphasis added).  As these 
two excerpts suggest, the debate as to whether or not ISIL should be considered “a 
country” is largely concerned with its material assets normally associated, by the West, 
with nation-states, including schools, hospitals, and court systems.  Even the magazine 
itself, and ISIL’s poignant social media campaign, serves to replicate the successes and 
modern advances of Western nation-states.  With its glossy pages, in-depth interviews, 
and high-resolution photographs, even satire columnists have gone so far as to say that 
Dabiq is the “‘town and country’ of the bloodthirsty would-be caliphate” (Biddle, 
2016).  
Thus, the notion of mimicry, or modeling oneself after similar organizations in 
the field perceived to be legitimate, can be considered a successful strategy for gaining 
organizational constitution and legitimacy.  Future researchers should extend CCO 
theorizing by taking on Bean and Buikema’s (2015) charge to consider the mimetic and 
imitative qualities of organizations such as al Qaeda or ISIL.   
(7) Confrontational Rhetoric Can Have Constitutive Force for an Organization 
 As Cathcart (1983) suggests, many rhetorical scholars maintain that rhetoric is a 
way of knowing; that our understanding of rhetorical strategies is “our only means of 
constructing social reality and maintaining social control” (p. 70).  Thus, rhetoric is both 




language strategies create consciousness of social movements.  The findings presented 
in this dissertation suggest a similar process: confrontational rhetoric may help 
constitute an organization’s being by projecting a [confrontational] reason for existence 
into the future.  This projection presents a perceptible goal, around which members can 
identify and organize.  
Additionally, Cathcart (1983) argues that social movements are directly related 
to confrontational rhetoric.  As it relates to this dissertation, he explains: “to fully 
understand what produces awareness of social movements, we must “analyze 
movement messages and systemic counter messages” as well as attempt to understand 
how the public responds to those messages (p. 71).  Furthermore, he contends, “the 
symbolic interactions among activists, counter-rhetors, and publics provide the ground 
wherein social movements become unique change collectives” (p. 71).  This is certainly 
the case for the organizational identity narrative produced by ISIL: their identity is a 
composite of both the rhetor (in this case, the editors of the Dabiq magazine) and the 
counter-rhetors (here, the US and West).  Again, confrontational rhetoric has 
constitutive force in the construction of an organization’s identity.  
As Short (1991) has suggested in his analysis of the Earth First! movement, 
confrontation draws public attention to many concerns of the rhetor.  With an 
organization such as ISIL, whose existence is contingent upon the complete destruction 
of its adversary, language choices inherent in confrontational rhetoric become even 
more poignant.  Scott and Smith (1969) argue that confrontation is a tactic for gaining 
attention, “and an importance not readily attainable through decorum” (p. 7).  Thus, 




reasons: (1) its technical and aesthetic appeal and (2) the editors’ discursive choices that 
illuminate and construct this sense of urgent confrontation. 
(8) The Language of Theory: A Reflection on Ethics 
 Finally, study of ISIL’s attempts at creating organizational legitimacy provides 
an opportunity to reflect on the vocabulary of institutional and CCO theories.  To see 
the word “legitimate” in association with a terrorist group, specifically, ISIL, is both 
jarring and somewhat discomforting to a reader.  This feeling is especially true for 
many contemporary readers, as ISIL’s organizational presence is ongoing and without 
resolution.  The use of the term “legitimate” in everyday discourse is often associated 
with what is ethical, moral, and right.  No doubt, some uses of the term “legitimacy,” 
even in institutional theory, is meant to capitalize on this connotation (see Scott, 2001). 
However, as is illustrated in the present case, the word “legitimate” can be both morally 
inaccurate and inappropriate to describe what ISIL is doing.  In other words, my use of 
the technical jargon associated with institutional theory, here, is divorced from my 
ethical condemnation of the organization.   
The term “legitimacy,” as used in the spirit of CCO and institutional theory, is 
concerned with ISIL’s attempts to be perceived as a legitimate threat to Western 
audiences.  The use of the term “legitimacy” in reference to ISIL means something 
more akin to the organization exists and matters.  To convince audiences an 
organization matters is a social and material process enmeshed with ethical choices and 
implications, not all of which are ethical (Conrad, 2011). Thus, the language of CCO 
and institutional theory may benefit from distinguishing ethical legitimacy from ethics-




appeals which the analyst deems ethical. Ethics-based legitimacy attempts can be used 
to describe organizational communication appeals that may involve allusions to ideals, 
philosophy, or religion, but which the analyst deems unethical.  Future theorizing 
should equip analysts with more nuanced vocabulary to deal with ethical critique of 





Chapter 7: Conclusion 
The findings of this present analysis suggest that institutional positioning 
messages may be constructed through a cooptation of messaging, by the organization 
itself, as well as counter positioning messages purported by an organization’s 
competition.  Additionally, socio-material configurations lend increased credibility to 
an organization’s attempts at positioning itself as legitimate.  However, organizations 
desperate for legitimacy, organizations such as ISIL, can rely on the power of identity 
narratives that position themselves as legitimate in the present and arising from an 
arduous past as well as extending into the future.  These findings lend themselves to 
several practical communicative implications, some of which extend recommendations 
of previous organizational communication research on countering violent extremism 
through applications of CCO.  While military strategy is undoubtedly important to 
consider in the fight against violent extremism, specifically against ISIL, my particular 
scholarly background and the subject matter discussed within this dissertation do not 
lend themselves to contributing to those specific strategic discussions.  Thus, the focus 
of the recommendations presented here will be on communicative strategies that may 
aid in the process of dismantling extremist terrorist organizations.  
First, the US has control over the language it uses to discuss its relationship with 
ISIL.  While the US cannot control the discourses propagated by ISIL, the findings of 
this dissertation suggest that the words the West uses to frame and respond to the 
growing threat of ISIL have been taken up by that organization and used to enhance its 
credibility and perceptions of success.  Communication scholars recognize that 




Quilliam Foundation (a counter-extremism think tank) contend, “while rejuvenating 
counter-extremism efforts the world over is, without a doubt, imperative, one must also 
consider how best to go about removing one of [ISIL’s] greatest attractions, its success” 
(p. 57).  “Somehow,” they continue, ISIL must be “rolled back” (p. 57).  Saltman and 
Winter (2014) conclude that a military strategy is not enough.  While we cannot 
necessarily speak to religious or political interventions, as communication scholars, we 
can offer a set of communication strategies.  For, as observed within the publication of 
this magazine, ISIL has been successful in transmitting its organizational identity 
narrative and garnering the support of foreign fighters and potential recruits in and 
through social media and its messaging.  As Saltman and Winter (2014) claim: 
We should not discount the medium and long-term evolution of [ISIL] to brand 
itself as the icon of global jihadism […] The new online frontline of the current 
crisis needs to be better defended. Censoring unwanted extremist content and 
propaganda materials is not only ineffective, but often counter productive […] 
The online space must be better contested. (p. 52)   
 
The question that logically results, then, is what are the types of words the West should 
be using to undermine and contest ISIL’s attempts at legitimacy?  My findings suggest 
that ISIL has used the words of the West as a source of legitimacy—so, what do 
discourses that attempt to challenge those legitimation attempts sound like?  Perhaps the 
US needs to use ISIL’s words against ISIL...  
Goodall, Jr., Trethewey, and McDonald (2008) suggest that the US 
government’s inability to prepare for, or respond to, the sophisticated jihadi media 
strategies is because for the past fifty years, “the dominant US approach to 
communicating with people living in regions of the world where we have strategic and 




‘one way model’” (p. 30).  Unsurprisingly, this one-way model implies that audiences 
are passive in their interpretation of a message’s meaning; a one-way transmission 
model of communication does not lend itself to successful diplomacy (p. 31).  Thus, 
Goodall Jr. et al. advocate for a communication strategy that takes seriously the notion 
that perceptions of meaning and message clarity are a result of relationships, not just 
word usage.  Deeper understandings of cultures, languages, and religions are thus 
extremely important in terms of countering extremist threats.   
One recommendation here would be to incorporate “the absurd” into Western 
discourses when referencing ISIL.  When their name and identity is on our lips, we need 
to make them out to be absurd.  The West needs to undermine their legitimacy in the 
present, and their construction of their past and future to minimize their constitution 
across time.  Corman and Schiefelbein (2008) ague that a key problem for Islamists is 
“legitimating what they do” and thus an important way to compete with them is to 
“identify those contradictions” and then “make or encourage efforts to draw attention to 
them” (p.  90).   To do this, however, requires a deep knowledge of Islam.  The West 
should continue to have Muslims, who have very deep understandings of Islam, help 
undermine these messages to make groups, such as ISIL, out to sound absurd.  Shanker 
and Schmitt (2004) argue that our job is not perception management, but “to counter the 
enemy’s perception management,” especially in a world where the enemy is clearly 
using media to help manage their image to the general public (p. 1).  Thus, countering 
that image perception through drawing attention to contradictions and framing ISIL’s 




Similarly, Corman and Schiefelbein (2008) advocate for a Western 
deconstruction of Islamist concepts of history and audience, and to identify and draw 
attention to Islamist actions that contradict Islam.  The findings of this present research 
lend strong support for these recommendations, even eight years after Corman and 
Schiefelbein’s initial recommendation.  They argue that Islamist ideology depends “on a 
very particular construction of history” (Corman & Schiefelbein, 2008, p. 91).  This 
construction maintains that Islam was at its height during the golden age of the Caliphs 
and has only declined since then; the plight of the Muslims will only get worse if they 
do not attempt change in the future (Corman & Schiefelbein, 2008).  Corman and 
Schiefelbein argue that this Islamist narrative provides a “built in logic for rejecting 
anything in the present associated with the decline,” e.g., Western influence (p. 91).  
Furthermore, orienting to this idealized past “simultaneously helps solidify identity 
[and] create a sense of legitimacy” (p. 91).  The present findings indicate that the 
organizational identity narrative that ISIL produced has accomplished just that.  ISIL 
attempted to legitimize itself in the present by constructing a narrative that draws on a 
long history and extends into the future, always in severe confrontation with the West.  
Corman and Schiefelbein advocate for additional research into the crafting of this 
counter narrative and what this counter-legitimacy narrative sounds like.  The findings 
of this dissertation could provide this next step.  
Similarly, a third implication of this research shows the importance of the need 
to explore US and Western rhetoric in terms of whether or not we are actually listening 
to how ISIL is constructing its organizational identity.  For a long time, the US 




Islamic, and not a threat to be taken seriously (e.g., “the jayvee squad of terrorists” 
commentary).  However, this rhetoric did not last, and several months after ISIL 
declared itself a State, US officials changed their discourse.  The editors of Dabiq 
picked up on this change. Cantlie, as quoted in Dabiq, points out, 
The language change in the West is undeniably there.  Just eight months into 
their campaign and already some of the most senior political figures in the US 
are admitting the Islamic State is unlike any opponent they have faced before 
and that a military solution by itself is impossible.  That speaks volumes by 
itself.  (Issue 8, p. 67)  
 
Cantlie’s remark once again calls our attention to the transactional nature of US 
discourse; or, more appropriately, whether or not the US construction of ISIL’s image 
takes into consideration its own purported identity.  Goodall Jr. et al. (2008) advocate 
that US and Western leaders should “not repeat the same message in the same channels 
with the same spokespersons and expect new or different results” (p.  34).  Similarly, 
the findings of this dissertation lend support to Goodall Jr. et al.’s recommendations.  
The fact that ISIL included an “In the Words of the Enemy” section in each magazine, 
as well as incorporated the sentiments of John Cantlie, are indicative of the influence of 
Western rhetoric on the construction of ISIL’s narrative.  
Limitations and Further Research 
This study, like all studies, is subject to limitations.  The first set of limitations 
comes as a result of analyzing publicly accessible documents.  I did not speak with 
editors of Dabiq themselves, so I do not know what legitimacy strategies they intended 
to create.  Rather, I can only comment on what strategies I was able to recognize in their 
writing.  Although I cannot talk about what they intended to do, I can speak to what is 




of magazines extend farther than the authors’ intentions.  While evaluating intent is not 
often a goal of communication studies, future research on the topic could explore 
various other sources (e.g., letters and other correspondence, and/or communication 
with ISIL leadership) for further inquiry into some of the intent of these magazines.  
Similarly, I did not measure or evaluate message effects.  Although I can 
comment on the appeals used the Dabiq editorial team to position ISIL as legitimate, I 
cannot speak to whether or not they have been successful in those attempts.  I do not 
know how persuasive these appeals have been to various audiences or publics; I can 
only tell readers how I’ve interpreted what was written in the documents.  However, 
given research outside the scope of this study on the relative success of ISIL in terms of 
recruitment, one could argue that these attempts have, in fact, been successful to some 
extent.  Future research into the effects of these magazines on various populations (e.g., 
Muslims living in the US and abroad, religious radicals, etc.) would be both interesting 
and fruitful.  
Third, CCO theory is unfriendly to empirical challenge.  Because the theory is 
stated at such a high level of abstraction, operationalization is difficult.  The abstract 
nature of the theory means that attempts to operationalize it can quickly descend into 
unproductive arguments over definitions.  “Constitution” is about what is, and thus, 
CCO theorists need make decisions about what is.  In other words, CCO is a safe theory 
that is difficult to challenge with empirical observations.  The observations presented 
here fall short of challenging CCO theory, but do extend the theory to include the 
transactional nature of institutional positioning and the role of sociomaterial 




Finally, additional case studies investigating the application of CCO and the 
construction of organizational identity narratives could potentially shed light onto the 
transactional nature of institutional positioning and the extension of CCO theorizing.  
While the use of ISIL as an extreme case serves as an exemplar and enables a thick 
description of the existence of a phenomenon, multiple-case studies may provide a 
stronger basis for theory building (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007).  Identity narratives 
are important in the constitution of any organization, so further research into how these 
narratives may be constructed from transactional communication between organizations 
and their competitors is important.  Although observing such phenomenon in extreme 
cases, such as the present example of ISIL, heightens the researcher’s ability to observe 
such phenomenon, investigating such findings in less extreme contexts is important for 
understanding the transferability and application of findings to like-contexts.   
To conclude, this dissertation explored how organizations attempt to construct 
their ontology and legitimacy through external messaging, known as institutional 
positioning.  The analysis of the Dabiq magazines, an example of constitutive texts, 
revealed that ISIL’s institutional positioning conformed to a communication pattern I 
defined as a transactional organizational identity narrative.  My findings suggest that 
institutional positioning messages can be transactional, constructed through a cooptation 
of messaging: those of the organization itself, as well as counter positioning messages 
purported by an organization’s competition.  Additionally, this research extends current 
CCO theorizing by emphasizing how socio-material configurations may lend increased 
credibility to an organization’s attempts at positioning itself as legitimate.  Future 




organizations’ use of transactional organizational identity narratives can be attacked, 
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Appendix A: ISIL’s Growing Infrastructure and Population (Selected Images) 
Above:  ISIL purported to have minted their own currency, based on the “intrinsic 
values of gold silver and copper” (Issue 5, p. 17) 
 






Appendix B: ISIL’s AlHayat Media Center 
 





Appendix C: ISIL’s Hospitals and Medical Infrastructure 
 
Above: Sample page from chapter in Issue 9, titled: “Healthcare in the Khilafah 
[Caliphate], (p. 25).  
25dabiq
The Current Health Infrastructure
The Islamic State provides the Muslims with 
extensive healthcare by running a host of medical 
facilities including hospitals and clinics in all major 
cities through which it is offering a wide range of 
medical services, from various types of complicated 
surgery to simpler services such as hijāmah. This 
infrastructure is aided by a widespread network 
of pharmacies run by qualified pharmacists and 
managed under the supervision and control of 
the Health Dīwān. Just as the medical staff in the 
hospitals and clinics are made up of qualified, 
trained professionals, the pharmacies are likewise 
only run by qualified and certified pharmacists.
Preparing for the Future
In order to ensure a steady supply of qualified 
medical personnel in the future as well as expanding 
and enhancing the current medical services from 
a professional as well as Islamic point of view, the 
Islamic State recently opened the Medical College 
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Appendix D: ISIL’s Civilian Resources 
 
Above: Images of “restoring electricity,” “cancer treatment center for children” “street 




Appendix E: “The spark has been lit here in Iraq” 
Below: The contents page of the first issue (Issue 1, p. 2).  The quote, “The spark has 
been lit here in Iraq, and its heat will continue to intensify—by Allah’s permission—
until it burns the crusader armies in Dabiq” appears on the contents page of every issue 










Appendix F: Endnotes 
                                                
i A discussion of terminology chosen to refer to ISIL is covered in Chapter 3.  
However, for the purposes for the discussion thus far, I refer to the group as “ISIL” 
when used in the context of American discourse, as that is how the White House refers 
to the organization.  When I am discussing how the group positions and refers to itself, I 
use the term the “Islamic State,” as that is how the organization self-identifies.  
ii Salafist thought is based on the concept of returning to the supposedly “pure” 
form of Islam as practiced by the early successors of Muhammed.  As Stern and Berger 
(2015) explain, “it is an ideology based on the principle that any government that does 
not rule through a strict interpretation of Shariah is an infidel regime that must be 
violently opposed” (p. 15).  According to Moghadam (2008), there are three aspects of 
salafi-jihadist thought: (1) their goal is to “raise awareness among Muslims that their 
religion has been on the wane […] Salafi-jihadists urge Muslims to understand that the 
tide has turned, and that Islam is in a constant state of decline in religious, political, 
military, economic and cultural terms.”  (2) The Salafi-jihadist “identifies the alleged 
source of Islam’s conundrum in the persistent attacks and humiliation of Muslims on 
the part of an anti-Islamic alliance of what it terms ‘crusaders,’ ‘Zionists’ and 
‘apostates.’”  And finally, (3) Salafi-jihadists attempt to instill into Muslims the idea 
that “the only identity that truly matters is that of membership in the umma, the global 
Islamic community that bestows comfort, dignity, security and honor upon the 
downtrodden Muslims.” 
iii The term, “global war on terror” stems from the days after the September 11th 




                                                                                                                                          
announced that the US response to the crime would be to “lead a global war on terror” 
to “bring those responsible to justice” (Bennis, 2015, p. 6). For more information, 
please read Bennis’ (2015) book titled, Understanding ISIS and the New Global War on 
Terror.  
iv As of June 2014, academic and intelligence experts estimate that over 12,000 
foreign fighters have gone to Syria from at least 81 countries; about 2,500 are from 
Western countries (including the European Union, the US, Canada, Australia, and New 
Zealand) (Barrett, 2014).  
v John Cantlie is a British war journalist who was captured in 2012 along with 
American James Foley, who was later executed.  At the time of this writing, Cantlie still 
remains a hostage.  His voice is channeled through numerous exposés throughout the 
Dabiq series, as well as in other ISIL propaganda videos.  It has not yet been made clear 
whether or not these are truly Cantlie’s sentiments, or if he has become a victim of 
Stockholm syndrome, or if he has been fed these lines.  Regardless, “his” words are 
included in Dabiq, and thus, ISIL sees it as significant to quote a Westerner.  
vi Today, many Western leaders refuse to refer to the group as the “Islamic 
State.”  Instead, they have chosen to refer to the group either as “ISIL,” or later, as 
“Daesh,” again, a derogatory label that ISIL abhors. See discussion about organizational 
naming in previous chapter.  
vii As Berger and Stern (2015) have argued, ISIL has exploited new technologies 
and changing social dynamics, to appeal and recruit, albeit successfully, potential 
foreign fighters.  “By mid-2014,” Berger and Stern (2015) note, ISIL’s messaging 




                                                                                                                                          
storytelling and production quality of ISIS video was often incredible, the likes of 
which had been rarely seen in propaganda of any kind, and certainly leaps and bounds 
ahead of its predecessor’s often sophisticated attempts” (p. 72).  Berger and Stern 
further note how ISIL’s messaging has been distinctly different from that of al Qaeda.  
“ISIS [is] offering something novel,” they explain, “dispensing with religious 
argumentation and generalized exhortation and emphasizing two seemingly disparate 
themes—ultraviolence and civil society.  They were unexpectedly potent when 
combined and alternated” (p. 72).  Based on the conclusions discussed in the previous 
chapter, ISIL’s ultraviolence may be perceived as justified when it is positioned 
alongside this appearance of a modern nation-state. 
viii It is important to point out that in my analysis, I do not evaluate whether or 
not the Islamic State has accurately interpreted or depicted passages from the Quran in 
its publication of Dabiq.  Rather, my goal in this section is to explain how the Islamic 
State uses religion as a source of legitimacy; i.e., the ways in which religion is evoked 
in their narratives.  
ix The following is the verse of the sword, the fifth verse of the ninth surah of the 
Quran.  It is often cited by critics of Islam, suggesting that it promotes violence against 
non-Muslims: “But when the forbidden months are past, then fight and slay the pagans 
wherever ye find them, and seize them, beleaguer them, and lie in wait for them in 
every stratagem (of war); but if they repent, and establish regular prayers and practice 
regular charity, then open the way for them: for Allah is Oft-forgiving, Most Merciful.” 
x As has been made evident thus far, ISIL is different from any other Islamist or 




                                                                                                                                          
this is difference is due to their interpretation and inclusion of readings from the Quran.  
In 2012, Halverson, Furlow, and Corman conducted a comprehensive analysis of the 
ways in which Islamist extremists quoted the Quran, citing texts from 1998-2011.  
Although obviously prior to the introduction of the Islamic State to the global stage, 
Halverson and colleagues were able to confirm several common assumptions about 
extremist readings of Qur’an.  The authors concluded that “verses extremists cite from 
the Qur’an do not suggest an aggressive offensive foe seeking domination and conquest 
of unbelievers, as is commonly assumed” (2012, p. 2).  “Instead,” they contend, 
Islamists “deal with themes of victimization, dishonor, and retribution.  This shows 
close integration with the rhetorical vision of Islamist extremists” (2012, p. 2).  One of 
their findings, in particular, however, was surprising: the oft-cited “verse of the sword” 
passage from the Qur’an, which many argue is most consistent with the violent spread 
of Islam, was nearly absent from the set of extremist rhetoric they examined.  In fact, 
their analysis revealed only 3 references to the “verse of the sword,” amongst the set of 
over 2,000 coded extremist texts.  However, just a cursory glance of the Dabiq series 
suggests that ISIL frames their historical and religious foundation quite differently.  
xi “The true religion – embodied by the Jamā’ah of the Muslims (the Khilāfah) 
and their Imām (the Khalīfah) – will be manifest over all false religions, with proof and 
evidence and by the sword and spear, even if the kāfirīn and mushrikīn despise such, 
and despite all the military, economic, intelligence, political, and media opposition to 
the Islamic State from the coalition of the cross.” (Issue 5, p. 3). 
xii The use of the phrase “boots on the ground” has been the subject of much 




                                                                                                                                          
desensitize people from distinguishing between American citizens—people—with 
machine-like infantry in war zones.   
xiii Cantlie still remains a hostage, and his voice is channeled through numerous 
exposés throughout the Dabiq series, as well as in other ISIL propaganda videos.  See 
endnote 1. 
